From an audit of the Authentik login, run against a fake OIDC provider:
- Session fixation: the session id wasn't changed at sign-in, so one planted beforehand
(from another page on the domain) became signed in as the victim. It is regenerated now.
- Requests from another origin: SameSite=Lax doesn't stop another app on the same parent
domain, and a body-less POST (stop a guest, rotate a token) needs no preflight. Every
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE, and GET /auth/logout, is refused when Sec-Fetch-Site (or, for older
browsers, Origin) says it came from elsewhere. The agent endpoint is exempt: it uses a token.
- ID token signature: openid-client checks a token's claims but, as OIDC allows for a token
from the token endpoint, not its signature, so the login rested on HTTPS to Authentik
alone. The signature is now verified against the provider's published keys (jose, now a
declared dependency).
- SESSION_SECRET: production refuses to start without one (the fallback is in the source
code) and warns when it is the .env.example placeholder or short.
- Response headers: frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy; the
framework name is no longer sent.
- A failed sign-in shows a plain page and is audited (session / login_failed, with address
and reason, no tokens); sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address so the
audit log and session store can't be flooded.
- A failed OIDC discovery (provider down at the first sign-in) was remembered until restart;
it is retried now.
Tests run the real app against the fake provider; switching each fix off in turn makes
the matching tests fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>