The systemd unit now bounds the agent's capabilities to the three jobs it does as root --
reading every user's crontab (DAC_OVERRIDE, DAC_READ_SEARCH), running "crontab -l -u"
(SETUID, SETGID) and naming the program behind each socket (SYS_PTRACE) -- and adds
ProtectClock, ProtectHostname, MemoryDenyWriteExecute and DevicePolicy=closed. It does not
use PrivateDevices, which would hide /dev/log (crontab logs each read there), nor anything
that hides other processes or users, since the agent needs both.
The installer's umask 077 (for the token file) also left the unit files readable by root only;
they now get chmod 644, so "systemctl cat" works for any user.
The test renders the unit through the installer's own heredoc, so a stray backtick or $ would
show up, and pins the capability list: tightening it silently drops tasks or process names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Linux: the token went to curl as an argument, readable by any local user in the process
list, and the reply was written to a fixed /tmp file that another user could replace with
a symlink (the agent runs as root). The token now goes to curl on stdin, and the payload
and reply live in a private mktemp directory that is removed afterwards. This also lifts
the limit on a report's size that a command-line argument imposed. The systemd unit now
runs with NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict, PrivateTmp and similar restrictions
(it still sees every process, which is how it names the program behind a port).
Windows: the SYSTEM task's folder was left to inherit ProgramData's permissions. It now
gets explicit ones: SYSTEM and Administrators only.
Installed agents keep their own copy of the script, so each server needs the install
one-liner re-run to pick this up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each server's detail page now has a Ports card. "Scan…" runs a TCP connect
scan of a chosen range from the app and shows what's open, along with the
ranges that were actually confirmed free; clicking a free range starts a
reservation. Any port can carry a service name and a comment, so the page
also answers "what is this port for". A port with a note counts as taken
even when nothing is listening, which is what makes a reservation work.
Operators can scan and edit; everyone can read. Scans and note changes are
audit-logged.
Details that matter for correctness:
- "Free" means the host actively refused the connection AND nobody has
claimed the port. A port that never answers (firewall drop, host down)
is reported as not answering, not as free.
- A scan from elsewhere can't see services bound to localhost only, so the
agent now also reports what is bound on the host (ss -tulnp) and those
ports are treated as taken. They show as "local only". Existing agents
keep working; re-run the install one-liner to add this. The field is
validated leniently so one odd line can never cost an agent its whole
report, tasks included.
- If nothing answers at all during a scan, existing results are left
alone instead of being marked all-closed.
- Scan targets are limited to private addresses (RFC1918, Tailscale
100.64/10, link-local, IPv6 ULA/link-local); loopback and public
addresses are refused. Ranges are capped at 20,000 ports, and only one
scan runs per server at a time.
- Rows exist only while they carry information: an open port, or one with
a note. A closed port with no note disappears on the next scan; one with
a note stays as "reserved".
New table server_ports plus two columns on servers (migration 0009).
Verified with 76 backend checks (scanner open/refused/filtered, address
rules, agent report leniency, note/reserve/clear semantics, free-range
calculation including the localhost-only case, roles, concurrency lock,
no-response guard, audit entries, cascade delete) and by driving the real
component against the real router in a browser. Real dev database mtime
untouched.
Not verified: the agent's ss/awk/jq pipeline on a real host — the awk step
was checked against sample ss output and the script passes bash -n, but
jq isn't available here to run the whole thing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
x86's /proc/cpuinfo has a per-core "model name" line; most 64-bit ARM
kernels don't. Raspberry Pi's kernel instead puts a single friendly
"Model" line at the end of /proc/cpuinfo (e.g. "Raspberry Pi 5 Model B
Rev 1.0"), and /proc/device-tree/model has the same string on any
device-tree-based board as a further fallback if even that's missing.
Try each in turn, matching real Pi 5 /proc/cpuinfo formatting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
report-tasks.sh's new hardware-collection code ran under set -euo
pipefail, so a single failing command inside it aborted the whole
script before the report was ever sent — with no error message,
since nothing in that path had explicit error handling. On real
hardware this hit immediately: `grep -m1 "model name" /proc/cpuinfo`
exits 1 when there's no match, and many ARM boards (e.g. Raspberry Pi)
have no such line at all. Confirmed via journalctl showing the
systemd service failing every 15 minutes with exit 1 and zero output,
and via a minimal repro of the exact bash control flow.
Wrap the hardware/network collection call so any failure inside it is
non-fatal: task reporting (the actual core function) must never be
taken down by a quirk in the best-effort hardware-gathering code, on
this host or any other. Also fixed a related gap found while testing
the fallback path: the server only accepted the system field being
absent, not explicitly null (what the script now sends if collection
fails outright), which would have turned graceful degradation into a
rejected report.
Verified end-to-end against the real dev server: system:null, system
omitted, and a normal populated report all now return 202 and persist
correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Installing the agent against a Homelab Manager instance with a
self-signed cert failed: curl verifies TLS by default on the install
download, the report-tasks.sh fetch inside install.sh, and every
periodic check-in — not just the outer one-liner, so passing -k to only
that first curl wasn't enough. Mirrors the existing Proxmox/Synology
"insecure" toggle pattern already in this app.
- install.sh and report-tasks.sh accept API_INSECURE=true, adding -k to
their own curl calls; install.sh persists it into the agent's env
file so the periodic systemd timer picks it up too.
- The Servers & Tasks page has a new checkbox next to the generated
install/uninstall commands that adds -k and API_INSECURE=true for
you, so the outer one-liner (which install.sh's own logic can't
touch) also skips verification.
Off by default — only for a trusted LAN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Servers & Tasks only tracked scheduled tasks — there was no overview of
the servers themselves and no way to see CPU/RAM/disk/IP info. Add a
clickable server overview (visible to every role, not just admins) that
opens a per-server detail page.
- servers table gains an agent-reported hardware/network snapshot
(IPs, CPU model/cores/load, memory, disks) and an optional link to a
Proxmox VM/LXC (integration + node + guest type + vmid).
- Proxmox adapter gains getGuestDetail(): live cores/memory/disk from
/config, live cpu/mem/uptime from /status/current, and IPs (LXC net
config directly, QEMU via a best-effort guest-agent call that degrades
gracefully when the agent isn't installed).
- New GET /api/servers/:id/detail combines whichever hardware source
applies (live Proxmox vs. last agent report) with a DNS reverse-lookup
against the DNS module's own record cache, so matching hostnames show
up next to each IP. New PATCH /api/servers/:id manages the Proxmox
link.
- agent/linux/report-tasks.sh now also collects and reports IPs,
CPU/memory/disk info on every check-in (load-average-based CPU number,
not instantaneous, to keep the agent a cheap oneshot).
- Extracted the per-server task table into a shared ServerTaskTable
component so the all-servers view and the new detail page render
tasks identically.
Verified server-side end-to-end against the real dev server (agent
report -> detail endpoint -> DNS match) and the Proxmox adapter against
a mock HTTPS server covering LXC/QEMU config parsing and the
guest-agent-unavailable fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports cron/systemd task tracking across Debian/Raspbian servers, including
the Linux push agent (install/report/uninstall scripts, rebranded from
"schedule-task-manager-agent" to "homelab-manager-agent") and the
manual-task-entry flow for things an agent can't see (Docker jobs, backups).
The schema (servers/scheduled_tasks tables) was already in place from the
foundation pass, so this is mostly a straight port of the original's
services/routes.
Deliberate change from the original: server/token management (which mints
agent credentials) is now admin-only rather than open to any logged-in user,
and manual task CRUD is gated to operator+ — consistent with how Secrets,
IPAM, and DNS already split "configure credentials" from "everyday edits"
across roles. All mutations are audit-logged.
- server/src/services/tokens.ts, taskSync.ts: ported near-verbatim (agent
token hashing, the agent-sync-marks-missing-as-stale-not-deleted logic).
- server/src/routes/servers.ts, tasks.ts, agentReport.ts: same contract as
the original (agent auth is a per-server bearer token, independent of the
session-based requireAuth used everywhere else).
- web: a single Servers & Tasks page (filter bar, task table grouped by
server/schedule type, manual task form, and an admin-only server
management panel with token reveal + copyable install/uninstall commands),
replacing the original's two separate pages/apps.
Verified: full build passes; a scripted HTTP test against a running server
covers unauthenticated access, role gating at each tier (admin-only server
mgmt, operator+ task mgmt), agent bearer-token auth (valid/invalid/rotated),
manual-vs-agent task edit protection, stale-marking on re-sync, and cascade
delete — 22/22 checks passing. Real agent installation on an actual
Debian/Raspbian host still needs to be tried on the user's network.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>