Apps → Authentik gets a Groups section for administrators: the groups with
member counts, and an Edit form to rename one and put users in and take them
out. Members are changed one user at a time, never by replacing the list.
Everything is checked first and nothing changes unless all of it may; service
accounts, the token's own account and the last active administrator losing
that are refused. Whether a group makes administrators is shown, not changed.
Groups that decide roles in this app (Settings → Sign-in) are marked and ask
first. Audited with who was put in and taken out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both sources are off until switched on under Settings, Sign-in. The server asks only
gravatar.com (by a hash of the email) and the identity provider's own host, accepts only
small PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF, keeps each picture for a day and serves it from /api/avatars/<id>,
so browsers never contact either. Shown in the user menu and on the Users page, with initials
as the fallback; the Privacy page says when it is on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Runbooks: notes per server/integration, shown next to matching alerts
- Backup coverage page across Proxmox and PBS, with a digest section
- Hardware inventory with warranty, power and running cost
- Authentik group to role mapping with preview and safeguards
- /metrics (bearer token) and signed outgoing event webhooks
- Docs: README, DATABASE, NOTIFICATIONS, ROLES and new API.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From an audit of the Authentik login, run against a fake OIDC provider:
- Session fixation: the session id wasn't changed at sign-in, so one planted beforehand
(from another page on the domain) became signed in as the victim. It is regenerated now.
- Requests from another origin: SameSite=Lax doesn't stop another app on the same parent
domain, and a body-less POST (stop a guest, rotate a token) needs no preflight. Every
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE, and GET /auth/logout, is refused when Sec-Fetch-Site (or, for older
browsers, Origin) says it came from elsewhere. The agent endpoint is exempt: it uses a token.
- ID token signature: openid-client checks a token's claims but, as OIDC allows for a token
from the token endpoint, not its signature, so the login rested on HTTPS to Authentik
alone. The signature is now verified against the provider's published keys (jose, now a
declared dependency).
- SESSION_SECRET: production refuses to start without one (the fallback is in the source
code) and warns when it is the .env.example placeholder or short.
- Response headers: frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy; the
framework name is no longer sent.
- A failed sign-in shows a plain page and is audited (session / login_failed, with address
and reason, no tokens); sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address so the
audit log and session store can't be flooded.
- A failed OIDC discovery (provider down at the first sign-in) was remembered until restart;
it is retried now.
Tests run the real app against the fake provider; switching each fix off in turn makes
the matching tests fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A check of every write path found gaps in what the audit log captured:
- Sign-ins and sign-outs are now recorded with the IP they came from
(sign-out is recorded first and can't block signing out).
- A new account is recorded when it's created on first sign-in, including
when the very first user becomes admin - so the log shows who gained
access, not only who changed things.
- The automatic log purge, which deletes audit entries, now records
itself, attributed to "system". recordAudit() takes an optional actor
for this. It only records when something was actually deleted.
- Settings updates record what changed (before and after) instead of only
which sections were touched. The notification channels (Gotify, ntfy,
SMTP, webhook) record field names only: they hold credentials, and
webhook URLs and public ntfy topics act as secrets, while the audit log
is readable by operators and Settings is admin-only.
- Integration edits record renames, enabling/disabling, whether
credentials were replaced (never the credentials), and which settings
fields changed (names only).
The Privacy page and README now say sign-ins store an IP in the audit log.
Verified through the real routes against a scratch database: user
creation, the logout route, the automatic purge, settings and
integration edits - including that a secret token and a webhook URL
appear nowhere in the stored entries. The sign-in callback itself needs
a real identity provider and wasn't run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
No visibility existed into who was currently signed in or a way to
force a device out. Sessions already live as files via
session-file-store, so this reads that store directly rather than
adding a new DB table: new Settings-adjacent "Sessions" page
(admin-only, alongside Users) lists every live session with the
user's name/email/resolved role, IP, a friendly "Browser on OS"
summary parsed from the user-agent, last-active time, and expiry, with
a Revoke button per row (extra confirmation if you revoke your own
current session, since that signs you out immediately).
IP and user-agent are now captured into the session at login
(auth/router.ts) since express-session doesn't track them itself.
session-file-store's own Store type doesn't declare its list()
method, so sessionStore.ts adds a narrow local interface for it rather
than losing type safety on the rest of the store.
Verified against a real session directory seeded through the actual
session-file-store APIs (not hand-written JSON): confirmed correct
field resolution including a session whose user row was later deleted
(role resolves to null instead of crashing), correctly excluded a
mid-OIDC-login session with no completed user yet, correctly excluded
an already-expired session, and confirmed revoke actually deletes the
right session file and only that one. Confirmed the real dev
database's mtime was untouched throughout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Monorepo (Express+TS+Drizzle/libSQL server, React+Vite+Tabler web) matching
the stack used by ScheduleTaskManager and Sloth Manager. Includes Authentik
OIDC login with local admin/operator/viewer roles (first user becomes admin),
a generalized audit log, encrypted-at-rest storage for future integration API
tokens, the DB schema for all planned modules, and the Tabler-styled app
shell/nav. Also ports the Secrets (expiry tracker) and IP Addresses (IPAM)
modules from Sloth Manager onto the new stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>