Refuse loopback and metadata targets; check the agent's token before reading its report

Certificate check, WHOIS lookup and port scanner connect to hosts that are typed in
or named by a plain-text reply. utils/networkGuard.ts now refuses loopback, link-local
(cloud metadata) and similar addresses for all three -- and a WHOIS server on a private
network -- and the connection goes to the address that was checked rather than looking
the name up again (no DNS rebinding). LAN hosts remain fine for certificate checks and
scans.

Agent endpoint: the token is checked before the body is read, the route is mounted ahead
of the 100 KB JSON parser so a real agent can send a large report (up to 4 MB), and
overlong text is trimmed instead of costing the host its whole report. An oversized or
malformed body is answered with 413 / 400 instead of a generic 500.

Tests (npm test --workspace server): the guard, the secrets route, the agent endpoint, the
Linux upload run against a fake server (token never on curl's arguments, private temp dir
removed), the systemd unit's directives, and the Windows folder permissions read back by
SID. 19 of the 26 new tests fail against the previous code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
bobbanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-06 22:05:18 +02:00
1 parent 047fcb403e
commit dbbe4180e0
9 files changed
+710 -40

No files matched your search

+4 -5
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import { tagsRouter } from "./routes/tags.js";
import { portsRouter } from "./routes/ports.js";
import { alertsRouter } from "./routes/alerts.js";
import { generatorRouter } from "./routes/generator.js";
import { apiErrorHandler } from "./utils/apiErrorHandler.js";
import { initSecretExpiryScheduler } from "./services/secretExpiryScheduler.js";
import { initTailscaleKeyExpiryScheduler } from "./services/tailscaleKeyExpiryScheduler.js";
import { initLogRetentionScheduler } from "./services/logRetentionScheduler.js";
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ mkdirSync(sessionDir, { recursive: true });
const app = express();
app.set("trust proxy", 1);
// The agent endpoint comes first: it reads its own (larger) body, only after checking the token, and an agent has no use for a session.
app.use("/api/agent/report", agentReportRouter);
app.use(express.json());
app.use(
session({
@@ -100,7 +103,6 @@ app.use("/api/ipam", ipamRouter);
app.use("/api/dns", dnsRouter);
app.use("/api/servers", serversRouter);
app.use("/api/tasks", tasksRouter);
app.use("/api/agent/report", agentReportRouter);
app.use("/api/integrations", integrationsRouter);
app.use("/api/settings", settingsRouter);
app.use("/api/search", searchRouter);
@@ -119,10 +121,7 @@ if (existsSync(webDist)) {
app.get("*", (_req, res) => res.sendFile(join(webDist, "index.html")));
}
app.use((err: unknown, _req: express.Request, res: express.Response, _next: express.NextFunction) => {
console.error(err);
res.status(500).json({ error: "internal_error" });
});
app.use(apiErrorHandler);
app.listen(env.port, () => {
console.log(`homelab-manager listening on port ${env.port}`);
+53 -30
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Router } from "express";
import express, { Router, type NextFunction, type Request, type Response } from "express";
import { z } from "zod";
import { db } from "../db/client.js";
import { hashToken } from "../services/tokens.js";
@@ -7,18 +7,30 @@ import { asyncHandler } from "../utils/asyncHandler.js";
export const agentReportRouter = Router();
// A host with a lot of listening sockets and cron entries sends a big report, so this endpoint takes far more than the
// 100 KB the rest of the API does. It's only safe to read that much from someone who has proved they're an agent, so the
// token is checked before the body is — and this route is mounted ahead of the app-wide JSON parser (see index.ts).
const AGENT_BODY_LIMIT = "4mb";
/** Text from an agent is trimmed to a sane length rather than rejected: a report that's refused over one long line costs the host its whole report. */
const text = (max: number) => z.string().transform((s) => (s.length > max ? s.slice(0, max) : s));
const cap = <T>(max: number) => (items: T[]) => (items.length > max ? items.slice(0, max) : items);
const listeningPortSchema = z.object({
protocol: z.enum(["tcp", "udp"]),
port: z.number().int().min(1).max(65535),
address: z.string().max(100),
process: z.string().max(100).optional(),
address: text(100),
process: text(100).optional(),
});
const systemSchema = z.object({
ip_addresses: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
cpu: z.object({ model: z.string().optional(), cores: z.number().optional(), load_percent: z.number().nullable().optional() }).optional(),
ip_addresses: z.array(text(100)).transform(cap(200)).optional(),
cpu: z.object({ model: text(200).optional(), cores: z.number().optional(), load_percent: z.number().nullable().optional() }).optional(),
memory: z.object({ total_bytes: z.number().optional(), used_bytes: z.number().optional() }).optional(),
disks: z.array(z.object({ mount: z.string(), size_bytes: z.number(), used_bytes: z.number() })).optional(),
disks: z
.array(z.object({ mount: text(500), size_bytes: z.number(), used_bytes: z.number() }))
.transform(cap(500))
.optional(),
// Deliberately lenient: one odd line from `ss` must never cost the agent its whole report (tasks included),
// so entries are validated one by one and bad ones dropped rather than failing the request.
listening_ports: z
@@ -31,39 +43,50 @@ const systemSchema = z.object({
})),
});
// What a task's free-form metadata may weigh once written out; more than this is dropped, the task itself kept.
const MAX_METADATA_JSON = 50_000;
const reportSchema = z.object({
hostname: z.string().max(255).optional(),
os_type: z.string().optional(),
reported_at: z.string().optional(),
hostname: text(255).optional(),
os_type: text(50).optional(),
reported_at: text(50).optional(),
system: systemSchema.nullable().optional(),
tasks: z.array(
z.object({
schedule_type: z.enum(["cron", "systemd_timer", "windows_task"]),
name: z.string().min(1),
command: z.string().optional(),
schedule_expression: z.string().optional(),
source: z.string().optional(),
enabled: z.boolean().optional(),
next_run_at: z.string().optional(),
metadata: z.unknown().optional(),
}),
),
tasks: z
.array(
z.object({
schedule_type: z.enum(["cron", "systemd_timer", "windows_task"]),
name: z.string().min(1).transform((s) => (s.length > 500 ? s.slice(0, 500) : s)),
command: text(8000).optional(),
schedule_expression: text(500).optional(),
source: text(500).optional(),
enabled: z.boolean().optional(),
next_run_at: text(100).optional(),
metadata: z
.unknown()
.optional()
.transform((m) => (m !== undefined && (JSON.stringify(m) ?? "").length > MAX_METADATA_JSON ? undefined : m)),
}),
)
.transform(cap(5000)),
});
agentReportRouter.post("/", asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const authHeader = req.header("authorization") ?? "";
const match = authHeader.match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i);
if (!match) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "missing_token" });
}
/** Who's calling: the server a bearer token belongs to. Runs before the body is read. */
async function authenticateAgent(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const match = (req.header("authorization") ?? "").match(/^Bearer\s+(.+)$/i);
if (!match) return res.status(401).json({ error: "missing_token" });
const tokenHash = hashToken(match[1]);
const server = await db.query.servers.findFirst({
where: (s, { eq }) => eq(s.apiTokenHash, tokenHash),
});
if (!server) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "invalid_token" });
}
if (!server) return res.status(401).json({ error: "invalid_token" });
res.locals.agentServer = server;
next();
}
agentReportRouter.post("/", asyncHandler(authenticateAgent), express.json({ limit: AGENT_BODY_LIMIT }), asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const server = res.locals.agentServer as { id: number };
const parsed = reportSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) {
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import * as net from "node:net";
import { domainToASCII } from "node:url";
import { resolveTarget } from "../utils/networkGuard.js";
/**
* Looks up when a domain registration expires. RDAP (the JSON successor to WHOIS) is used wherever the TLD
@@ -40,9 +41,14 @@ export const defaultDeps: LookupDeps = {
}
return { status: res.status, json };
},
whoisQuery(server, query) {
async whoisQuery(server, query) {
// The WHOIS server is named in a plain-text reply on port 43, which anyone on the path could rewrite — so it has to look like a
// hostname and must not be this machine, a cloud metadata address or anything on a private network. Connect to the address
// that passed, not to the name again.
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/.test(server)) throw new Error(`Refusing to query "${server}": not a hostname.`);
const address = await resolveTarget(server, { allowPrivate: false });
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const socket = net.connect({ host: server, port: 43 });
const socket = net.connect({ host: address, port: 43 });
let out = "";
socket.setTimeout(12_000, () => {
socket.destroy();
+4
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import * as net from "node:net";
import * as dns from "node:dns/promises";
import { classifyAddress } from "../utils/networkGuard.js";
export const MAX_SCAN_SPAN = 20_000;
@@ -102,6 +103,9 @@ export async function resolveScanTarget(address: string): Promise<string> {
throw new Error(`Couldn't resolve "${trimmed}".`);
}
}
if (ips.some((a) => classifyAddress(a) === "metadata")) {
throw new Error(`"${trimmed}" is a cloud metadata address, which can't be scanned.`);
}
const ip = ips.find(isPrivateAddress);
if (!ip) {
throw new Error(
+8 -2
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { isIP } from "node:net";
import { eq, isNotNull } from "drizzle-orm";
import { db } from "../db/client.js";
import { secrets } from "../db/schema.js";
import { resolveTarget } from "../utils/networkGuard.js";
/**
* Opens a real TLS connection and returns the server certificate's expiry as
@@ -12,12 +13,17 @@ import { secrets } from "../db/schema.js";
* commonly present self-signed or internal-CA certificates that a verifying
* connection would refuse before ever exposing the dates — including an
* already-expired one, which is exactly the case worth reporting.
*
* The host is typed in by an operator, so it can't be just anything: loopback, link-local (cloud metadata) and similar
* addresses are refused, and the connection goes to the one address that passed the check rather than to the name again
* (see utils/networkGuard.ts). LAN and public hosts are fine — those are what certificates are checked on.
*/
export function fetchCertExpiry(host: string, port: number, timeoutMs = 10_000): Promise<string> {
export async function fetchCertExpiry(host: string, port: number, timeoutMs = 10_000): Promise<string> {
const address = await resolveTarget(host, { allowPrivate: true });
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const socket = tls.connect(
{
host,
host: address,
port,
// SNI must be a hostname — Node warns (and some servers reject) when an IP is sent as the server name.
servername: isIP(host) === 0 ? host : undefined,
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
/**
* The app's last-resort error handler. A body that's too large or isn't valid JSON is the caller's doing, so it's answered
* as such (413 / 400) rather than as a server error — an agent whose report is too big then sees "payload_too_large", not a
* vague 500.
*/
export function apiErrorHandler(err: unknown, _req: Request, res: Response, _next: NextFunction) {
const status = (err as { status?: unknown } | null)?.status;
if (status === 413) return res.status(413).json({ error: "payload_too_large" });
if (status === 400 && (err as { type?: unknown }).type === "entity.parse.failed") return res.status(400).json({ error: "invalid_json" });
console.error(err);
res.status(500).json({ error: "internal_error" });
}
+106
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
/**
* Where the server itself may be pointed.
*
* A few features make the server connect to a host a person typed in: the certificate check on a secret, the WHOIS server a
* registry names, a port scan. Left open, each is a way to ask "what can the server reach?" from the server's own position —
* its loopback services, the cloud metadata address that hands out instance credentials, whatever sits behind it. This module
* is the one place that says which addresses are off limits, and resolves a name to the single address it will then connect to,
* so a name can't pass the check and be pointed somewhere else a moment later (DNS rebinding).
*
* Always refused: loopback, "this host" (0.0.0.0), link-local (169.254/16, fe80::/10 — where metadata services live),
* multicast/reserved, and the known cloud metadata addresses wherever they sit. Private LAN ranges are allowed or not
* depending on the caller: a homelab's own services are private, a registry's WHOIS server never is.
*/
import net from "node:net";
import dns from "node:dns/promises";
export type AddressClass = "public" | "private" | "loopback" | "unspecified" | "link-local" | "multicast" | "metadata";
function list(...subnets: [string, number, "ipv4" | "ipv6"][]): net.BlockList {
const l = new net.BlockList();
for (const [address, prefix, family] of subnets) l.addSubnet(address, prefix, family);
return l;
}
const METADATA = list(
["169.254.169.254", 32, "ipv4"], // AWS, Azure, GCP, most others
["169.254.170.2", 32, "ipv4"], // AWS ECS task credentials
["100.100.100.200", 32, "ipv4"], // Alibaba Cloud (inside the CGNAT range that Tailscale also uses)
["fd00:ec2::254", 128, "ipv6"], // AWS over IPv6
);
const LOOPBACK = list(["127.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4"], ["::1", 128, "ipv6"]);
const UNSPECIFIED = list(["0.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4"], ["::", 128, "ipv6"]);
const LINK_LOCAL = list(["169.254.0.0", 16, "ipv4"], ["fe80::", 10, "ipv6"]);
const MULTICAST = list(["224.0.0.0", 4, "ipv4"], ["240.0.0.0", 4, "ipv4"], ["ff00::", 8, "ipv6"]);
const PRIVATE = list(
["10.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4"],
["172.16.0.0", 12, "ipv4"],
["192.168.0.0", 16, "ipv4"],
["100.64.0.0", 10, "ipv4"], // CGNAT — where Tailscale addresses live
["fc00::", 7, "ipv6"],
);
/** Which kind of address this is. Checked in order, so a metadata address is "metadata" even though it is also link-local or CGNAT. */
export function classifyAddress(ip: string): AddressClass {
const kind = net.isIP(ip);
if (kind === 0) throw new Error(`Not an IP address: ${ip}`);
const family = kind === 4 ? "ipv4" : "ipv6";
// net.BlockList treats an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (::ffff:127.0.0.1) as the IPv4 address it wraps.
if (METADATA.check(ip, family)) return "metadata";
if (LOOPBACK.check(ip, family)) return "loopback";
if (UNSPECIFIED.check(ip, family)) return "unspecified";
if (LINK_LOCAL.check(ip, family)) return "link-local";
if (MULTICAST.check(ip, family)) return "multicast";
if (PRIVATE.check(ip, family)) return "private";
return "public";
}
export class BlockedTargetError extends Error {
constructor(
message: string,
public readonly kind: AddressClass | "unresolvable",
) {
super(message);
}
}
const WHY: Record<Exclude<AddressClass, "public" | "private">, string> = {
loopback: "it's this server itself (loopback)",
unspecified: "it isn't a real destination (0.0.0.0 / ::)",
"link-local": "it's a link-local address, where cloud metadata services live",
multicast: "it's a multicast or reserved address",
metadata: "it's a cloud metadata address",
};
/**
* The address to connect to for `host` (an IP or a name), or a BlockedTargetError. When a name resolves to several addresses
* every one of them must be allowed — a name that also points at loopback is refused — and the first is the one to connect to.
*/
export async function resolveTarget(host: string, options: { allowPrivate: boolean }): Promise<string> {
const trimmed = host.trim();
let addresses: string[];
if (net.isIP(trimmed)) {
addresses = [trimmed];
} else {
try {
addresses = (await dns.lookup(trimmed, { all: true })).map((r) => r.address);
} catch {
throw new BlockedTargetError(`Couldn't resolve "${trimmed}".`, "unresolvable");
}
if (addresses.length === 0) throw new BlockedTargetError(`Couldn't resolve "${trimmed}".`, "unresolvable");
}
for (const address of addresses) {
const kind = classifyAddress(address);
if (kind === "public") continue;
if (kind === "private") {
if (options.allowPrivate) continue;
throw new BlockedTargetError(`"${trimmed}" is on a private network, which isn't allowed here.`, kind);
}
throw new BlockedTargetError(
`"${trimmed}"${trimmed === address ? "" : ` (${address})`} can't be used: ${WHY[kind]}.`,
kind,
);
}
return addresses[0];
}
+512
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the second security pass: where the server may be pointed, what an agent may send, and how the agent
* scripts handle the token.
*
* - utils/networkGuard.ts: loopback, link-local (cloud metadata) and similar addresses are refused for the certificate check,
* the WHOIS lookup and the port scanner; the connection goes to the address that was checked.
* - the agent endpoint checks the token before reading a body, takes a large report, and trims rather than rejects.
* - the Linux agent keeps the token off curl's command line and out of a fixed /tmp file; its systemd unit is locked down.
* - the Windows installer gives the SYSTEM task's folder explicit permissions.
*
* Run with: npm test --workspace server
*/
import { test, describe, before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, existsSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import http from "node:http";
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hm-hardening-test-"));
process.env.DATABASE_PATH = join(dir, "test.sqlite");
process.env.SESSION_DIR = join(dir, "sessions");
process.env.CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "ab".repeat(32);
const repoRoot = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../", import.meta.url));
const { classifyAddress, resolveTarget, BlockedTargetError } = await import("../src/utils/networkGuard.js");
const { fetchCertExpiry } = await import("../src/services/tlsCheck.js");
const { defaultDeps } = await import("../src/services/domainLookup.js");
const { resolveScanTarget } = await import("../src/services/portScan.js");
const { runMigrations } = await import("../src/db/migrate.js");
await runMigrations();
const blocked = (kind?: string) => (err: unknown) => err instanceof BlockedTargetError && (kind === undefined || err.kind === kind);
// ─── Where the server may be pointed ────────────────────────────────────────
describe("networkGuard", () => {
test("classifies addresses, including IPv4 wrapped in IPv6", () => {
const expected: Record<string, string> = {
"127.0.0.1": "loopback",
"127.9.9.9": "loopback",
"::1": "loopback",
"::ffff:127.0.0.1": "loopback",
"0.0.0.0": "unspecified",
"::": "unspecified",
"169.254.169.254": "metadata",
"::ffff:169.254.169.254": "metadata",
"fd00:ec2::254": "metadata",
"100.100.100.200": "metadata",
"169.254.1.1": "link-local",
"fe80::1": "link-local",
"224.0.0.1": "multicast",
"255.255.255.255": "multicast",
"10.1.2.3": "private",
"172.16.5.5": "private",
"192.168.1.10": "private",
"100.64.0.5": "private",
"fd12:3456::1": "private",
"::ffff:10.0.0.1": "private",
"172.32.0.1": "public",
"8.8.8.8": "public",
"2606:4700::1111": "public",
"::ffff:8.8.8.8": "public",
};
for (const [ip, kind] of Object.entries(expected)) assert.equal(classifyAddress(ip), kind, ip);
});
test("refuses what is never allowed, and resolves names before judging them", async () => {
for (const host of ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "169.254.169.254", "fe80::1", "fd00:ec2::254", "localhost"]) {
await assert.rejects(() => resolveTarget(host, { allowPrivate: true }), blocked(), host);
}
});
test("private ranges: allowed when asked for, refused when not", async () => {
assert.equal(await resolveTarget("192.168.1.10", { allowPrivate: true }), "192.168.1.10");
assert.equal(await resolveTarget("8.8.8.8", { allowPrivate: false }), "8.8.8.8");
await assert.rejects(() => resolveTarget("192.168.1.10", { allowPrivate: false }), blocked("private"));
});
test("odd spellings of loopback don't get through (they're refused or don't resolve)", async () => {
for (const host of ["2130706433", "0x7f000001", "127.1", "0177.0.0.1"]) {
await assert.rejects(() => resolveTarget(host, { allowPrivate: true }), blocked(), host);
}
});
});
describe("certificate check", () => {
test("won't connect to loopback, link-local or metadata addresses", async () => {
for (const host of ["127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "169.254.169.254", "fd00:ec2::254", "100.100.100.200", "2130706433"]) {
await assert.rejects(() => fetchCertExpiry(host, 443, 500), blocked(), host);
}
});
test("LAN and public hosts get past the check (and fail only on the connection)", async () => {
// Nothing answers on these, so what comes back is a timeout or an unreachable error — never a refusal by the guard.
for (const host of ["192.0.2.1", "10.255.255.1"]) {
await assert.rejects(
() => fetchCertExpiry(host, 443, 400),
(err: unknown) => !(err instanceof BlockedTargetError),
host,
);
}
});
});
describe("WHOIS server", () => {
test("must look like a hostname and must be neither this machine, metadata nor private", async () => {
for (const server of ["127.0.0.1", "localhost", "169.254.169.254", "10.0.0.1", "192.168.1.1"]) {
await assert.rejects(() => defaultDeps.whoisQuery(server, "example.se"), blocked(), server);
}
for (const server of ["not a host", "evil.com/x", "a;b", "", "fd00::1", "[::1]"]) {
await assert.rejects(() => defaultDeps.whoisQuery(server, "example.se"), /not a hostname/, JSON.stringify(server));
}
});
});
describe("port scanner", () => {
test("refuses loopback and the cloud metadata address, still scans the LAN", async () => {
await assert.rejects(() => resolveScanTarget("127.0.0.1"));
await assert.rejects(() => resolveScanTarget("169.254.169.254"), /metadata/);
await assert.rejects(() => resolveScanTarget("8.8.8.8"), /private network/);
assert.equal(await resolveScanTarget("192.168.1.10"), "192.168.1.10");
assert.equal(await resolveScanTarget("100.64.1.2"), "100.64.1.2");
});
});
// ─── Routes ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let port = 0;
let server: http.Server;
let operator = "";
/** Sends a path exactly as written, with a raw body. Resolves with the status and the reply text. */
function send(method: string, path: string, opts: { cookie?: string; token?: string; json?: object; raw?: string } = {}): Promise<{ status: number; text: string }> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const payload = opts.raw ?? (opts.json ? JSON.stringify(opts.json) : undefined);
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
if (opts.cookie) headers.cookie = opts.cookie;
if (opts.token) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${opts.token}`;
if (payload !== undefined) {
headers["content-type"] = "application/json";
headers["content-length"] = String(Buffer.byteLength(payload));
}
const req = http.request({ host: "127.0.0.1", port, method, path, headers }, (res) => {
let text = "";
res.on("data", (c) => (text += c));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, text }));
});
// The server may answer (and close) before it has taken the whole body; that's the point of some of these tests.
req.on("error", (err) => (/EPIPE|ECONNRESET/.test(String(err)) ? undefined : reject(err)));
if (payload !== undefined) req.write(payload);
req.end();
});
}
let agentToken = "";
let agentServerId = 0;
before(async () => {
const express = (await import("express")).default;
const session = (await import("express-session")).default;
const { db } = await import("../src/db/client.js");
const { users, servers } = await import("../src/db/schema.js");
const { generateApiToken } = await import("../src/services/tokens.js");
const { secretsRouter } = await import("../src/routes/secrets.js");
const { agentReportRouter } = await import("../src/routes/agentReport.js");
const { apiErrorHandler } = await import("../src/utils/apiErrorHandler.js");
await db.insert(users).values({ oidcSub: "op", email: "op@x", name: "Operator", role: "operator" });
const { token, prefix, hash } = generateApiToken();
agentToken = token;
agentServerId = (await db.insert(servers).values({ name: "agent-host", apiTokenHash: hash, apiTokenPrefix: prefix }).returning())[0].id;
// The same order index.ts uses: the agent endpoint first, then the app-wide JSON parser and sessions, then everything else.
const app = express();
app.use("/api/agent/report", agentReportRouter);
app.use(express.json());
app.use(session({ secret: "t", resave: false, saveUninitialized: true }));
app.post("/login", (req, res) => {
req.session.user = { sub: "op" } as never;
res.json({});
});
app.use("/api/secrets", secretsRouter);
app.use(apiErrorHandler);
server = app.listen(0);
port = (server.address() as { port: number }).port;
operator = ((await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/login`, { method: "POST" })).headers.get("set-cookie") as string).split(";")[0];
});
after(() => {
server?.close();
try {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
// Windows keeps the SQLite file locked until the process exits.
}
});
describe("secrets: the certificate check can't be aimed at the server itself", () => {
test("a blocked host is refused with a clear reason", async () => {
for (const checkHost of ["127.0.0.1", "169.254.169.254", "localhost"]) {
const res = await send("POST", "/api/secrets", { cookie: operator, json: { name: "probe", type: "ssl_certificate", checkHost, checkPort: 8080 } });
assert.equal(res.status, 400, `${checkHost}: ${res.text}`);
assert.match(res.text, /can't be used/, checkHost);
}
});
test("with a typed-in expiry the secret is saved, and the check records why it wasn't done — it never connects", async () => {
const res = await send("POST", "/api/secrets", {
cookie: operator,
json: { name: "manual", type: "ssl_certificate", checkHost: "127.0.0.1", checkPort: 8080, expiryDate: "2030-01-01" },
});
assert.equal(res.status, 201, res.text);
assert.match(JSON.parse(res.text).secret.lastCheckError, /loopback/);
});
});
// ─── The agent endpoint ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("agent endpoint", () => {
const report = (extra: object = {}) => ({ hostname: "agent-host", os_type: "linux", tasks: [], ...extra });
test("is mounted ahead of the app-wide JSON parser and the session store", () => {
const index = readFileSync(join(repoRoot, "server/src/index.ts"), "utf8");
const agent = index.indexOf('app.use("/api/agent/report"');
assert.ok(agent > 0, "agent route not found in index.ts");
assert.ok(agent < index.indexOf("app.use(express.json())"), "the agent route must come before the 100 KB JSON parser");
assert.ok(agent < index.indexOf("session({"), "the agent route must come before the session store");
});
test("answers 401 without reading a body when the token is missing or wrong", async () => {
const huge = JSON.stringify(report({ hostname: "x".repeat(3_000_000) }));
assert.equal((await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { raw: huge })).status, 401);
assert.equal((await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { token: "hlm_" + "0".repeat(48), raw: huge })).status, 401);
assert.equal((await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { token: "nonsense", json: report() })).status, 401);
});
test("takes an ordinary report", async () => {
const res = await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { token: agentToken, json: report({ hostname: "web-1" }) });
assert.equal(res.status, 202, res.text);
});
test("takes a big report (well past the 100 KB the rest of the API allows) from a real agent", async () => {
const ports = Array.from({ length: 2500 }, (_, i) => ({ protocol: "tcp", port: 1000 + i, address: "0.0.0.0", process: "some-process-name" }));
const body = JSON.stringify(report({ system: { listening_ports: ports } }));
assert.ok(body.length > 150_000, `the test report should be larger than 100 KB, was ${body.length}`);
const res = await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { token: agentToken, raw: body });
assert.equal(res.status, 202, res.text);
const { db } = await import("../src/db/client.js");
const row = await db.query.servers.findFirst({ where: (s, { eq }) => eq(s.id, agentServerId) });
assert.equal(JSON.parse(row!.listeningPorts!).length, 2500);
});
test("a body over the limit is a 413, not a server error", async () => {
const res = await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { token: agentToken, raw: JSON.stringify(report({ hostname: "x".repeat(4_500_000) })) });
assert.equal(res.status, 413, res.text);
assert.match(res.text, /payload_too_large/);
});
test("malformed JSON is a 400", async () => {
const res = await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", { token: agentToken, raw: "{not json" });
assert.equal(res.status, 400);
assert.match(res.text, /invalid_json/);
});
test("overlong text is trimmed instead of costing the host its whole report", async () => {
const res = await send("POST", "/api/agent/report", {
token: agentToken,
json: report({
hostname: "h".repeat(300),
system: { ip_addresses: Array.from({ length: 300 }, (_, i) => `10.0.${Math.floor(i / 250)}.${i % 250}`) },
tasks: [
{ schedule_type: "cron", name: "n".repeat(600), command: "c".repeat(20_000), schedule_expression: "* * * * *" },
{ schedule_type: "cron", name: "big-metadata", metadata: { blob: "m".repeat(60_000) } },
{ schedule_type: "cron", name: "small-metadata", metadata: { user: "root" } },
],
}),
});
assert.equal(res.status, 202, res.text);
const { db } = await import("../src/db/client.js");
const row = await db.query.servers.findFirst({ where: (s, { eq }) => eq(s.id, agentServerId) });
assert.equal(row!.hostname!.length, 255);
assert.equal(JSON.parse(row!.ipAddresses!).length, 200);
const tasks = await db.query.scheduledTasks.findMany({ where: (t, { eq }) => eq(t.serverId, agentServerId) });
const long = tasks.find((t) => t.name.startsWith("nnn"))!;
assert.equal(long.name.length, 500);
assert.equal(long.command!.length, 8000);
assert.equal(tasks.find((t) => t.name === "big-metadata")!.rawMetadata, null, "oversize metadata is dropped, the task kept");
assert.equal(tasks.find((t) => t.name === "small-metadata")!.rawMetadata, JSON.stringify({ user: "root" }));
});
});
// ─── The Linux agent ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const agentScript = join(repoRoot, "agent/linux/report-tasks.sh");
const installScript = join(repoRoot, "agent/linux/install.sh");
const haveBash = spawnSync("bash", ["-c", "command -v curl"]).status === 0;
const posix = (p: string) => p.replace(/\\/g, "/");
/** Runs a command without blocking this process (the fake server in these tests lives in it, so a blocking spawn would deadlock). */
function run(cmd: string, args: string[], env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): Promise<{ status: number | null; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const child = spawn(cmd, args, { env });
let stdout = "";
let stderr = "";
const timer = setTimeout(() => child.kill(), 30_000);
child.stdout.on("data", (c) => (stdout += c));
child.stderr.on("data", (c) => (stderr += c));
child.on("error", reject);
child.on("close", (status) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve({ status, stdout, stderr });
});
});
}
describe("Linux agent", () => {
test("both scripts are valid bash", { skip: !haveBash }, () => {
for (const script of [agentScript, installScript]) {
const r = spawnSync("bash", ["-n", posix(script)], { encoding: "utf8" });
assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
}
});
test("the token never goes on a command line and nothing is written to a fixed /tmp path", () => {
const text = readFileSync(agentScript, "utf8");
assert.doesNotMatch(text, /-H\s+"Authorization/, "the token must not be passed with -H");
assert.doesNotMatch(text, /\/tmp\/hlm/, "no fixed file name in /tmp");
assert.match(text, /mktemp -d/);
assert.match(text, /trap 'rm -rf "\$HLM_TMPDIR"' EXIT/);
assert.match(text, /curl .* -K -/, "curl should read its config (with the token) from stdin");
});
test("the systemd unit is locked down", () => {
const text = readFileSync(installScript, "utf8");
const unit = text.slice(text.indexOf("[Service]"), text.indexOf("EOF", text.indexOf("[Service]")));
for (const directive of ["NoNewPrivileges=yes", "PrivateTmp=yes", "ProtectSystem=strict", "ProtectHome=read-only", "ProtectKernelTunables=yes", "ProtectControlGroups=yes", "LockPersonality=yes", "RestrictAddressFamilies="]) {
assert.ok(unit.includes(directive), `missing ${directive}`);
}
// It has to keep seeing every process: that is how it names the program behind a listening port.
assert.doesNotMatch(unit, /ProtectProc|ProcSubset/);
});
describe("the upload, run against a fake server", { skip: !haveBash }, () => {
let fake: http.Server;
let fakePort = 0;
let seen: { authorization?: string; contentType?: string; body: string }[] = [];
let work = "";
before(async () => {
work = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hm-agent-upload-"));
fake = http.createServer((req, res) => {
let body = "";
req.on("data", (c) => (body += c));
req.on("end", () => {
seen.push({ authorization: req.headers.authorization, contentType: req.headers["content-type"], body });
res.writeHead(202, { "content-type": "application/json" });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
});
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => fake.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
fakePort = (fake.address() as { port: number }).port;
// A curl that records its own arguments and then runs the real one — to prove what is, and isn't, on the command line.
writeFileSync(join(work, "curl"), '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf \'%s\\n\' "$@" >> "$ARGV_LOG"\nexec "$REAL_CURL" "$@"\n');
});
after(() => {
fake?.close();
try {
rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
// best effort
}
});
/** Runs the script's own post_report function (cut out of the real file) the way the script does. */
async function upload(token: string, payload: string) {
seen = [];
const argvLog = join(work, "argv.log");
const tmpRecord = join(work, "tmpdir.txt");
rmSync(argvLog, { force: true });
const harness = [
"set -euo pipefail",
'REAL_CURL=$(command -v curl); export REAL_CURL ARGV_LOG="$(cygpath -u "$ARGV_LOG_WIN" 2>/dev/null || echo "$ARGV_LOG_WIN")"',
// A "C:/..." directory can't go in PATH on Windows bash (the colon splits it), so convert it the way bash itself would.
'SHIM_UNIX=$(cygpath -u "$SHIM_DIR" 2>/dev/null || echo "$SHIM_DIR")',
'chmod +x "$SHIM_UNIX/curl"; PATH="$SHIM_UNIX:$PATH"',
'source <(sed -n "/^# >>> post_report/,/^# <<< post_report/p" "$AGENT_SCRIPT")',
"CURL_INSECURE_FLAG=()",
'HLM_TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d); printf "%s" "$HLM_TMPDIR" > "$TMP_RECORD"',
"trap 'rm -rf \"$HLM_TMPDIR\"' EXIT",
"response=$(post_report)",
'echo "HTTP=$response"',
].join("\n");
const r = await run("bash", ["-c", harness], {
...process.env,
API_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${fakePort}`,
API_TOKEN: token,
PAYLOAD: payload,
SHIM_DIR: posix(work),
AGENT_SCRIPT: posix(agentScript),
ARGV_LOG_WIN: argvLog,
TMP_RECORD: posix(tmpRecord),
});
const argv = existsSync(argvLog) ? readFileSync(argvLog, "utf8") : "";
return { ...r, argv, tmpdir: existsSync(tmpRecord) ? readFileSync(tmpRecord, "utf8") : "" };
}
test("an ordinary report arrives with the token as a header, and the token isn't in curl's arguments", async () => {
const r = await upload("hlm_abc123", '{"hostname":"web-1","tasks":[]}');
assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
assert.match(r.stdout, /HTTP=202/);
assert.equal(seen.length, 1);
assert.equal(seen[0].authorization, "Bearer hlm_abc123");
assert.equal(seen[0].contentType, "application/json");
assert.equal(seen[0].body, '{"hostname":"web-1","tasks":[]}');
assert.ok(r.argv.length > 0, "the curl shim recorded nothing, so the test proves nothing");
assert.doesNotMatch(r.argv, /hlm_abc123/, "the token was on curl's command line");
assert.doesNotMatch(r.argv, /Authorization/i);
});
test("a token with quotes, a backslash and a space arrives intact", async () => {
const token = 'hlm_a"b\\c d';
const r = await upload(token, "{}");
assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
assert.equal(seen[0].authorization, `Bearer ${token}`);
});
test("a large report goes through (it isn't limited by the length of a command line)", async () => {
const payload = JSON.stringify({ tasks: [], padding: "p".repeat(600_000) });
const r = await upload("hlm_big", payload);
assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
assert.equal(seen[0].body.length, payload.length);
assert.doesNotMatch(r.argv, /ppppppppppppppppppppppppp/, "the payload was on curl's command line");
});
test("a token with a line break is refused and nothing is sent", async () => {
const r = await upload("hlm_x\nX-Injected: yes", "{}");
assert.notEqual(r.status, 0);
assert.match(r.stderr, /line break/);
assert.equal(seen.length, 0);
});
test("the private temporary directory is gone afterwards", async () => {
const r = await upload("hlm_clean", "{}");
assert.equal(r.status, 0, r.stderr);
assert.ok(r.tmpdir.length > 0);
const gone = spawnSync("bash", ["-c", `test ! -e "${r.tmpdir}"`]);
assert.equal(gone.status, 0, `${r.tmpdir} still exists`);
});
});
});
// ─── The Windows installer ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
const pwsh = process.platform === "win32" ? spawnSync("pwsh", ["-NoProfile", "-Command", "$PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major"], { encoding: "utf8" }) : null;
const havePwsh = pwsh?.status === 0;
describe("Windows installer", { skip: !havePwsh }, () => {
test("the folder the SYSTEM task runs from is writable only by SYSTEM and Administrators", () => {
const work = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hm-acl-"));
const target = join(work, "HomelabManager");
mkdirSync(target);
const script = `
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
. '${join(repoRoot, "agent", "windows", "install.ps1").replace(/'/g, "''")}'
$me = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value
Protect-InstallDir '${target.replace(/'/g, "''")}' -ExtraGrants @("*\${me}:(OI)(CI)(F)") # lets this un-elevated test keep access to its own folder
$file = Join-Path '${target.replace(/'/g, "''")}' 'homelab-manager-agent.ps1'
Set-Content -Path $file -Value 'x'
function Describe($p) {
$acl = Get-Acl $p
foreach ($rule in $acl.GetAccessRules($true, $true, [Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])) { '{0}|{1}' -f $rule.IdentityReference.Value, $rule.IsInherited }
}
'DIR'; Describe '${target.replace(/'/g, "''")}'
'FILE'; Describe $file
'ME=' + $me
`;
const scriptFile = join(work, "check-acl.ps1");
writeFileSync(scriptFile, script);
const r = spawnSync("pwsh", ["-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-File", scriptFile], { encoding: "utf8" });
try {
// No error output and a complete listing; the exit status is left out because PowerShell's -File status isn't reliable across hosts here.
assert.equal(r.stderr.trim(), "", `PowerShell reported an error:
${r.stderr}
${r.stdout}`);
assert.ok(r.stdout.includes("ME="), `the script did not finish:
${r.stdout}`);
const lines = r.stdout.split(/\r?\n/).map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean);
const me = lines.find((l) => l.startsWith("ME="))!.slice(3);
const part = (from: string, to: string | null) => lines.slice(lines.indexOf(from) + 1, to ? lines.indexOf(to) : lines.findIndex((l) => l.startsWith("ME="))).map((l) => l.split("|"));
const dir = part("DIR", "FILE");
const file = part("FILE", null);
const allowed = new Set(["S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-32-544", me]);
assert.deepEqual(new Set(dir.map(([sid]) => sid)), allowed, `folder ACL: ${JSON.stringify(dir)}`);
assert.ok(dir.every(([, inherited]) => inherited === "False"), "the folder must not inherit ProgramData's permissions");
assert.deepEqual(new Set(file.map(([sid]) => sid)), allowed, `file ACL: ${JSON.stringify(file)}`);
for (const everyone of ["S-1-5-32-545" /* Users */, "S-1-5-11" /* Authenticated Users */, "S-1-1-0" /* Everyone */]) {
assert.ok(!dir.some(([sid]) => sid === everyone) && !file.some(([sid]) => sid === everyone), `${everyone} has access`);
}
} finally {
try {
rmSync(work, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
// best effort
}
}
});
});