Both send to one fixed address each (api.telegram.org, api.pushover.net), take part in routing rules and the channel count, have a Send test that shows the service's own refusal, and keep their tokens and keys encrypted and out of errors and the audit log. A Telegram message carries one button, and a Pushover message one link, to the page where an alert can be acknowledged, silenced or snoozed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Old addresses (/alert-rules, /service-levels, /settings/notifications) lead to the right tab.
Notifications and Alert tickets stay administrator-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Notifications gains Alert tickets, Display gains Badge colours, and a new Data tab holds Backup,
Logs and Cache. Domains is the 'Domain names' tab of DNS. Old addresses redirect; the docs, the
Privacy page and the links from alerts and the agenda name the new places.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dependencies become a view of the Map (graph with the editor under it), Sessions the
'Signed in now' tab of Users, the Audit Log the 'Raw audit log' tab of the Change log, and the
Diagnostic Log the 'Call log' tab of Integrations (admins). Backup coverage and Proxmox Backup
move to a new Backups group. Old addresses redirect; a shared ViewTabs component does the tabs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both sources are off until switched on under Settings, Sign-in. The server asks only
gravatar.com (by a hash of the email) and the identity provider's own host, accepts only
small PNG/JPEG/WebP/GIF, keeps each picture for a day and serves it from /api/avatars/<id>,
so browsers never contact either. Shown in the user menu and on the Users page, with initials
as the fallback; the Privacy page says when it is on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Dependencies: servers and integrations can depend on each other; alerts are folded under the root cause, and a failure explained by something down isn't announced
- Web push: hand-written VAPID and RFC 8291 encryption, per-device subscriptions, a fifth notification channel, service worker handlers
- Inventory: maker/model/serial from the agents fill blank fields, "Refresh from agent", QR label printing and ?asset= deep links
- Windows agent (v4) reports failed services, disk health, Storage Spaces pools and hardware identity; Linux agent (v5) reports hardware identity
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Dashboard card on what changed since the user pressed Got it (users.last_looked_at,
migration 0021), folding each problem and its recovery into one line.
- Uptime ribbons on servers and integrations, built from the audit log; integrations'
failing/working-again moments are now recorded.
- Timeline of running and scheduled maintenance windows on the Maintenance page.
- TimeAgo component: relative times with the exact time in the chosen format on hover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Feedback: toasts confirm common actions, and a page's error or success message
that appears out of view is also shown as a toast. Icons: the tab, app and
home-screen icons are the house from the logo; a dev instance gets a coloured dot
on its tab icon. Tables: Secrets, Admin Links, IP Addresses and Alerts share one
toolbar (search, filters, row count, actions, Export CSV); twelve more tables get
a multi-word search box; long tables keep their column headings in view on wide
screens. Density: Compact / Normal / Roomy in the user menu, remembered per
browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Settings -> Alert tickets: switch it on, choose the osTicket integration (only ones with a ticket API
set up can be chosen), who the tickets come from, help topic and priority, which severities and kinds,
how long a problem must last, when many become one summary ticket, how long a return counts as the
same problem, and what to do about problems already there. Buttons to send a test ticket and to check
now, and a line saying what the last check did. Server messages (a missing integration, a refused key)
are shown as they are.
The Alerts page shows "Ticket #123" on an alert that has one, linking to it in osTicket, and a Ticket
column in the CSV export.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Certificate check, WHOIS lookup and port scanner connect to hosts that are typed in
or named by a plain-text reply. utils/networkGuard.ts now refuses loopback, link-local
(cloud metadata) and similar addresses for all three -- and a WHOIS server on a private
network -- and the connection goes to the address that was checked rather than looking
the name up again (no DNS rebinding). LAN hosts remain fine for certificate checks and
scans.
Agent endpoint: the token is checked before the body is read, the route is mounted ahead
of the 100 KB JSON parser so a real agent can send a large report (up to 4 MB), and
overlong text is trimmed instead of costing the host its whole report. An oversized or
malformed body is answered with 413 / 400 instead of a generic 500.
Tests (npm test --workspace server): the guard, the secrets route, the agent endpoint, the
Linux upload run against a fake server (token never on curl's arguments, private temp dir
removed), the systemd unit's directives, and the Windows folder permissions read back by
SID. 19 of the 26 new tests fail against the previous code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Gotify and ntfy tokens, the SMTP password and the webhook secret were stored
as plain text in the settings table. They are now encrypted with the same key as
integration credentials (CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY), marked with an "enc:v1:"
prefix. Settings are decrypted when read and encrypted when written, so nothing
else changes; values saved before this are converted at startup.
An edit that doesn't touch a credential keeps its stored ciphertext, so a wrong or
missing key (which reads as empty) can't be made permanent by an unrelated edit.
Without a key new credentials fall back to plain storage, and the startup warning,
.env.example and the Privacy page say so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Name lists now live in settings instead of the web bundle. Admins edit them under
Settings -> Names (add/remove names, create/rename/delete lists, reset a built-in
list). Names are folded to hostname-safe form (a-z, 0-9, hyphen) and validated on
the server; saves are audited.
Adds Swedish boy names, Pixar, Norse mythology and Astrid Lindgren lists, and
lengthens the Swedish girl and Disney lists. "Mixed" is now every list with each
name counted once.
Admins can preview and import the most common Swedish names from Skatteverket's
open "Namn pa nyfodda" data (girls or boys, latest 1-5 full years); nothing is
stored until the editor is saved. The old comment that credited SCB statistics is
gone: SCB stopped publishing name statistics after 2023.
Privacy page, README and ROLES updated for the new outbound call and page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A check of every write path found gaps in what the audit log captured:
- Sign-ins and sign-outs are now recorded with the IP they came from
(sign-out is recorded first and can't block signing out).
- A new account is recorded when it's created on first sign-in, including
when the very first user becomes admin - so the log shows who gained
access, not only who changed things.
- The automatic log purge, which deletes audit entries, now records
itself, attributed to "system". recordAudit() takes an optional actor
for this. It only records when something was actually deleted.
- Settings updates record what changed (before and after) instead of only
which sections were touched. The notification channels (Gotify, ntfy,
SMTP, webhook) record field names only: they hold credentials, and
webhook URLs and public ntfy topics act as secrets, while the audit log
is readable by operators and Settings is admin-only.
- Integration edits record renames, enabling/disabling, whether
credentials were replaced (never the credentials), and which settings
fields changed (names only).
The Privacy page and README now say sign-ins store an IP in the audit log.
Verified through the real routes against a scratch database: user
creation, the logout route, the automatic purge, settings and
integration edits - including that a secret token and a webhook URL
appear nowhere in the stored entries. The sign-in callback itself needs
a real identity provider and wasn't run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A page every signed-in user can open. It states what the installation
stores (accounts, sign-in sessions, audit and diagnostic logs, server
reports, the secrets tracker, credentials, inventory) and for how long,
where data goes (Authentik, integrations, DNS providers, notification
channels, domain registries, certificate checks, port scans), what lives
in the browser, who can see what, and how to limit or remove data.
Written from what the code actually does, including the uncomfortable
parts: the session file keeps the user's Authentik ID token plus the IP
and browser from sign-in; audit entries keep a name snapshot after an
account is gone; the app has no delete-account function; cron commands
in agent reports can contain sensitive text. It also says what isn't
there -- no telemetry, update checks, third-party scripts, fonts or
tracking cookies -- which was checked against the web build and the
server's outbound calls before being asserted.
Live values rather than boilerplate: log retention (and whether it's on),
which integration and DNS provider types are enabled, how many domains,
certificate checks and reporting servers, and which notification channels
are on. Channel addresses are shown to admins only, and only the host --
never a path, query string or token -- since a webhook URL can embed a key.
Each user also sees their own account and active sign-ins, and can
"Download my data": their account, their sign-ins and the audit-log entries
made under their account, as JSON. Only their own -- never another user's --
and without session ids or ID tokens. The export is itself audit-logged, so
a later export shows it.
Verified with 23 backend checks (own-vs-others isolation for audit counts,
sessions and export; no session ids, ID tokens or channel secrets in any
response; admin-vs-viewer channel visibility; live counts; audit of the
export; auth) using an isolated session directory so real sessions are
never read, and in a browser against the real router, including the
download. Real dev database and session files untouched.
Not legal text: this is a transparency page for the people using the app,
not a privacy policy or a GDPR compliance document.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>