92726568b7cfc4dc0706c5429408432b9543bc34
24
Commits
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171511c6db |
Fold alerts under their host, recurring maintenance, run playbooks from alerts, and an Updates page
- Servers can say what they run on (or it is worked out from the Proxmox node); when the host is down the guests' offline alerts fold under it: held back, not counted, not notified, still recorded. - Recurring maintenance schedules made into ordinary windows a week ahead (maintenance_schedules). - Run a Semaphore template limited to a server from its page or an alert, and watch the run. - Agents report pending updates (apt, dnf, zypper, Windows Update); an Updates page lists them. - Migrations 0024 and 0025. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9965d94036 |
Phone card layout, status symbols, breadcrumbs, integration cards and server trends
Tables stack into labelled cards on a phone. Green, red and amber badges carry a check, cross or triangle as well as their colour. Pages inside a menu group show a breadcrumb, with the thing's name on a server's page. Integrations are cards with an Open button and a live status (working, failing, not checked yet, disabled). Agent-reported servers keep a short history of load, memory and disk use (migration 0019, one sample per ten minutes for 35 days) and show it as a Trends card with a days-until-full forecast for a filling disk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a641211484 |
Stop IDs in a request from being turned into other calls to connected systems
The Tailscale device, Proxmox node, Cloudflare zone/record and Azure record/zone IDs
were put into the outgoing request path as typed. An operator could send a crafted ID
("x/../../tailnet/-/keys/k1") and make the app call a different endpoint than the button
meant -- delete an auth key instead of a device, stop every guest on a node, delete a whole
DNS zone -- under the integration's own credential. Gitea and Dockhand encoded their IDs but
still passed "..".
- utils/pathSegment.ts: checks an ID against what a real one looks like, then encodes it
(encodeURIComponent alone leaves ".." untouched). Used by the Tailscale, Proxmox,
Cloudflare, Azure, Gitea and Dockhand adapters.
- The routes refuse a bad ID with a 400 before anything is sent, and the DNS routes turn the
adapters' refusal into a 400. A server's Proxmox node name is validated when saved.
- Azure: a zone ID without "::" is now refused instead of being cut into two bogus pieces.
- Regression tests (npm test --workspace server, Node's built-in runner): the crafted IDs
are refused for every adapter and route, real IDs still work, viewers are still refused.
Against the old code 13 of the 22 tests fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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86dfa9ae2e |
Unlink servers before deleting a Proxmox integration
servers.proxmox_integration_id was created (migration 0001) without an ON DELETE rule, although schema.ts asks for "set null", so with foreign keys on, deleting an integration that a server was linked to failed with a constraint error. The delete route now clears the four proxmox_* columns on those servers first and records how many it unlinked in the audit entry. schema.ts notes the gap. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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88d9c8e097 |
Record sign-ins, new accounts, automatic log trimming and what settings changed
A check of every write path found gaps in what the audit log captured: - Sign-ins and sign-outs are now recorded with the IP they came from (sign-out is recorded first and can't block signing out). - A new account is recorded when it's created on first sign-in, including when the very first user becomes admin - so the log shows who gained access, not only who changed things. - The automatic log purge, which deletes audit entries, now records itself, attributed to "system". recordAudit() takes an optional actor for this. It only records when something was actually deleted. - Settings updates record what changed (before and after) instead of only which sections were touched. The notification channels (Gotify, ntfy, SMTP, webhook) record field names only: they hold credentials, and webhook URLs and public ntfy topics act as secrets, while the audit log is readable by operators and Settings is admin-only. - Integration edits record renames, enabling/disabling, whether credentials were replaced (never the credentials), and which settings fields changed (names only). The Privacy page and README now say sign-ins store an IP in the audit log. Verified through the real routes against a scratch database: user creation, the logout route, the automatic purge, settings and integration edits - including that a secret token and a webhook URL appear nowhere in the stored entries. The sign-in callback itself needs a real identity provider and wasn't run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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de5c39dddf |
Add an osTicket integration: list open tickets from its database
osTicket's own REST API only supports creating tickets, not listing or reading them, so this reads osTicket's MySQL/MariaDB database directly with a read-only user instead - the only integration in this app that isn't a REST API. Joins the ticket, status, priority, department, staff, team, and user tables, filtered to tickets in the "open" state (status names are customizable per install, but that state flag isn't). Surfaces per-ticket subject, priority, department, assignee, requester, and osTicket's own overdue/awaiting-reply flags, plus a page at /osticket and a Dashboard widget with open/overdue/awaiting-reply counts. Not verified against a live instance: unlike the HTTP-based integrations, there was no way to fake a MySQL server to test against in this environment, so the query is built from osTicket's published schema but has never actually run against a real database. See INTEGRATIONS.md for the read-only grant needed and further caveats. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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df2a5ce42b |
Add a Proxmox Backup Server integration: datastore/snapshot verification status
Proxmox VE already shows whether the last vzdump push to PBS succeeded, but has no visibility into PBS's own backup verification, GC/prune health, or host status. This adds PBS as its own integration (own adapter, page, nav entry, and Dashboard widget) that reads datastore usage and, for every stored snapshot, its verification state directly from PBS. A new daily check (mirroring the existing Proxmox backup-failure check) notifies when a snapshot has failed verification or a datastore couldn't be read, with its own toggle in Settings -> Notifications and its own maintenance-window silencing. Not verified against a live PBS instance — built from PBS's published API docs and a scratch test against a mocked PBS server exercising the adapter's parsing and auth-header format (PBSAPIToken uses a colon separator, unlike PVE's PVEAPIToken which uses =). See INTEGRATIONS.md for details and the "not verified" caveat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bf7f73f6b6 |
Import maintenance windows from Uptime Kuma
New "Import from Uptime Kuma" action on the Maintenance page (operator):
pick an Uptime Kuma integration and a duration, and it starts (or
extends) a maintenance window here for every server whose address
matches a monitor Uptime Kuma currently reports as being in maintenance,
reusing the existing monitor-to-server matching from the Uptime Kuma
integration itself.
Uptime Kuma's metrics endpoint only exposes a monitor's *current* status,
not its scheduled start/end time (there's no API for that), so this
deliberately doesn't try to mirror Uptime Kuma's own schedule -- it starts
a window for the duration you choose, the same bounded/required-end
window this feature has always used. Running it again while Kuma is
still in maintenance extends the same window rather than stacking a
second one; when Kuma later shows nothing in maintenance, already-active
windows are left alone rather than force-ended, since ending them isn't
something only Uptime Kuma's state should decide. Two Kuma monitors that
match the same server are deduped to one window. Monitors with no
matching server are reported back by name so nothing is silently missed,
and monitors that aren't in maintenance are ignored entirely.
The manual "Start maintenance" endpoint's start-or-extend logic (dedupe,
pruning old rows, the response shape) is now a shared
services/maintenance.ts function instead of living only in that route
handler, so the import path can't drift from how a manual window behaves.
Likewise the server-matching helper gained a small toMatchableServers()
so the existing Uptime Kuma monitors route and this new one build the
same match input the same way instead of each parsing server rows on
their own.
No schema change -- imported windows are ordinary maintenance windows;
their Uptime-Kuma origin is only in the reason text ("Imported from
Uptime Kuma (<integration>): <monitor>"), visible in the Active table and
the audit log like any other window.
Verified with 28 backend checks (the refactored manual start/extend
flow as a regression check; roles; unknown/wrong-type/disabled
integration; validation; nothing-in-maintenance; matching including
same-server dedup and unmatched monitors; re-running extends rather than
duplicating; windows left alone once Kuma exits maintenance; upstream
failure; audit entries) and by driving the real Maintenance page against
the real routers in a browser: import, re-import (extends), the
nothing-in-maintenance state, and the viewer view (no edit card, active
windows still visible). Real dev database mtime untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1a2dd19736 |
Add an Uptime Kuma integration: monitor status and which server each one watches
New integration, following the existing pattern: config in-app (URL + API key, credentials encrypted at rest), its own Uptime Kuma page, an Integrations list entry, a Dashboard widget, and diagnostic-log/ integration-down-alert coverage for free via the shared withDiagLogging wrapper. Read-only -- no start/stop equivalent exists for a monitor. Uptime Kuma has no conventional REST API (the dashboard talks to it over Socket.IO); researched before writing any code, since guessing wrong here would have cost real time. The one machine-readable, authenticated endpoint that lists every monitor is its Prometheus exporter at GET /metrics, gated by HTTP Basic auth -- an API key as the password with the username left blank on current installs, or the real dashboard login on installs from before the API-key feature existed. This adapter authenticates the same way and parses that endpoint's text-exposition format itself (metrics: monitor_status, monitor_response_time, monitor_cert_days_remaining, monitor_uptime_ratio; labels: monitor_id, monitor_name, monitor_type, monitor_url, monitor_hostname, monitor_port), verified against the documented metric/label set and the actual upstream source (server/prometheus.js). A malformed line is skipped rather than failing the whole scrape. "What server is being monitored for what": each monitor's target (an IP for TCP checks, or the hostname out of the URL for HTTP/keyword checks) is matched against your servers' own IPs and hostnames -- reusing the same kind of match already used in the consistency report -- and linked to that server's page. Monitors with no single network target (groups, push monitors, DNS/keyword checks with a complex URL) are left unmatched rather than guessed at. Uptime Kuma's tags aren't read, since the Prometheus endpoint doesn't reliably distinguish a tag label from any other label it might add later. The username field is the first genuinely optional integration config field this app has had; IntegrationField gained an `optional` flag (server validation and both the add/edit web forms honor it) rather than special-casing Uptime Kuma. Verified with 48 backend checks (Prometheus text parsing including escaped quotes, decimals, negative numbers, and malformed lines; TCP vs. HTTP target/port extraction; every documented status code; server matching by IP, hostname, and short name, including no-match cases; the route's real HTTP round trip against a fake Uptime Kuma server, wrong credentials, upstream failures, roles, wrong/disabled/missing integration, diagnostic-log entries; the optional-field validation rule) and by driving the real page and the real Dashboard widget in a browser against the real routers, including CSV export and column sorting. Real dev database mtime untouched. Not verified: a real Uptime Kuma instance. Everything here was checked against Uptime Kuma's documented metric format, its actual upstream source, and a fake server built to match both -- not against a live installation. If your instance's /metrics output differs from what's documented (older version, unusual monitor types), the parser should degrade to an empty or partial monitor list rather than error, but that degradation itself hasn't been observed against the real thing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ca61f2a915 |
Surface Proxmox VMs/LXCs with no backup coverage at all
A failing backup run is visible now, but a guest with no backup job covering it in the first place was still a silent gap. Rather than depending on Proxmox's /cluster/backup-info/not-backed-up-guests endpoint (only exists on newer PVE versions), this derives coverage from data already fetched: a guest counts as covered if any enabled job either lists its vmid directly, or backs up "all guests" (scoped to the job's node, if it has one) without excluding it. Adds a warning banner plus a full table to the Proxmox page's Backups card, and extends the existing daily "Proxmox backup failed" notification (relabeled to mention this too) to also list uncovered guests, gated by the same toggle. Verified the coverage logic directly (it's a pure function, so no fake server needed) across 7 cases: no jobs at all, an all-guests job with an exclude list, a specific-vmids job, a node-scoped job that shouldn't cover a guest on a different node, a disabled job providing no real coverage, two jobs whose combined scope covers everything neither would alone, and a realistic mixed scenario — all passed. Confirmed the real dev database's mtime was untouched throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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99db7e1cf0 |
Surface Proxmox backup job status, with a daily failure notification
Proxmox already runs vzdump backups, but nothing in the app said
whether they were actually succeeding — a silent backup failure is
one of the more dangerous blind spots a homelab admin can have. Adds
a "Backups" card to the Proxmox page: configured backup job
schedules (storage target, which guests, enabled/disabled) from
GET /cluster/backup, and recent vzdump task history per node from
GET /nodes/{node}/tasks?typefilter=vzdump, with a banner at the top
if the most recent run didn't succeed.
New "Proxmox backup failed" notification toggle under Settings ->
Notifications, on the same daily schedule as the other checks. The
scheduler checks each node's own most-recent vzdump run independently
(not just the single most recent task overall) so one node's healthy
backup can't mask another node's failing one in a multi-node cluster.
Known limitation, documented in the adapter's own header comment:
Proxmox's task list doesn't reliably expose which specific guest
failed within an "all guests" job — only the task's own log text has
that — so this surfaces job- and task-level status rather than
guessing at per-guest outcomes.
Verified against a fake Proxmox server (real self-signed HTTPS, since
the adapter's node:https usage can't be monkey-patched under ESM)
reproducing the documented /cluster/backup and task-list response
shapes: job parsing (all-guests+exclude vs specific-vmids+disabled)
correct, task OK/failure parsing correct, and the critical multi-node
scenario confirmed — one node's failing latest run flagged, the
other's healthy latest run correctly left alone, with exactly one
notification of the right content. This reproduces Proxmox's
documented API shape rather than a live-verified one; flag if the
real cluster's response differs in some way this didn't anticipate.
Confirmed the real dev database's mtime was untouched throughout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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f2a6253ddf |
Show container image-update status from Dockhand
Dockhand already tracks per-container image updates internally (its UI shows this) via a cached check plus an on-demand recheck -- surface that here instead of only showing running/stopped state. adapter.listContainers() now also reads GET /api/containers/pending- updates per environment (a cached read, no registry hit) and merges each container's hasImageUpdate/newerVersion/checkedAt onto it. updateAvailable is a tri-state: true (update pending), false (checked, up to date), or null (never checked) -- distinguishing "no update" from "we don't know yet" matters since a container can sit unchecked indefinitely until someone triggers a check. New adapter.checkForUpdates() triggers a fresh check across every environment (POST /api/containers/check-updates, one registry lookup per container so this can take a while) and new POST /:id/dockhand/ check-updates route (operator+, matching the existing container action's role gating). Docker page: new "Update" column (badge + tooltip with the newer version), an "updates available" count next to the running/total count, and a "Check for updates" button. Dashboard's Dockhand widget also gained an "Updates" mini-stat, swapped in for the less useful "Not running" figure (already inferable from running/total). Field names (hasImageUpdate, newerVersion, checkedAt, the check- updates response shape) came from Dockhand's own published OpenAPI spec, not guessed -- and verified against a local mock Dockhand server covering all three update states (pending, up to date, never checked) plus the check-updates aggregation across environments, since this sandbox can't reach the user's real Dockhand instance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2d062a9ac4 |
Add host stats to the Proxmox page
The Proxmox page only showed guest (VM/LXC) status; there was no view
of the underlying host(s) themselves -- uptime, CPU/RAM usage, or how
full each storage pool is.
New adapter.listNodeStats() calls GET /nodes/{node}/status and GET
/nodes/{node}/storage for every online node (a node going down
shouldn't blank the whole page, same tolerance as listGuests()) and
returns uptime, CPU usage % + core count + load average, RAM/swap
usage, and per-storage (local, LVM-thin, ZFS, NFS, ...) used/total.
New GET /:id/proxmox/nodes route alongside the existing /guests one.
One card per online node now sits above the VM/LXC table, showing
these stats plus a small storage table with usage bars (reusing the
same green/yellow/red thresholds as the Servers detail page and the
Synology page). Handles a multi-node cluster by rendering one card
per node, and storages with no active/total data (e.g. an offline NFS
mount) render as an "Inactive" badge with blank usage instead of
throwing.
Verified end-to-end against a local mock Proxmox API server over real
TLS (a throwaway self-signed cert, matching how the adapter's
`insecure` option is meant to be used) since this sandbox can't reach
the user's actual Proxmox cluster -- confirmed CPU fraction-to-percent
conversion, load average parsing, byte fields, and that a
null-valued/inactive storage doesn't break parsing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1ff59afb40 |
Notify on expiring Tailscale device keys
The Tailscale page already showed per-device key expiry; extend the existing daily-reminder infrastructure (currently only for Secrets) to push it out through the configured notification channels too, the same way expiring secrets already are. New tailscaleKeyExpiryScheduler.ts mirrors secretExpiryScheduler.ts: runs once at startup (skipped if already run today) and daily thereafter, checking every enabled Tailscale integration's devices for keys expiring within the warning window and calling notify() with the results. Reuses the exact same daily time/timezone setting as the secret-expiry check (one "Daily reminder time" control, two independent on/off toggles) rather than adding a second schedule for users to configure. Centralized the expiring-soon threshold and check (previously only duplicated in the /synology and /tailscale route summaries) into adapter.ts as `KEY_EXPIRY_WARN_DAYS` / `isKeyExpiringSoon()`, and updated the devices route to use it instead of its own inline copy. New `tailscaleKeyCheck` notification-event toggle (default on) in settings, alongside the existing secret-expiry one. Verified end-to-end against a temp SQLite DB + real migrations: a tailscale integration pointed at a mock Tailscale API (one device expiring in 10 days, one with key-expiry disabled) with the webhook channel enabled and pointed at a mock receiver — confirmed the scheduler's startup check queries the DB correctly, decrypts the integration's credential, calls the adapter, filters out the disabled-expiry device, and delivers a webhook payload naming only the expiring device. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c0af546d08 |
Show Tailscale device key expiry
Tailscale node keys expire (180 days by default unless disabled per
device) and an expired key drops the device off the tailnet until
re-authenticated -- worth surfacing before it happens.
adapter.listDevices() now reads `expires` and `keyExpiryDisabled` from
the device list API (`?fields=all`, already being fetched). Go's zero
time ("0001-01-01T00:00:00Z") is what Tailscale returns for "no real
expiry set" and is treated as null rather than shown as a bogus 1AD
date.
New "Key expiry" column on the Tailscale page: "Never" when disabled,
otherwise the date plus a badge (green/yellow/red matching the
Secrets module's ok/expiring/expired convention) using the same
30-day warning window as that module's default. The devices summary
gained `expiringSoon` (<=30 days left, including already-expired),
surfaced in the page header and as a new warning line on the
Dashboard's Tailscale widget, alongside the existing "awaiting
authorization" one.
Verified the parsing (real expiry, disabled/zero-time, already-expired,
far-future) against the compiled adapter with fetch calls to
api.tailscale.com redirected to a local mock server, since this
sandbox can't reach the user's real tailnet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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9f2d27e2c4 |
Add system/hardware info to the Synology page
Beyond volume/disk health, DSM exposes hostname, CPU, RAM, IP addresses, model/serial/firmware, and uptime -- surface those too as a "System" card on the Synology page. New adapter.getSystemInfo() combines three DSM Web API calls (fields confirmed against the actively-maintained mib1185/py-synologydsm-api client, which documents the same SYNO.Core.System / SYNO.Core.System. Utilization / SYNO.DSM.Network endpoints this adapter already uses the discover-then-call pattern for): - SYNO.Core.System "info" -- model, serial, firmware_ver, cpu_cores, cpu_clock_speed, up_time (a raw uptime-command-style string, not a duration -- parsed client-side into "5d 15h 2m" with a fallback to the raw string if DSM ever returns an unexpected format). - SYNO.Core.System.Utilization "get" -- live CPU load % (user+system+ other) and real memory usage, in KB. - SYNO.DSM.Network "list" -- hostname and interface IP addresses (loopback filtered out). New GET /:id/synology/system route alongside the existing /storage one, read-only like the rest of this integration. Verified end-to-end against a local mock DSM server standing in for the real API (login/session flow, all three endpoint shapes, IP filtering, byte math) since this sandbox can't reach the user's LAN; also unit-checked the client-side uptime regex against DSM's three uptime-command formats (with/without days, minutes-only) plus its unmatched-format fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a6ab69316d |
Add a graceful Shutdown action alongside Proxmox's Start/Restart/Stop
Stop maps to Proxmox's hard power-off (/status/stop) — fine for a
crashed guest, but risky for anything with a filesystem that'd rather
flush cleanly first. Proxmox exposes a separate /status/shutdown
endpoint that asks the guest to power itself down (ACPI event for a
VM, SIGTERM-then-wait for a container), so add it as its own action
rather than overloading Stop.
- New shutdownGuest() on the Proxmox adapter, calling /status/shutdown.
- The existing generic action route/loop already dispatches by
${action}Guest, so adding "shutdown" to that list was enough on the
server side — no new route needed.
- New Shutdown button next to Restart/Stop on both the Integrations
page's guest table and a Proxmox-linked server's detail page.
Stop's confirm prompt now explicitly points at Shutdown as the
gentler alternative.
Verified end-to-end against a mock Proxmox server: the shutdown call
hits /status/shutdown (never /status/stop) and is audit-logged as
shutdown_guest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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f5d3c25c89 |
Add editing existing integrations, so an expired secret can be rotated
Manage integrations only supported add/toggle/delete — fixing an expired API token meant deleting and recreating the whole integration. - New GET /api/integrations/:id/config returns only the non-secret config fields (never the decrypted secret) so an edit form can pre-fill URL/tailnet/etc. fields. - New POST /api/integrations/:id/test merges the stored, decrypted config with any freshly-typed overrides and pings the real adapter — lets "Test connection" work during an edit without ever sending the current secret back to the browser. - New IntegrationEditForm component: secret fields render blank with a "leave blank to keep the current value" placeholder; submitting only sends the fields that were actually filled in, so a name/URL edit can't accidentally wipe a secret and a secret rotation can't touch anything else. Reuses the existing PATCH /:id route, which already merged partial config updates correctly. Verified end-to-end against the real dev server: confirmed via direct DB decryption that a non-secret-only edit leaves the stored secret byte-for-byte unchanged, and that a secret-only edit rotates it without touching other config; the test route was confirmed to make a real network call (got a genuine "API token invalid" from Tailscale's API against a fake key). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a83a4b3b11 |
Add Synology integration — completes all six planned live integrations
Sixth and final live integration: volume and disk health across the NAS, read-only per the delivery plan (DSM write actions are riskier and stayed out of scope). Adapter built against the same discover-then-call pattern used by hacf-fr/synologydsm-api (the library behind Home Assistant's Synology integration) since DSM's API paths/versions vary by release and the user's NAS isn't reachable from here to check directly: - GET query.cgi?api=SYNO.API.Info&method=query&query=all once per adapter instance, to learn the real path/version for SYNO.API.Auth and SYNO.Storage.CGI.Storage rather than hardcoding them - SYNO.API.Auth login (account/passwd/format=sid) for a session id, re-used across calls and refreshed on session-related error codes (105/106/119) - SYNO.Storage.CGI.Storage's `load_info` method, which returns disks, volumes, and pools in one call — verified against that library's storage.py field mapping (size.total/used, status, smart_status, temp, exceed_bad_sector_thr, below_remain_life_thr) Uses node:https directly (like Proxmox and the cPanel DNS adapter) for an "allow self-signed certificate" option, since DSM ships one by default. No 2FA support — login surfaces a clear error if the account requires it rather than failing silently. Verified: full build passes. Unreachable from here, so ran an 11-check HTTP test against the live server: confirms all six integration types are now registered, role gating, credential (password) non-leakage, disabled- integration blocking, and the wrong_type crash-safety check — server stays up throughout. Real volume/disk data still needs verification once this app can reach the user's NAS. This completes the integrations phase from the original plan: Tailscale, Gitea, Dockhand, Semaphore, Proxmox, Synology are all built, each following the same config-in-UI + encrypted-credentials pattern. Combined with the foundation, Secrets, IPAM, DNS, and Servers & Tasks modules from earlier, Homelab Manager now covers every feature area from the user's original request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bc72b9e152 |
Add Proxmox integration
Fifth live integration: VM/LXC status across every online node in the
cluster, with start/stop/restart actions — matching the "dashboard + basic
actions" depth from the plan. Adapter built against Proxmox VE's own
published API tree (pve.proxmox.com/pve-docs/api-viewer/apidoc.js — parsed
its ~4MB ExtJS tree structure directly since it's not plain JSON) plus
community-verified docs for the token auth header format, since the user's
instance isn't reachable from here.
server/src/integrations/proxmox/adapter.ts: GET /nodes for online nodes,
then GET /nodes/{node}/{qemu,lxc} per node in parallel (Promise.all) and
flattened, tagging each guest with its node and type; POST
/nodes/{node}/{qemu,lxc}/{vmid}/status/{start,stop,reboot} for actions (all
confirmed token-auth-eligible via the spec's "allowtoken" flag). Uses
node:https directly (like the cPanel DNS adapter) rather than fetch, since
Proxmox commonly runs a self-signed certificate in homelab setups — added
an "Allow self-signed certificate" checkbox field for that. Auth is
`Authorization: PVEAPIToken=<tokenId>=<tokenSecret>`, a different shape
from the other three integrations' single bearer token, so the field
schema splits it into two fields (a non-secret token ID like
"root@pam!homelab-manager" and a secret token value).
Verified: full build passes. Unreachable from here, so ran a 16-check HTTP
test against the live server: role gating, credential non-leakage,
disabled-integration blocking, invalid-guest-type and non-numeric-vmid
rejection, checkbox-only config correctly still failing required-field
validation, and the wrong_type crash-safety check for this fifth adapter
type — server stays up throughout. Real node/VM data and the actual
start/stop/restart actions still need verification once this app can reach
the user's Proxmox cluster.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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abb5335a52 |
Add Semaphore integration
Fourth live integration: Ansible run history per template with a
trigger-a-run action — matching the "dashboard + basic actions" depth from
the plan. Adapter built against Semaphore's official published OpenAPI spec
(github.com/semaphoreui/semaphore/blob/develop/api-docs.yml) plus its Go
source directly for the task-status enum, which the spec itself leaves
untyped (db/Task.go, pkg/task_logger/task_logger.go) — instance wasn't
reachable from here (semaphore.int.toolabs.se doesn't resolve outside the
user's LAN), so verified against the real spec/source rather than guessing.
server/src/integrations/semaphore/adapter.ts: GET /api/projects, then GET
/api/project/{id}/templates?sort=name&order=asc per project — each template
in that response already embeds its last_task, so listing every template's
current status across every project needs only one call per project (no
N+1 per-template lookup, unlike Gitea where the run history isn't embedded
in the repo list). POST /api/project/{id}/tasks {template_id} triggers a
run. Follows the same config-in-UI + encrypted-credential pattern as the
other three integrations.
Verified: full build passes. Same as Dockhand — unreachable, so ran a
14-check HTTP test against the live server (real target URL, bogus token):
role gating, credential non-leakage, disabled-integration blocking, and the
wrong_type crash-safety check for this fourth adapter type, confirming the
server stays up throughout. Real template/run data and the trigger-a-run
action still need verification once this app can reach the user's LAN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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9c45a806c8 |
Add Dockhand integration
Third live integration: container status across every Docker host Dockhand manages, with start/stop/restart actions — matching the "dashboard + basic actions" depth from the plan. Talks to Dockhand's own aggregating REST API (bearer tokens, dh_...) rather than the raw Docker Engine API on each host directly, so one credential covers every host Dockhand is already connected to. Adapter built against Dockhand's real published OpenAPI spec (fetched from https://github.com/strausmann/mcp-dockhand/blob/main/docs/dockhand-openapi.json, 257 documented paths) since the instance itself isn't reachable from here — same "verify against the real shape, don't guess" approach as Gitea, just via the spec instead of a live instance: - GET /api/environments — the Docker hosts Dockhand knows about - GET /api/containers?env=<id>&all=true — containers per host ({id, name, image, state, status}) - POST /api/containers/{id}/{start,stop,restart}?env=<id> server/src/integrations/dockhand/adapter.ts fans the environments call out to one containers call per host (Promise.all) and flattens the result, tagging each container with its environment; one unreachable host returns an empty list for that host rather than failing the whole dashboard view. Follows the same config-in-UI + encrypted-credential pattern as Tailscale and Gitea. Verified: full build passes. Since Dockhand isn't reachable from here, ran a 14-check HTTP test against the live server instead of the real API — role gating, credential non-leakage, disabled-integration blocking, and (critically) re-confirmed the wrong_type crash-safety pattern holds for this third adapter type: hitting the Dockhand routes on a differently-typed integration row returns a clean 400 rather than crashing the process, and the server keeps responding to /health afterward. Real container data and the start/stop/restart actions still need verification once this app runs on the user's LAN where Dockhand is reachable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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79710aa7a5 |
Add Gitea integration; fix .env never being loaded outside Docker
Second live integration: repo list with last CI run status, and re-running
failed jobs on a workflow run — matching the "dashboard + basic actions"
depth from the plan. Adapter built directly against the real Gitea 1.27
swagger spec (fetched from the user's own instance) rather than guessing at
the API shape: GET /user/repos for the repo list, GET
/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs?limit=1 for the latest run per repo (only
for repos with Actions enabled), and POST .../rerun-failed-jobs for retrying
just the failed jobs in a run. Follows the same config-in-UI +
encrypted-credential pattern as Tailscale and DNS providers.
Since Gitea collects its own base URL as a config field (unlike Tailscale,
which always talks to a fixed api.tailscale.com), generalized the
"integrations.baseUrl" bookkeeping into resolveBaseUrl() instead of the
one-fixed-URL-per-type map used previously.
Also fixed a real gap found while setting this up: server/src/env.ts reads
process.env directly, but nothing in the app ever loaded .env into
process.env for plain `node dist/index.js` / `tsx src/index.ts` runs — only
Docker's `env_file` config populated it, by injecting vars before Node even
starts. Every local (non-Docker) run silently had every setting at its
insecure default. Added server/src/loadEnv.ts (dotenv, pointed at the
repo-root .env) as the first import in both server/src/index.ts and
server/src/db/migrate.ts's standalone entrypoint.
Verified against the user's real, reachable services — not mocks:
- Authentik (auth.labsconnect.se): full OIDC login completed by the user
through the real UI; confirmed their account landed as admin (first user).
- Gitea (gitea.labsconnect.se): the compiled adapter run directly against a
real API token correctly listed all 11 real repos; a full HTTP-layer test
against the live server (8 checks) additionally covered a real
test-connection ping, credential non-leakage in list responses, and role
gating (403) on the rerun-failed-jobs action even with a valid token
behind it. None of the real repos have any workflow run history yet, so
the success/failure status badge and the rerun action itself are
implemented per the swagger spec but not yet exercised against a real run
— worth checking once one of those repos has actual CI activity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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9c2742c30f |
Add Tailscale integration and harden all routes against crash-on-throw
First of the six planned live integrations (Proxmox, Synology, Semaphore, Tailscale, Gitea, Dockhand), reusing Sloth Manager's existing Tailscale adapter logic. Generalizes the "integrations" table already scaffolded in the foundation pass into a working config-in-UI + encrypted-credentials flow, following the same pattern as the DNS providers module — an "Add integration" form only offers types with an implemented adapter (currently just Tailscale), so the framework is ready for the next five integrations without further schema/plumbing changes. - server/src/integrations/tailscale/adapter.ts: ported from Sloth Manager's backend/src/adapters/tailscale.js — listDevices/setAuthorized/deleteDevice against the Tailscale API, now config-based (tailnet + apiKey) instead of reading process.env, and returning a ping() result instead of throwing. - server/src/routes/integrations.ts: generic integration CRUD (admin) + a "test connection" endpoint, plus Tailscale-specific device routes (dashboard-and-basic-actions depth per the plan: authorize/deauthorize/ remove, gated to operator+, audit-logged). - web: an Integrations page (provider-style manage/browse split, matching the DNS page's UX) with a device table, and a live Tailscale widget on the Dashboard. Bug found and fixed while testing: hitting the Tailscale device routes on a non-Tailscale integration row crashed the ENTIRE server process, not just that request — the generic adapter registry throws for unimplemented types, and that throw happened inside an async handler with no surrounding try/catch, which Express 4 doesn't catch, so it became an unhandled rejection that (on modern Node) kills the process. Fixed at the source (check the row's type before ever constructing an adapter) and, since the same "a helper throws before any local try/catch runs" shape existed wherever a route calls into loadDnsProviderConfig/loadIntegrationConfig (both call decryptSecret, which throws if CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is ever wrong/missing after data was already encrypted with a different key), added a small asyncHandler() wrapper and applied it to every route handler across every router — a single bad request should never be able to take the whole app down for every user. Verified: full build passes. Fresh HTTP-layer tests against a running server (17 checks) cover not-implemented-type rejection, missing-field validation, a real network call to api.tailscale.com with a bogus key (clean ok:false, not a crash), role gating at every tier, credential non-leakage, disabled-integration blocking, and the wrong_type case that originally crashed the server — confirmed it now returns 400 cleanly and the server stays up. Re-ran the existing DNS (13 checks) and Servers/Tasks suites afterward to confirm the asyncHandler sweep didn't regress anything — all passing. Authorizing/removing a real device still needs a real Tailscale API key to verify end-to-end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |