Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bobbanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 dbbe4180e0 Refuse loopback and metadata targets; check the agent's token before reading its report
Certificate check, WHOIS lookup and port scanner connect to hosts that are typed in
or named by a plain-text reply. utils/networkGuard.ts now refuses loopback, link-local
(cloud metadata) and similar addresses for all three -- and a WHOIS server on a private
network -- and the connection goes to the address that was checked rather than looking
the name up again (no DNS rebinding). LAN hosts remain fine for certificate checks and
scans.

Agent endpoint: the token is checked before the body is read, the route is mounted ahead
of the 100 KB JSON parser so a real agent can send a large report (up to 4 MB), and
overlong text is trimmed instead of costing the host its whole report. An oversized or
malformed body is answered with 413 / 400 instead of a generic 500.

Tests (npm test --workspace server): the guard, the secrets route, the agent endpoint, the
Linux upload run against a fake server (token never on curl's arguments, private temp dir
removed), the systemd unit's directives, and the Windows folder permissions read back by
SID. 19 of the 26 new tests fail against the previous code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 22:05:18 +02:00
bobbanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a641211484 Stop IDs in a request from being turned into other calls to connected systems
The Tailscale device, Proxmox node, Cloudflare zone/record and Azure record/zone IDs
were put into the outgoing request path as typed. An operator could send a crafted ID
("x/../../tailnet/-/keys/k1") and make the app call a different endpoint than the button
meant -- delete an auth key instead of a device, stop every guest on a node, delete a whole
DNS zone -- under the integration's own credential. Gitea and Dockhand encoded their IDs but
still passed "..".

- utils/pathSegment.ts: checks an ID against what a real one looks like, then encodes it
  (encodeURIComponent alone leaves ".." untouched). Used by the Tailscale, Proxmox,
  Cloudflare, Azure, Gitea and Dockhand adapters.
- The routes refuse a bad ID with a 400 before anything is sent, and the DNS routes turn the
  adapters' refusal into a 400. A server's Proxmox node name is validated when saved.
- Azure: a zone ID without "::" is now refused instead of being cut into two bogus pieces.
- Regression tests (npm test --workspace server, Node's built-in runner): the crafted IDs
  are refused for every adapter and route, real IDs still work, viewers are still refused.
  Against the old code 13 of the 22 tests fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 21:02:22 +02:00
bobbanandClaude Sonnet 5 9c2742c30f Add Tailscale integration and harden all routes against crash-on-throw
First of the six planned live integrations (Proxmox, Synology, Semaphore,
Tailscale, Gitea, Dockhand), reusing Sloth Manager's existing Tailscale
adapter logic. Generalizes the "integrations" table already scaffolded in
the foundation pass into a working config-in-UI + encrypted-credentials
flow, following the same pattern as the DNS providers module — an
"Add integration" form only offers types with an implemented adapter
(currently just Tailscale), so the framework is ready for the next five
integrations without further schema/plumbing changes.

- server/src/integrations/tailscale/adapter.ts: ported from Sloth Manager's
  backend/src/adapters/tailscale.js — listDevices/setAuthorized/deleteDevice
  against the Tailscale API, now config-based (tailnet + apiKey) instead of
  reading process.env, and returning a ping() result instead of throwing.
- server/src/routes/integrations.ts: generic integration CRUD (admin) + a
  "test connection" endpoint, plus Tailscale-specific device routes
  (dashboard-and-basic-actions depth per the plan: authorize/deauthorize/
  remove, gated to operator+, audit-logged).
- web: an Integrations page (provider-style manage/browse split, matching
  the DNS page's UX) with a device table, and a live Tailscale widget on
  the Dashboard.

Bug found and fixed while testing: hitting the Tailscale device routes on
a non-Tailscale integration row crashed the ENTIRE server process, not just
that request — the generic adapter registry throws for unimplemented types,
and that throw happened inside an async handler with no surrounding
try/catch, which Express 4 doesn't catch, so it became an unhandled
rejection that (on modern Node) kills the process. Fixed at the source
(check the row's type before ever constructing an adapter) and, since the
same "a helper throws before any local try/catch runs" shape existed
wherever a route calls into loadDnsProviderConfig/loadIntegrationConfig
(both call decryptSecret, which throws if CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
ever wrong/missing after data was already encrypted with a different key),
added a small asyncHandler() wrapper and applied it to every route handler
across every router — a single bad request should never be able to take
the whole app down for every user.

Verified: full build passes. Fresh HTTP-layer tests against a running
server (17 checks) cover not-implemented-type rejection, missing-field
validation, a real network call to api.tailscale.com with a bogus key
(clean ok:false, not a crash), role gating at every tier, credential
non-leakage, disabled-integration blocking, and the wrong_type case that
originally crashed the server — confirmed it now returns 400 cleanly and
the server stays up. Re-ran the existing DNS (13 checks) and Servers/Tasks
suites afterward to confirm the asyncHandler sweep didn't regress anything
— all passing. Authorizing/removing a real device still needs a real
Tailscale API key to verify end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 23:31:19 +02:00