Linux agent unit: keep only the root powers it uses; make unit files readable
The systemd unit now bounds the agent's capabilities to the three jobs it does as root -- reading every user's crontab (DAC_OVERRIDE, DAC_READ_SEARCH), running "crontab -l -u" (SETUID, SETGID) and naming the program behind each socket (SYS_PTRACE) -- and adds ProtectClock, ProtectHostname, MemoryDenyWriteExecute and DevicePolicy=closed. It does not use PrivateDevices, which would hide /dev/log (crontab logs each read there), nor anything that hides other processes or users, since the agent needs both. The installer's umask 077 (for the token file) also left the unit files readable by root only; they now get chmod 644, so "systemctl cat" works for any user. The test renders the unit through the installer's own heredoc, so a stray backtick or $ would show up, and pins the capability list: tightening it silently drops tasks or process names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ ExecStart=$INSTALL_DIR/homelab-manager-agent.sh
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# The agent only reads (crontabs, timers, /proc, listening sockets) and makes one HTTPS request, but it runs as root. These
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# keep a bug in it, or in anything it parses, from being able to change the system. It still sees every process, which is
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# how it names the program behind each listening port. Directives an older systemd doesn't know are ignored.
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#
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# Of root's powers it keeps only what it uses: to read every user's crontab (DAC_OVERRIDE, DAC_READ_SEARCH), to run
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# the command that lists one user's crontab, which switches user and group (SETUID, SETGID), and to see which program owns each socket (SYS_PTRACE).
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# If a change here ever makes a report lose tasks, this line is the first thing to look at.
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CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID
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# Not PrivateDevices=: that would also hide /dev/log, which crontab writes to each time the agent reads a crontab. This stops it
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# opening hardware devices all the same.
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DevicePolicy=closed
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UMask=0077
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NoNewPrivileges=yes
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PrivateTmp=yes
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@@ -100,6 +108,9 @@ ProtectKernelTunables=yes
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ProtectKernelModules=yes
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ProtectKernelLogs=yes
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ProtectControlGroups=yes
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ProtectClock=yes
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ProtectHostname=yes
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MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
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RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
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RestrictRealtime=yes
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RestrictNamespaces=yes
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@@ -121,6 +132,9 @@ Persistent=true
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WantedBy=timers.target
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EOF
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# The umask above is for the token file. Unit files hold nothing secret and are meant to be readable (systemctl cat, as any user).
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chmod 644 "$SYSTEMD_DIR/homelab-manager-agent.service" "$SYSTEMD_DIR/homelab-manager-agent.timer"
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systemctl daemon-reload
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systemctl enable --now homelab-manager-agent.timer
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