Uptime Kuma shares its maintenance windows only over its dashboard Socket.IO
connection, which takes a login. With a login username and password on the
integration, "Sync schedule" on the Maintenance page (and a 15-minute
background pass when switched on) reads each window's running and next time
slot and the monitors it covers, and makes a maintenance window on every
server those monitors match. Windows that haven't started are listed as
Scheduled and silence nothing until they begin; ones ended or cancelled by
hand stay ended, and ones removed in Kuma are removed here.
maintenance_windows gets a source column (migration 0017) and active windows
now require their start to have passed. Adds socket.io-client, and tests
against a stand-in Uptime Kuma speaking the same protocol.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The import route returned its errors as {error} while the page reads
{message}, so a wrong API key or an unreachable Uptime Kuma showed as raw
JSON. Every failure now carries a readable message. An empty result now
says how many monitors were read and that only maintenance active right
now can be imported, and a disabled integration is explained instead of
leaving a greyed-out button. Adds route tests against a stand-in Uptime Kuma.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The expiry date is now optional: no date means the secret never expires,
gets the status "no expiry" and never raises an alert or reminder. The
Secrets form has a "Never expires" checkbox. Certificates checked against a
host keep their live expiry and can't be set to never expire. Migration
0016 makes secrets.expiry_date nullable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each integration page now has a button next to its title that opens the
product's own admin panel in a new tab, using the address entered on the
integration. Tailscale links to its admin console. Only http(s) addresses
become links.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
What to back up (the database file, and CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY kept apart from it), two ways to take a
backup (stop and copy, or a VACUUM INTO snapshot while the app runs, using only Node and the app's own database
library since the container has no sqlite3), checking a backup, taking one before every upgrade, keeping
backups safe, a nightly script with rotation, step-by-step restore (an older backup restores into a newer
version, not the reverse; what a wrong key looks like), and how the encrypted export in Settings -> Backup
differs from a real backup.
The commands were run against a scratch database made with the real migrations: a snapshot taken while the
app was writing, an older version's database upgrading itself when the current version started, the wrong-key
error, and the rotation line. They were not run through docker compose exec in the real container.
DATABASE.md pointed at SQLite's .backup command, which the container doesn't have; it now points here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ticket API was first verified with a test ticket (key and IP restriction, creation, message text arriving
as written), then with a ticket opened for a real alert. A summary ticket (many problems at once) has not been
seen on a real osTicket yet. Also records the two mistakes the real osTicket showed that the stand-in server
had hidden: percent-encoded text, then base64.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Percent-encoding put "%20" in every space of a real ticket, and the base64 that replaced it arrived
as base64. osTicket (Format::parseRfc2397, via ApiJsonDataParser::fixup) takes the message's type from the
"data:" prefix and uses everything after the first comma exactly as it is, decoding nothing; its own
documented example is plain text after the comma. The text is now sent raw (JSON takes care of quotes and
line breaks; later commas are fine, since only the first one splits).
The test now mimics that parsing -- split at the first comma, decode nothing -- and requires the text to
arrive exactly as written; it fails if percent-encoding or base64 comes back. The stand-in server in the
earlier test had decoded the encoding, which is why neither mistake was caught. INTEGRATIONS.md says what
happened and that it hasn't been re-checked against a real osTicket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A test ticket sent to a real osTicket arrived with every space shown as %20. osTicket takes the
message's type from an RFC 2397 data URL and strips the "data:" part, but leaves percent-encoded text
as it is. The message is now sent as base64 (data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,...), which osTicket
decodes (it is how it takes attachments), and which works whether or not a given osTicket version
decodes percent-encoding.
The stand-in osTicket in the test had decoded the percent-encoding, which is why this wasn't caught:
the test now requires base64 and fails if any percent-encoding is in the message. INTEGRATIONS.md says
the ticket API is only partly verified against a real osTicket, and what that first test showed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README, INTEGRATIONS (the osTicket ticket API: fields, making the key, what is sent, what it can't do,
what wasn't verified), NOTIFICATIONS (the rules, in one table), ROLES, DATABASE (the new table, the
settings key, the internal flags, what deleting an integration does), and the Privacy page (the one new
thing that leaves the app: an alert's text, to your osTicket).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Settings -> Alert tickets: switch it on, choose the osTicket integration (only ones with a ticket API
set up can be chosen), who the tickets come from, help topic and priority, which severities and kinds,
how long a problem must last, when many become one summary ticket, how long a return counts as the
same problem, and what to do about problems already there. Buttons to send a test ticket and to check
now, and a line saying what the last check did. Server messages (a missing integration, a refused key)
are shown as they are.
The Alerts page shows "Ticket #123" on an alert that has one, linking to it in osTicket, and a Ticket
column in the CSV export.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With Settings -> Alert tickets switched on (off by default), every 15 minutes the problems on the
Alerts page are looked at and one that is new and has lasted gets one ticket in osTicket, through
its API (POST api/tickets.json, key in X-API-Key). One problem opens one ticket however many checks
see it; the app remembers what it has seen in a new alert_tickets table (migration 0015).
- Which: critical and warning by default, every kind; severities and kinds are settings.
- A problem must be seen in 2 checks in a row first (1-4, a setting), so a blip that fixes itself,
like one failed call to an integration, never opens a ticket.
- One ticket per occurrence; a problem that clears and returns within 60 minutes is the same one.
- More than 5 new problems in one check become a single summary ticket.
- Never for alerts under a maintenance window, nor about osTicket itself or its overdue tickets.
- Problems already there when it is switched on are left alone by default (the first check records
them as a baseline); can be set to ticket them too.
- If osTicket can't be reached nothing is recorded, so the next check retries; if a source couldn't
be read, a problem isn't treated as gone. Every ticket is audited.
The ticket API address, key (stored encrypted) and self-signed option are optional fields on the
osTicket integration, which otherwise still only reads the database. The settings page can send a
test ticket and run a check now; the Alerts page shows each alert's ticket number, linked to osTicket.
osTicket's API can't close or update a ticket, so a ticket opened here is the end of this app's part
in it. Tested against a stand-in osTicket, not a real one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The records endpoint returned raw cache rows, whose `id` is this app's own row number
(12, 13, ...). The DNS page sends `r.id` back when a record is edited or deleted, so the
provider was handed a row number instead of its record id. That only worked straight after
a manual Sync, whose response carries the provider's ids; after any save or delete the page
reloads from the cache and the problem came back. The ID check added for connected systems
now refuses such an id with "That isn't a valid record ID".
The list now returns records shaped like a sync's: `id` is the provider's record id. Editing
and deleting work from the cached list for every DNS provider.
The test checks the list hands out the provider's id, and that deleting with it reaches
Cloudflare at the right address; with the old shape it fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From an audit of the Authentik login, run against a fake OIDC provider:
- Session fixation: the session id wasn't changed at sign-in, so one planted beforehand
(from another page on the domain) became signed in as the victim. It is regenerated now.
- Requests from another origin: SameSite=Lax doesn't stop another app on the same parent
domain, and a body-less POST (stop a guest, rotate a token) needs no preflight. Every
POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE, and GET /auth/logout, is refused when Sec-Fetch-Site (or, for older
browsers, Origin) says it came from elsewhere. The agent endpoint is exempt: it uses a token.
- ID token signature: openid-client checks a token's claims but, as OIDC allows for a token
from the token endpoint, not its signature, so the login rested on HTTPS to Authentik
alone. The signature is now verified against the provider's published keys (jose, now a
declared dependency).
- SESSION_SECRET: production refuses to start without one (the fallback is in the source
code) and warns when it is the .env.example placeholder or short.
- Response headers: frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy; the
framework name is no longer sent.
- A failed sign-in shows a plain page and is audited (session / login_failed, with address
and reason, no tokens); sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address so the
audit log and session store can't be flooded.
- A failed OIDC discovery (provider down at the first sign-in) was remembered until restart;
it is retried now.
Tests run the real app against the fake provider; switching each fix off in turn makes
the matching tests fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
index.ts builds the app, runs migrations and starts the schedulers in one go, so nothing
could exercise the app without also starting all that. The app itself (middleware order,
session store, routers) is now createApp() in app.ts; index.ts keeps the startup work and
calls it. No change in behaviour. The test that checks the agent endpoint is mounted ahead
of the 100 KB JSON parser reads app.ts instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The systemd unit now bounds the agent's capabilities to the three jobs it does as root --
reading every user's crontab (DAC_OVERRIDE, DAC_READ_SEARCH), running "crontab -l -u"
(SETUID, SETGID) and naming the program behind each socket (SYS_PTRACE) -- and adds
ProtectClock, ProtectHostname, MemoryDenyWriteExecute and DevicePolicy=closed. It does not
use PrivateDevices, which would hide /dev/log (crontab logs each read there), nor anything
that hides other processes or users, since the agent needs both.
The installer's umask 077 (for the token file) also left the unit files readable by root only;
they now get chmod 644, so "systemctl cat" works for any user.
The test renders the unit through the installer's own heredoc, so a stray backtick or $ would
show up, and pins the capability list: tightening it silently drops tasks or process names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Certificate check, WHOIS lookup and port scanner connect to hosts that are typed in
or named by a plain-text reply. utils/networkGuard.ts now refuses loopback, link-local
(cloud metadata) and similar addresses for all three -- and a WHOIS server on a private
network -- and the connection goes to the address that was checked rather than looking
the name up again (no DNS rebinding). LAN hosts remain fine for certificate checks and
scans.
Agent endpoint: the token is checked before the body is read, the route is mounted ahead
of the 100 KB JSON parser so a real agent can send a large report (up to 4 MB), and
overlong text is trimmed instead of costing the host its whole report. An oversized or
malformed body is answered with 413 / 400 instead of a generic 500.
Tests (npm test --workspace server): the guard, the secrets route, the agent endpoint, the
Linux upload run against a fake server (token never on curl's arguments, private temp dir
removed), the systemd unit's directives, and the Windows folder permissions read back by
SID. 19 of the 26 new tests fail against the previous code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Linux: the token went to curl as an argument, readable by any local user in the process
list, and the reply was written to a fixed /tmp file that another user could replace with
a symlink (the agent runs as root). The token now goes to curl on stdin, and the payload
and reply live in a private mktemp directory that is removed afterwards. This also lifts
the limit on a report's size that a command-line argument imposed. The systemd unit now
runs with NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict, PrivateTmp and similar restrictions
(it still sees every process, which is how it names the program behind a port).
Windows: the SYSTEM task's folder was left to inherit ProgramData's permissions. It now
gets explicit ones: SYSTEM and Administrators only.
Installed agents keep their own copy of the script, so each server needs the install
one-liner re-run to pick this up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A container image pinned by digest (name@sha256:...) has no spaces to wrap at, so a
single one made the whole table wider than the page and pushed the Actions column
off the edge: Restart still fit, Stop did not, and the sideways scrollbar sat at the
bottom of a long list. The container, host and image cells can now wrap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Tailscale device, Proxmox node, Cloudflare zone/record and Azure record/zone IDs
were put into the outgoing request path as typed. An operator could send a crafted ID
("x/../../tailnet/-/keys/k1") and make the app call a different endpoint than the button
meant -- delete an auth key instead of a device, stop every guest on a node, delete a whole
DNS zone -- under the integration's own credential. Gitea and Dockhand encoded their IDs but
still passed "..".
- utils/pathSegment.ts: checks an ID against what a real one looks like, then encodes it
(encodeURIComponent alone leaves ".." untouched). Used by the Tailscale, Proxmox,
Cloudflare, Azure, Gitea and Dockhand adapters.
- The routes refuse a bad ID with a 400 before anything is sent, and the DNS routes turn the
adapters' refusal into a 400. A server's Proxmox node name is validated when saved.
- Azure: a zone ID without "::" is now refused instead of being cut into two bogus pieces.
- Regression tests (npm test --workspace server, Node's built-in runner): the crafted IDs
are refused for every adapter and route, real IDs still work, viewers are still refused.
Against the old code 13 of the 22 tests fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every table, column, foreign key and unique index (checked against a database built
from the migrations), the JSON stored in text columns, the settings keys, delete
behaviour, retention and backups, and how to change the schema. Linked from the
README alongside the other documents.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Gotify and ntfy tokens, the SMTP password and the webhook secret were stored
as plain text in the settings table. They are now encrypted with the same key as
integration credentials (CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY), marked with an "enc:v1:"
prefix. Settings are decrypted when read and encrypted when written, so nothing
else changes; values saved before this are converted at startup.
An edit that doesn't touch a credential keeps its stored ciphertext, so a wrong or
missing key (which reads as empty) can't be made permanent by an unrelated edit.
Without a key new credentials fall back to plain storage, and the startup warning,
.env.example and the Privacy page say so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
servers.proxmox_integration_id was created (migration 0001) without an ON DELETE
rule, although schema.ts asks for "set null", so with foreign keys on, deleting
an integration that a server was linked to failed with a constraint error.
The delete route now clears the four proxmox_* columns on those servers first
and records how many it unlinked in the audit entry. schema.ts notes the gap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Name lists now live in settings instead of the web bundle. Admins edit them under
Settings -> Names (add/remove names, create/rename/delete lists, reset a built-in
list). Names are folded to hostname-safe form (a-z, 0-9, hyphen) and validated on
the server; saves are audited.
Adds Swedish boy names, Pixar, Norse mythology and Astrid Lindgren lists, and
lengthens the Swedish girl and Disney lists. "Mixed" is now every list with each
name counted once.
Admins can preview and import the most common Swedish names from Skatteverket's
open "Namn pa nyfodda" data (girls or boys, latest 1-5 full years); nothing is
stored until the editor is saved. The old comment that credited SCB statistics is
gone: SCB stopped publishing name statistics after 2023.
Privacy page, README and ROLES updated for the new outbound call and page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One list of the current problems across servers and integrations, instead
of waiting for a notification or visiting each page: servers that stopped
reporting, full or nearly full disks and volumes (critical from 95%),
Synology volume/disk problems, failed or uncovered Proxmox backups,
failed Proxmox Backup Server verifications, container image updates,
expired or expiring secrets/domains/Tailscale keys, failed Semaphore and
Gitea runs, Uptime Kuma monitors that are down, overdue osTicket tickets,
and integrations whose calls keep failing. Visible to every role, with
severity and kind filters, search, sorting, CSV export and "Check now".
It runs the same checks that send the notifications rather than a second
copy of them: the detection in the health, automation, Proxmox backup,
PBS, Docker update and Tailscale key checks is pulled out into shared
collectors that both the schedulers and the page call, so the two can't
disagree about what counts as a problem. Notification behaviour is
unchanged, including the scheduled backup checks skipping integrations
under a maintenance window. Unlike the notifications the page ignores the
on/off toggles, and keeps problems under a maintenance window, marked
silenced and counted apart.
It reads live, so a result is reused for a minute (and Refresh can't
re-run everything more than once every ten seconds), and every source has
a 20 s limit so one hung integration can't hang the page. Anything it
couldn't read is called out at the top instead of looking like all clear,
and server checks pause for the same 20 minutes after a restart as the
notifications do, with a note saying so.
Also gives the newer integrations (PBS, osTicket, Uptime Kuma, phpIPAM)
proper names in "integration down" notifications instead of their ids.
Verified through the real routes against a scratch database with fake
backends (offline and full-disk servers, secrets and domains, a silenced
server, a fake PBS with failed verification, a hanging integration, a
refused one, a failing-calls streak, caching, the restart grace period,
auth), and by rendering the real page against that data in a browser:
filters, search, silenced toggle, sorting, Check now, dark mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All 31 native dialogs (27 confirms, 4 text prompts: ignore reason, two
"exclude a range" boxes, tag rename) now use the app's own Tabler-styled
modals, which follow the light/dark theme.
A small promise-based API (utils/dialogs.ts: confirmDialog, promptDialog)
and a single DialogHost mounted once in App mean call sites just await
it in place of the browser call - no hooks or per-page modal state. Every
call site was already in an async function, so each is a one-line swap.
Each dialog now has a title and a main button that names the action
("Delete", "Stop now", "Run now") instead of "OK", with destructive ones
in red. Escape cancels, Enter confirms, Tab stays inside the dialog, the
page behind stops scrolling, and focus returns to the button that was
clicked. Destructive dialogs start with focus on Cancel so a stray Enter
can't delete anything. Text prompts pre-select their default and disable
the main button until something is typed where it's required, and still
tell cancelling (null) apart from confirming an empty box (""). Clicking
the backdrop cancels, but releasing a text selection over it doesn't.
Dialogs asked for together appear one after another.
Verified in a browser on a test page using the real component and the
app's real stylesheet: Escape, Enter, Tab trapping, focus handling,
required and optional prompts, backdrop clicks, queuing, scroll lock and
dark mode. The 31 call sites themselves were checked by search and
typecheck rather than clicked through in the logged-in app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A check of every write path found gaps in what the audit log captured:
- Sign-ins and sign-outs are now recorded with the IP they came from
(sign-out is recorded first and can't block signing out).
- A new account is recorded when it's created on first sign-in, including
when the very first user becomes admin - so the log shows who gained
access, not only who changed things.
- The automatic log purge, which deletes audit entries, now records
itself, attributed to "system". recordAudit() takes an optional actor
for this. It only records when something was actually deleted.
- Settings updates record what changed (before and after) instead of only
which sections were touched. The notification channels (Gotify, ntfy,
SMTP, webhook) record field names only: they hold credentials, and
webhook URLs and public ntfy topics act as secrets, while the audit log
is readable by operators and Settings is admin-only.
- Integration edits record renames, enabling/disabling, whether
credentials were replaced (never the credentials), and which settings
fields changed (names only).
The Privacy page and README now say sign-ins store an IP in the audit log.
Verified through the real routes against a scratch database: user
creation, the logout route, the automatic purge, settings and
integration edits - including that a secret token and a webhook URL
appear nowhere in the stored entries. The sign-in callback itself needs
a real identity provider and wasn't run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Entries were stored in UTC without a zone marker and the Audit and
Diagnostic Log pages read them as local time, so every entry showed
shifted by the viewer's UTC offset (two hours early in Sweden). A shared
parseDbTimestamp() now reads them as UTC, and replaces the inline
workaround the Consistency page had.
The Audit Log never displayed an entry's details at all, so adding an
admin link showed only "server #1". Link entries now carry the server
name and the label/URL, and a new Details column shows them, along with
things like a port scan's address and range. Entries made within the
same second are now ordered by id instead of arbitrarily.
A domain's "Check now" was the one user-triggered action that wasn't
audited; it is now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both places you add an admin link - a server's own Admin Links section
and the Operations > Admin Links summary page - now offer a "fill from
a known port" dropdown once a server is picked, listing its
agent-reported and manually-noted ports (the same data the Ports
page/card shows). Picking one fills in the URL as
http(s)://<hostname-or-IP>:<port>, guessing https for a handful of
common admin-panel ports, and fills the label too if it's still empty.
The URL field stays fully editable either way.
Shared the address/label logic in a small adminLinkUrl.ts helper used
by both pages. No server-side changes needed - built entirely on the
existing per-server ports and detail endpoints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
IP Addresses (IPAM) now reads the same excluded-ranges setting the
Consistency page manages, so "not interesting" addresses - a Docker
bridge network repeating on every host, say - can be hidden there too.
Adds a "Hide excluded addresses" toggle (on by default, with a live
count), an inline ranges editor matching Consistency's, an "excluded"
badge on rows shown anyway, and a per-row "Exclude..." shortcut that
suggests a /24 (or /64 for IPv6) around that address. Editing ranges
from either page updates both, since it's one shared setting.
Also adds Operations > Admin Links: a single page summarizing every
admin bookmark added across all servers (Dockge, Webmin, Cockpit, etc,
previously only visible per-server on each server's own detail page),
sortable and searchable, with the same add/edit/delete capability -
adding one here just asks which server it belongs to.
Verified both with real HTTP-level tests: a genuine Express app, a
scratch SQLite DB, and forged sessions, covering the exclusion
matching, the shared-setting round trip, the links aggregation and
join, and role enforcement - the real dev DB was confirmed untouched
throughout. Both packages build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Summarizes every server's agent-reported listening ports in one
cross-server table (grouped by protocol+port, addresses merged,
loopback-only flagged) - previously this only existed per-server on
each server's own detail page.
Adds a second table for ports this app has no way to see on its own:
manually-recorded openings on a router, edge firewall, or cloud
security group, each with a label, external port/protocol, an optional
link to a tracked server (with its own internal port when NAT changes
it) or a freeform destination, a free-text source, and a comment.
Viewer-readable; adding/editing/deleting needs operator or admin.
The agent-port grouping logic (dedupe by protocol+port, detect
loopback-only sockets) was shared with the existing per-server Ports
card via a new agentPorts.ts service instead of duplicating it.
Verified with a real HTTP-level test: a genuine Express app with the
actual routers, a scratch SQLite DB, and forged admin/viewer sessions,
covering grouping correctness, the server-name join, input validation,
and role enforcement - the real dev DB was confirmed untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Covers all 16 notification types (daily reminders, state-based health/
automation alerts, real-time DNS and integration-down alerts, and the
quiet-hours digest), what triggers each, and what does and doesn't
respect quiet hours and maintenance windows. Every trigger condition
and threshold was cross-checked against the actual scheduler/monitor
code, not just the settings labels.
Also fixes the "Daily reminder time" hint text in NotificationSettings,
which had gone stale — it listed only 4 of the 6 checks that actually
share that schedule (missing domain expiry and PBS verification).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
osTicket's own REST API only supports creating tickets, not listing or
reading them, so this reads osTicket's MySQL/MariaDB database directly
with a read-only user instead - the only integration in this app that
isn't a REST API. Joins the ticket, status, priority, department,
staff, team, and user tables, filtered to tickets in the "open" state
(status names are customizable per install, but that state flag isn't).
Surfaces per-ticket subject, priority, department, assignee, requester,
and osTicket's own overdue/awaiting-reply flags, plus a page at
/osticket and a Dashboard widget with open/overdue/awaiting-reply
counts.
Not verified against a live instance: unlike the HTTP-based
integrations, there was no way to fake a MySQL server to test against
in this environment, so the query is built from osTicket's published
schema but has never actually run against a real database. See
INTEGRATIONS.md for the read-only grant needed and further caveats.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a reference table of which sidebar items each role (viewer,
operator, admin) can see, plus a summary of which in-page actions on
otherwise-visible pages are held back to operator/admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Proxmox VE already shows whether the last vzdump push to PBS succeeded, but
has no visibility into PBS's own backup verification, GC/prune health, or
host status. This adds PBS as its own integration (own adapter, page, nav
entry, and Dashboard widget) that reads datastore usage and, for every
stored snapshot, its verification state directly from PBS.
A new daily check (mirroring the existing Proxmox backup-failure check)
notifies when a snapshot has failed verification or a datastore couldn't be
read, with its own toggle in Settings -> Notifications and its own
maintenance-window silencing.
Not verified against a live PBS instance — built from PBS's published API
docs and a scratch test against a mocked PBS server exercising the adapter's
parsing and auth-header format (PBSAPIToken uses a colon separator, unlike
PVE's PVEAPIToken which uses =). See INTEGRATIONS.md for details and the
"not verified" caveat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New "Sync from phpIPAM" action on IP Addresses, alongside the existing
"Sync from Tailscale" / "Sync from Proxmox" ones and built the same way:
a new integration type (config in-app, URL + API app ID + app token,
credentials encrypted at rest) that this page pulls from on demand.
Deliberately import-only, not a full integration -- no dedicated page,
dashboard widget, or nav entry, since that's all this was asked for.
Auth is phpIPAM's static "App token" method: create an API app under
Administration -> API with its security set to "SSL with App token", and
its one-time code goes straight in as the `token` header (also sent as
`phpipam-token`, in case a given version expects that name instead) --
no login call, no token to renew. The user/password "User token" method
isn't implemented.
Addresses are read the standard way: GET /subnets/, then GET
/subnets/{id}/addresses/ for each, rather than assuming a single
"all addresses" endpoint exists on every version. phpIPAM wraps every
response as {code, success, data} -- including an empty result: a subnet
with nothing in it answers success:false, message:"No addresses found"
rather than success:true, data:[]. That's read as "nothing here", not a
failure; anything else with success:false throws with phpIPAM's own
message. One subnet failing outright (e.g. the app lacks permission on
it) is skipped with a note rather than aborting the whole sync. Every
address field is read defensively -- optional, independently
type-checked -- so a field phpIPAM renames or drops in some version
leaves that value blank instead of breaking the import.
Imported entries: label from hostname or description, "phpIPAM" as
vendor, the subnet's own description (or its CIDR, if it has none) as
location, and description/note/MAC folded into notes. Existing sync
plumbing (upsertSyncedEntry) gained a location parameter so this and any
future sync can set it; the two existing syncs pass null, unchanged.
Endpoints, the token header, and the address/subnet field names are
cross-checked against phpIPAM's own published API documentation. Not
verified against a live instance -- there wasn't one available while
building this, so if a real sync comes back empty or with the wrong
fields, that's the next thing to check.
Verified with 23 backend checks against a fake phpIPAM server matching
that documented shape (the empty-subnet quirk, a subnet that fails
outright, malformed/missing fields, a non-JSON response) and the real
route (added/updated/skipped counts, a manually-entered IP never
overwritten, roles, no-enabled-integration, upstream failure surfaced
per-integration rather than as a 500, audit entries) plus a browser check
of the real IP Addresses page against the real routers: the sync button,
its result message, re-syncing (updates rather than duplicates), the
manual entry staying untouched, and the viewer view.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New "Import from Uptime Kuma" action on the Maintenance page (operator):
pick an Uptime Kuma integration and a duration, and it starts (or
extends) a maintenance window here for every server whose address
matches a monitor Uptime Kuma currently reports as being in maintenance,
reusing the existing monitor-to-server matching from the Uptime Kuma
integration itself.
Uptime Kuma's metrics endpoint only exposes a monitor's *current* status,
not its scheduled start/end time (there's no API for that), so this
deliberately doesn't try to mirror Uptime Kuma's own schedule -- it starts
a window for the duration you choose, the same bounded/required-end
window this feature has always used. Running it again while Kuma is
still in maintenance extends the same window rather than stacking a
second one; when Kuma later shows nothing in maintenance, already-active
windows are left alone rather than force-ended, since ending them isn't
something only Uptime Kuma's state should decide. Two Kuma monitors that
match the same server are deduped to one window. Monitors with no
matching server are reported back by name so nothing is silently missed,
and monitors that aren't in maintenance are ignored entirely.
The manual "Start maintenance" endpoint's start-or-extend logic (dedupe,
pruning old rows, the response shape) is now a shared
services/maintenance.ts function instead of living only in that route
handler, so the import path can't drift from how a manual window behaves.
Likewise the server-matching helper gained a small toMatchableServers()
so the existing Uptime Kuma monitors route and this new one build the
same match input the same way instead of each parsing server rows on
their own.
No schema change -- imported windows are ordinary maintenance windows;
their Uptime-Kuma origin is only in the reason text ("Imported from
Uptime Kuma (<integration>): <monitor>"), visible in the Active table and
the audit log like any other window.
Verified with 28 backend checks (the refactored manual start/extend
flow as a regression check; roles; unknown/wrong-type/disabled
integration; validation; nothing-in-maintenance; matching including
same-server dedup and unmatched monitors; re-running extends rather than
duplicating; windows left alone once Kuma exits maintenance; upstream
failure; audit entries) and by driving the real Maintenance page against
the real routers in a browser: import, re-import (extends), the
nothing-in-maintenance state, and the viewer view (no edit card, active
windows still visible). Real dev database mtime untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It watches over things rather than being a machine/platform itself,
closer in spirit to Maintenance than to Proxmox or Tailscale. Also
balances the two groups (6/2 -> 5/3).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New integration, following the existing pattern: config in-app (URL +
API key, credentials encrypted at rest), its own Uptime Kuma page, an
Integrations list entry, a Dashboard widget, and diagnostic-log/
integration-down-alert coverage for free via the shared withDiagLogging
wrapper. Read-only -- no start/stop equivalent exists for a monitor.
Uptime Kuma has no conventional REST API (the dashboard talks to it over
Socket.IO); researched before writing any code, since guessing wrong here
would have cost real time. The one machine-readable, authenticated
endpoint that lists every monitor is its Prometheus exporter at
GET /metrics, gated by HTTP Basic auth -- an API key as the password with
the username left blank on current installs, or the real dashboard
login on installs from before the API-key feature existed. This adapter
authenticates the same way and parses that endpoint's text-exposition
format itself (metrics: monitor_status, monitor_response_time,
monitor_cert_days_remaining, monitor_uptime_ratio; labels: monitor_id,
monitor_name, monitor_type, monitor_url, monitor_hostname, monitor_port),
verified against the documented metric/label set and the actual upstream
source (server/prometheus.js). A malformed line is skipped rather than
failing the whole scrape.
"What server is being monitored for what": each monitor's target (an IP
for TCP checks, or the hostname out of the URL for HTTP/keyword checks)
is matched against your servers' own IPs and hostnames -- reusing the
same kind of match already used in the consistency report -- and linked
to that server's page. Monitors with no single network target (groups,
push monitors, DNS/keyword checks with a complex URL) are left unmatched
rather than guessed at. Uptime Kuma's tags aren't read, since the
Prometheus endpoint doesn't reliably distinguish a tag label from any
other label it might add later.
The username field is the first genuinely optional integration config
field this app has had; IntegrationField gained an `optional` flag
(server validation and both the add/edit web forms honor it) rather than
special-casing Uptime Kuma.
Verified with 48 backend checks (Prometheus text parsing including
escaped quotes, decimals, negative numbers, and malformed lines; TCP vs.
HTTP target/port extraction; every documented status code; server
matching by IP, hostname, and short name, including no-match cases; the
route's real HTTP round trip against a fake Uptime Kuma server, wrong
credentials, upstream failures, roles, wrong/disabled/missing
integration, diagnostic-log entries; the optional-field validation rule)
and by driving the real page and the real Dashboard widget in a browser
against the real routers, including CSV export and column sorting. Real
dev database mtime untouched.
Not verified: a real Uptime Kuma instance. Everything here was checked
against Uptime Kuma's documented metric format, its actual upstream
source, and a fake server built to match both -- not against a live
installation. If your instance's /metrics output differs from what's
documented (older version, unusual monitor types), the parser should
degrade to an empty or partial monitor list rather than error, but that
degradation itself hasn't been observed against the real thing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The flat 22-item menu becomes 7 entries: Dashboard and Secrets as plain
links, and five groups.
- Infrastructure: Servers, Proxmox, Synology, Docker, Tailscale
- Network: DNS, Domains, IP Addresses, Consistency
- Automation: Semaphore, Gitea
- Operations: Maintenance, Generator
- Administration: Integrations, Users, Sessions, Audit Log, Diagnostic
Log, Settings
Privacy moves to the sidebar footer beside the theme toggle and sign-out,
since it's about the person rather than the homelab.
Behaviour:
- Groups open on demand. The group holding the current page is always
open (deep routes count: /servers/7 keeps Servers active), and its
header stays emphasised even if you close it. Which groups you leave
open is remembered in the browser, and the menu still works if storage
is blocked.
- Role handling: pages a role can't use are dropped, an emptied group
disappears, and a group reduced to a single page is drawn as that
page's own link. A viewer therefore sees a plain Integrations link
where an admin sees Administration, and an operator sees Administration
with Integrations and Audit Log.
- Toggling a group on mobile keeps the menu open; choosing a page closes
it, as before.
- Group headers are real buttons with aria-expanded.
Front end only: one component, plus a small CSS rule tightening submenu
rows so several open groups still fit on one screen. Routes, permissions
and backend are unchanged.
Verified in a browser with the real shell as admin, operator and viewer:
structure per role, open/close and aria state, active highlighting on
direct and deep routes, auto-open of the current page's group, state
surviving a reload, and the mobile toggler behaviour. Not done: the
attention dots on closed groups (deliberately held for a later step).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Domains card completing the Overview row (DNS, Secrets, Servers,
Domains), shaped like the Secrets card: a status badge (N expired / N
expiring / All OK / No expiry dates / Not configured), tracked, expiring
and expired counts, an OK/expiring/expired/no-date bar, and details --
the expired domains and the soonest-expiring ones (first three, soonest
first), the next one to expire when everything is fine, and a note when
some domains couldn't be refreshed, linking to the Domains page.
Purely front end: the existing /api/domains already carries each domain's
status, days left and last-check error, computed against the warning
window from Settings. A registry that doesn't publish expiry dates (.de,
.eu) shows as "no date" and is not counted as a failed refresh; anything
else that stopped a refresh is.
Verified in a browser against the real domains router across four states:
problems (expired, several expiring, an undated one, a failed refresh),
all healthy, only undated domains, and none tracked. Web build only; no
backend or database changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Servers card in the dashboard's Overview row, in the same shape as the
DNS and Secrets cards: a status badge (N offline / N disks nearly full /
All online / No agent data / Not configured), total, online and offline
counts, an online/offline/no-data bar, and the details that matter --
which servers are offline and for how long (the first three, linking to
their pages), which disks are at or above the usage threshold, and a
Linux/Windows split when there are Windows machines.
The numbers come from a new GET /api/servers/summary, computed on the
server with the health monitor's own evaluateHealth. That means "offline"
and "disk full" are decided by exactly the rules the alerts use, so the
widget can't say a server is fine while an alert says it isn't, and it
follows the thresholds set in Settings, which viewers can't read
themselves and so couldn't have applied client-side. Servers under a
maintenance window are marked as such. A server that has never reported
(no agent, or tracked only through Proxmox) counts as "no data" rather
than offline, an offline server's stale disk figure isn't reported, and a
garbled report doesn't blank the widget.
Readable by every signed-in user, like the dashboard itself.
Verified with 23 backend checks (offline/online/no-data classification
including the bare SQLite timestamp format, ordering, colons in Windows
mounts, threshold changes, maintenance flags, agreement with the alert
path's own offline and disk sets, empty and garbled inputs, and the route
as a viewer following Settings) and in a browser against the real router
across five states: problems, disks only, all healthy, no data, and empty.
Real dev database mtime untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reports a Windows machine the way the Linux agent does, replacing the
"planned" stub in agent/windows: scheduled tasks plus hostname, IPv4
addresses, CPU model/cores/current load, memory, every fixed disk, and
TCP/UDP listening ports with the owning process (which feed the Ports
card, localhost-only listeners included).
Scripts (plain ASCII by design -- they are downloaded as text and Windows
PowerShell 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI):
- report-tasks.ps1: collects and POSTs to /api/agent/report. Works in
Windows PowerShell 5.1 and PowerShell 7. -DryRun prints the JSON.
Microsoft's own \Microsoft\ tasks (hundreds) are left out unless
INCLUDE_MICROSOFT_TASKS is set. Triggers are turned into readable text
("Weekly on Mon, Wed at 03:00", "At logon", "..., repeating every 15 min").
Self-signed certificates work via API_INSECURE on both PowerShell
versions (they need different mechanisms).
- install.ps1: elevated only; downloads the agent to ProgramData, writes
agent.json with permissions locked to SYSTEM and Administrators *before*
the token goes in, and registers a SYSTEM scheduled task (every 15 min
plus at startup with a 2 min delay). Reinstalling replaces the task.
- uninstall.ps1: removes the task and only the files the agent installed.
Server: accepts schedule_type "windows_task"; a server can be registered
as Windows (Add a server has an operating system choice); an agent's
reported os_type ("linux"/"windows", anything else ignored) corrects the
stored one. The Servers page shows the right install and uninstall
command for each OS (Windows PowerShell 5.1 one-liners, with a self-signed
variant and a note about PowerShell 7), and Windows tasks are labelled
"Windows scheduled tasks". The Linux commands are unchanged.
Verified on this Windows machine, in both PowerShell 5.1 and 7:
- Real dry runs found and fixed bugs before anything shipped: tasks and
ports came out as one nested item (return , $out wrapped twice), integer
keys in an ordered dictionary index by position (wrong weekday names),
and generic "Trigger" labels.
- End to end against the real agent-report router: HTTP, self-signed HTTPS
refused by default and accepted with API_INSECURE, wrong token gives a
clear one-line error and exit 1, and Swedish letters plus a euro sign
survive JSON -> UTF-8 -> HTTP -> SQLite.
- 35 checks on trigger/action/duration descriptions, 20 on the installer's
building blocks (task parts built but not registered, credentials file
content and ACL, download over HTTP and self-signed HTTPS), 18 on the
server rules, and the generated one-liners run through PowerShell's
parser. The documented one-liners were run through iex and stop at the
administrator check without changing anything.
- Found that PowerShell 7 ignores the ServicePointManager certificate
override, so the installer's own download now uses -SkipCertificateCheck
there.
NOT verified: the elevated install itself. Registering a SYSTEM scheduled
task needs elevation and changes the machine, so it was not run: the task
registration, that the repeating trigger really runs indefinitely, and
the agent running as SYSTEM under Task Scheduler have not been exercised.
Windows 10 / Server 2016 or newer is assumed; older is untested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New Settings > Tags tab (admin) listing every tag -- ones servers use and
ones added ahead of time -- with how many servers carry each:
- Add a tag before anything uses it, optionally with a colour. Such tags
are offered as one-click "Add:" chips (and datalist suggestions) when
tagging a server, so the same word gets spelled the same way everywhere.
- Give any tag a colour of your choosing, in use or not, or reset it to the
automatic one. Changes are drafted with Save/Cancel rather than saved as
the picker drags. Colours show on the Servers page, its tag filter bar,
the detail page and the editor, and update everywhere without a reload
through one shared cached colour map.
- Rename a tag; every server that has it is rewritten. Renaming to a name
that already exists merges the two after a confirmation naming what will
happen; the target keeps its own colour unless it had none, and a server
carrying both ends up with one.
- Delete a tag, which removes it from every server that has it, with a
confirmation stating how many.
Tags still live on the servers (servers.tags); a new tag_definitions table
holds only what a server can't: existence before use, and a colour. A
defined tag stays listed until an admin deletes it, even with no servers.
Rename and delete change the servers and the catalogue in one transaction
so they can't disagree. Only servers that actually carry the tag are
rewritten and counted -- an earlier draft also counted servers whose tags
merely weren't in sorted order, which the tests caught.
Reading the list and colours is open to everyone signed in (needed to draw
tags anywhere); changing the catalogue is admin-only, while tagging a
server stays an operator action. Names go through the same normalisation
as before, colours must be #rrggbb, and every change is audit-logged.
New table tag_definitions (migration 0013).
Verified with 44 backend checks (list/counts, roles, create/adopt/
duplicate/rejects, colour set/reset, rename incl. defined, undefined and
unused tags, merge colour rules and both-sides servers, delete, audit, and
that normal tagging still works afterwards) and in a browser against the
real routers: add with colour, set/reset a colour and see it change on the
Servers page live, merge with confirmation, delete, and the error path.
Not clicked through: the quick-add chips inside the tag editor on a
server's detail page (typechecked; same colour code as the rest).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A page every signed-in user can open. It states what the installation
stores (accounts, sign-in sessions, audit and diagnostic logs, server
reports, the secrets tracker, credentials, inventory) and for how long,
where data goes (Authentik, integrations, DNS providers, notification
channels, domain registries, certificate checks, port scans), what lives
in the browser, who can see what, and how to limit or remove data.
Written from what the code actually does, including the uncomfortable
parts: the session file keeps the user's Authentik ID token plus the IP
and browser from sign-in; audit entries keep a name snapshot after an
account is gone; the app has no delete-account function; cron commands
in agent reports can contain sensitive text. It also says what isn't
there -- no telemetry, update checks, third-party scripts, fonts or
tracking cookies -- which was checked against the web build and the
server's outbound calls before being asserted.
Live values rather than boilerplate: log retention (and whether it's on),
which integration and DNS provider types are enabled, how many domains,
certificate checks and reporting servers, and which notification channels
are on. Channel addresses are shown to admins only, and only the host --
never a path, query string or token -- since a webhook URL can embed a key.
Each user also sees their own account and active sign-ins, and can
"Download my data": their account, their sign-ins and the audit-log entries
made under their account, as JSON. Only their own -- never another user's --
and without session ids or ID tokens. The export is itself audit-logged, so
a later export shows it.
Verified with 23 backend checks (own-vs-others isolation for audit counts,
sessions and export; no session ids, ID tokens or channel secrets in any
response; admin-vs-viewer channel visibility; live counts; audit of the
export; auth) using an isolated session directory so real sessions are
never read, and in a browser against the real router, including the
download. Real dev database and session files untouched.
Not legal text: this is a transparency page for the people using the app,
not a privacy policy or a GDPR compliance document.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docker-compose.arm64.build.yml builds the image for linux/arm64 from
source and tags it for the registry (docker compose ... build, then push);
it can also build and run directly on an arm64 machine. Building on x86
works through QEMU, with the one-time binfmt setup noted in the file.
docker-compose.arm64.yml runs that published image on the arm64 machine
with no build there. Both use the same image name and an :arm64 tag, kept
apart from the default image so the existing docker-compose.yml is
untouched. IMAGE_REPO and ARM64_TAG (in .env or the shell) switch the
registry or pin a release tag.
Also adds a .dockerignore, which the repo lacked. The Dockerfile runs
COPY . . after npm ci, so a local build from a developer checkout would
overwrite the container's node_modules with the host's (Windows/x86
binaries) and break the build -- most visibly when cross-building for
arm64. It also keeps .env, data/ and .git out of the build context.
libsql's arm64 musl binary is present in package-lock.json, and the
Dockerfile's node:22-alpine base is multi-arch.
Not built or run: Docker isn't available in this environment, so neither
the emulated arm64 build nor the compose files themselves have been
executed. The YAML was only checked for whitespace and against the
runtime section of docker-compose.yml.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Docker reuses the same subnet on many hosts, and those networks aren't
part of the LAN, so they show up as conflicts and unlisted addresses. The
report only knew about 172.16.0.0/12 through a hardcoded rule; Docker can
just as well pick 192.168.x or 10.x.
The Consistency page now has an Excluded ranges card: CIDR ranges (IPv4
or IPv6) and single addresses, added with a form and removed with one
click, shown to everyone and editable by operators. There's also an
"Exclude range" button on each finding that pre-fills a /24 (or /64) around
its address to edit. Exclusions are applied to servers, IPAM and DNS
before anything is compared, so an excluded address never appears in any
kind of finding, whichever source it came from, and the card says how many
addresses are currently being hidden so it's clear the filter is doing
something.
The old hardcoded rule becomes a visible default (172.16.0.0/12) that can
be removed -- it was silently wrong for anyone using 172.16/12 as a real
LAN. That default is also slightly stronger than before: an address in the
range is now left out even if it is in IPAM or DNS, where the old rule only
skipped it when nothing else mentioned it. Remove or narrow it if that
isn't wanted.
Ranges are validated and normalised on the server (both families, prefix
bounds, no /0, at most 50), a bad one is rejected with a message naming it
and nothing is saved, and changes are audit-logged with before/after.
Matching uses Node's BlockList. Stored as a settings value; managed from
the report rather than admin-only Settings, like ignoring a finding.
Verified with 44 checks (range parsing and rejection, boundary addresses
just inside and outside a range, IPv6, single addresses, exclusion across
all sources and finding kinds, the hidden-address count, route
validation/roles/audit) and in a browser against the real router: add,
invalid, remove the default, exclude from a finding. Real dev database
mtime untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New Consistency page listing where the three places this app records
what lives at an address disagree:
- Address conflicts: the same address reported by more than one server.
- DNS out of date: a record named after a server (its hostname, or its
short name) that points at an address the server doesn't report.
- IPAM out of date: an entry labelled with a server's name at an
address the server doesn't report.
- Not in IPAM: addresses a server reports or DNS points at that IPAM
doesn't list, merged into one finding per address, with a one-click
"Add to IPAM" that pre-fills a label.
- No DNS record: server LAN addresses no cached A/AAAA record resolves to.
It compares data the app already holds and fetches nothing when opened,
so the page states how many servers had reported addresses and how many
DNS zones are synced (and how old the oldest sync is) -- DNS records are
only cached for zones that have been synced, and a report that silently
treated missing data as "no records" would mislead.
Rules chosen to keep it from crying wolf:
- Only private addresses are compared; public DNS records aren't expected
to be in IPAM.
- Servers with no reported addresses are never judged.
- Agents report IPv4 only, so records are only compared within an address
family (an AAAA record isn't "stale" for lacking an IPv6 address).
- Docker bridge networks (172.16/12) are ignored: shared ones aren't
conflicts, and they aren't listed unless someone put them in DNS.
- Tailscale addresses don't need DNS records (MagicDNS), and IPAM entries
kept current by the Tailscale/Proxmox syncs aren't second-guessed.
Findings anyone has decided are fine can be ignored (operators) with a
reason. An ignore is keyed on the finding's stable identity so it stays
ignored across runs, its stored text comes from the finding rather than
the request, and it is marked "no longer occurring" once the condition
goes away. Ignore/restore are audit-logged.
New table consistency_ignores (migration 0012). portScan's private-address
helper is now exported and shared.
Verified with 36 checks (each rule and its exclusions, address-family and
case/trailing-dot handling, IPv6 case, ordering, stable keys, the report
route including a garbled agent report, source counts, ignore/unignore
rules and audit entries) and by driving the page against the real routers
in a browser: Add to IPAM actually created the entry, ignore and restore,
severity filter, "show all", the viewer view, and narrow-width layout
(which found and fixed a squeezed badge and clipped buttons). Real dev
database mtime untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New Domains page listing when each domain registration expires, read from
the registry. Domains behind the DNS zones already synced are picked up
automatically; others can be added by hand. You're reminded daily from N
days before expiry (Settings > Notifications, default 30) until it's
renewed, and told when an expiry date hasn't been refreshable for several
days so a stale date isn't trusted silently.
RDAP alone would not have covered this homelab: .se, .nu, .io, .eu and .de
are not in IANA's RDAP bootstrap. Lookups therefore try RDAP where the TLD
publishes a server and fall back to WHOIS on port 43, found via IANA's
own referral, parsing the expiry line out of the free-text answer. Only
the expiry date and registrar are read or stored. Verified live against
the real registries: .se and .nu via WHOIS, .com/.org/.dev via RDAP.
Behaviour worth knowing:
- A DNS zone that is a subdomain (lab.example.se) resolves to the
registration that actually expires by trying the name and then its
parents, so no public-suffix list is needed. Zones already covered by a
tracked domain are not looked up again.
- "Couldn't ask" is never confused with "not registered": network errors,
rate limits and garbled answers are errors, and a transient error at any
level stops the walk from concluding the domain doesn't exist.
- A failed refresh keeps the last known expiry and records why, rather
than blanking a date that's still relied on.
- Zones that don't resolve to a real registration (.lan, .local, unregistered
names) simply get no row. Zone-derived rows disappear when their zone
does; manual rows stay. Zone-derived rows can't be deleted by hand.
- Registries that don't publish an expiry (.de, .eu) are tracked with a
note instead of a date.
- Input like "example.com/path" is refused rather than silently reduced
to its host.
- Runs on the daily secret-expiry schedule and reminder time, on demand
(Check all now / per domain), and once at startup if nothing has been
read in a day. Never blocks startup, one lookup at a time with a pause.
The warning window lives with the other thresholds in settings.
New table domains (migration 0011); two settings fields (toggle and
warning days).
Verified with 90 checks against fake RDAP/WHOIS backends (name
normalization, date formats, WHOIS parsing including rate-limit and
no-expiry answers, bootstrap and referral caching, stale-cache fallback,
parent walking, add/sync/check/refresh, concurrency guard, alert
selection and stale detection, the daily notification and its toggle,
role rules) plus a live smoke test against real registries and a browser
check of the page against the real router. Real dev database mtime
untouched. Not checked: a screenshot of the finished page (the capture
timed out); structure, sorting, errors and the viewer view were verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The API already returned Gitea's updated_at for every repo but the page
never displayed it. The Gitea table now has a sortable "Last updated"
column with a relative age ("3 d ago") over the exact date/time (in the
app's configured date format), and the CSV export includes it.
Gitea only exposes a single updated_at per repository (there is no
separate last-push time), so this is Gitea's own notion of "updated".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>