Harden the login flow: new session at sign-in, signed ID tokens, same-origin requests, headers

From an audit of the Authentik login, run against a fake OIDC provider:

- Session fixation: the session id wasn't changed at sign-in, so one planted beforehand
  (from another page on the domain) became signed in as the victim. It is regenerated now.
- Requests from another origin: SameSite=Lax doesn't stop another app on the same parent
  domain, and a body-less POST (stop a guest, rotate a token) needs no preflight. Every
  POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE, and GET /auth/logout, is refused when Sec-Fetch-Site (or, for older
  browsers, Origin) says it came from elsewhere. The agent endpoint is exempt: it uses a token.
- ID token signature: openid-client checks a token's claims but, as OIDC allows for a token
  from the token endpoint, not its signature, so the login rested on HTTPS to Authentik
  alone. The signature is now verified against the provider's published keys (jose, now a
  declared dependency).
- SESSION_SECRET: production refuses to start without one (the fallback is in the source
  code) and warns when it is the .env.example placeholder or short.
- Response headers: frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy; the
  framework name is no longer sent.
- A failed sign-in shows a plain page and is audited (session / login_failed, with address
  and reason, no tokens); sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address so the
  audit log and session store can't be flooded.
- A failed OIDC discovery (provider down at the first sign-in) was remembered until restart;
  it is retried now.

Tests run the real app against the fake provider; switching each fix off in turn makes
the matching tests fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
bobbanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-06 23:35:34 +02:00
1 parent 73b86d88de
commit 2dac273b1d
12 files changed
+681 -18

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+2
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@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ APP_BASE_URL=https://homelab.example.lan
# Random long string used to sign session cookies. Generate with: # Random long string used to sign session cookies. Generate with:
# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))" # node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))"
# Required in production: without it the app refuses to start (the alternative is a value that is
# in the source code). Changing it signs everyone out.
SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string
# 32-byte (64 hex char) key used to encrypt stored integration API tokens, and the # 32-byte (64 hex char) key used to encrypt stored integration API tokens, and the
+12
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@@ -232,6 +232,18 @@ relatives), and connect to the address they checked rather than looking the name
checks and scans; a WHOIS server must be public. IDs in a request (a device, a node, a DNS record) are checked against what a real ID checks and scans; a WHOIS server must be public. IDs in a request (a device, a node, a DNS record) are checked against what a real ID
looks like before they go into a call to a connected system. `npm test --workspace server` covers all of this. looks like before they go into a call to a connected system. `npm test --workspace server` covers all of this.
**Signing in** — through Authentik (OpenID Connect) with PKCE and a random `state`. The ID token's signature is checked against Authentik's
published keys, not just its contents, so the login doesn't rest on the connection to Authentik alone. A new session id is issued at sign-in. A
request that changes something is refused when it comes from another origin: the session cookie is SameSite=Lax, which doesn't stop another app on
the same parent domain, so the server also checks where each such request came from. A failed sign-in shows a plain message and is written to the
audit log (as `session` / `login_failed`, with the address and a short reason), and sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address.
Every response carries `frame-ancestors 'none'`, `X-Frame-Options`, `nosniff` and a no-referrer-to-other-sites policy. In production the app
refuses to start without a `SESSION_SECRET`, and warns if it is still the placeholder from `.env.example`.
Things to know: the first account to sign in becomes admin, so sign in yourself first on a new install. A session lasts up to 7 days after last use,
and disabling someone in Authentik does not end it — delete them on the Users page (or revoke the session on the Sessions page) and it ends at once.
If Authentik uses a certificate from an internal CA, point Node at the CA with `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/path/to/ca.pem` rather than turning verification
off with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`.
**Privacy** — a page every signed-in user can open that says what this **Privacy** — a page every signed-in user can open that says what this
installation stores (accounts, sign-in sessions with their IP and browser, the audit installation stores (accounts, sign-in sessions with their IP and browser, the audit
and diagnostic logs, server reports, the secrets tracker, credentials), where data and diagnostic logs, server reports, the secrets tracker, credentials), where data
+1
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@@ -5002,6 +5002,7 @@
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2", "drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
"express": "^4.21.2", "express": "^4.21.2",
"express-session": "^1.18.1", "express-session": "^1.18.1",
"jose": "^6.2.12",
"mysql2": "^3.24.5", "mysql2": "^3.24.5",
"node-schedule": "^2.1.1", "node-schedule": "^2.1.1",
"nodemailer": "^6.9.14", "nodemailer": "^6.9.14",
+1
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@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2", "drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
"express": "^4.21.2", "express": "^4.21.2",
"express-session": "^1.18.1", "express-session": "^1.18.1",
"jose": "^6.2.12",
"mysql2": "^3.24.5", "mysql2": "^3.24.5",
"node-schedule": "^2.1.1", "node-schedule": "^2.1.1",
"nodemailer": "^6.9.14", "nodemailer": "^6.9.14",
+37
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
import * as client from "openid-client";
import { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify } from "jose";
import { env } from "../env.js";
const keySets = new WeakMap<client.Configuration, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>();
/**
* Checks the ID token's signature against the keys the identity provider publishes.
*
* openid-client already checks the token's claims (issuer, audience, expiry, subject) but, as OpenID Connect allows for a token
* received straight from the token endpoint, not its signature: it takes the HTTPS connection to the provider as proof of where
* the token came from. That makes the whole login only as strong as that connection — if certificate checking toward the
* provider is ever switched off (the usual way to cope with an internal CA is NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0), anyone on the
* network path could hand the app a token naming any user, the admin included. Verifying the signature as well means a weakened
* connection no longer lets a forged login through.
*
* Throws if the signature is wrong or the provider publishes no keys.
*/
export async function verifyIdTokenSignature(config: client.Configuration, idToken: string): Promise<void> {
const metadata = config.serverMetadata();
if (!metadata.jwks_uri) throw new Error("The identity provider publishes no signing keys (no jwks_uri).");
let keys = keySets.get(config);
if (!keys) {
// Fetched on demand and cached; an unknown key id (the provider rotated its key) triggers a re-fetch.
keys = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(metadata.jwks_uri));
keySets.set(config, keys);
}
await jwtVerify(idToken, keys, {
issuer: metadata.issuer,
audience: env.authentik.clientId,
// The one algorithm openid-client itself accepts unless told otherwise, so this can't turn away a token the library would take.
algorithms: [config.clientMetadata().id_token_signed_response_alg ?? "RS256"],
clockTolerance: 60,
});
}
+4
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@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ export function getOidcConfig(): Promise<client.Configuration> {
env.authentik.clientId, env.authentik.clientId,
env.authentik.clientSecret, env.authentik.clientSecret,
); );
// If the provider was unreachable this time, try again on the next sign-in — not never, until the app is restarted.
configPromise.catch(() => {
configPromise = null;
});
} }
return configPromise; return configPromise;
} }
+74 -18
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Router } from "express"; import { Router, type Request, type Response } from "express";
import * as client from "openid-client"; import * as client from "openid-client";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm"; import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { getOidcConfig } from "./oidc.js"; import { getOidcConfig } from "./oidc.js";
@@ -7,12 +7,54 @@ import { env } from "../env.js";
import { db } from "../db/client.js"; import { db } from "../db/client.js";
import { users } from "../db/schema.js"; import { users } from "../db/schema.js";
import { recordAudit } from "../services/audit.js"; import { recordAudit } from "../services/audit.js";
import { verifyIdTokenSignature } from "./idToken.js";
import { rateLimit } from "../utils/rateLimit.js";
export const authRouter = Router(); export const authRouter = Router();
authRouter.get("/login", async (req, res, next) => { // Anyone can reach these two without an account. Each visit to /login starts a session and each failed callback is written to the
// audit log, so without a limit one script could fill the disk and the log.
const signInLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 60_000, max: 20, message: "Too many sign-in attempts. Wait a minute and try again." });
const SIGN_IN_FAILED_PAGE = `<!doctype html>
<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"><title>Sign-in failed</title></head>
<body style="font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; max-width: 32rem; margin: 4rem auto; padding: 0 1rem; line-height: 1.5">
<h1>Sign-in failed</h1>
<p>Something went wrong while signing you in. <a href="/auth/login">Try again</a>.</p>
<p>If it keeps failing, ask an administrator to look at the audit log.</p>
</body></html>`;
/**
* A sign-in that didn't work: the person gets a plain explanation (never the reason — that tells an attacker what to adjust),
* and the reason goes to the server log and, unless it's just a stale page, the audit log.
*/
async function failSignIn(req: Request, res: Response, reason: string, err?: unknown, options: { audit?: boolean } = {}) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : err === undefined ? undefined : String(err);
console.error(`[auth] sign-in failed (${reason})${message ? `: ${message}` : ""}`);
if (options.audit !== false) {
try {
await recordAudit({
category: "session",
action: "login_failed",
targetType: "auth",
detail: { reason, ...(message ? { error: message.slice(0, 200) } : {}), ip: req.ip },
});
} catch (auditErr) {
console.error("[auth] couldn't record the failed sign-in:", auditErr);
}
}
delete req.session.pendingAuth; // a failed attempt's state and verifier can't be tried again
res.status(400).type("html").send(SIGN_IN_FAILED_PAGE);
}
authRouter.get("/login", signInLimiter, async (req, res, next) => {
try { try {
const config = await getOidcConfig(); let config;
try {
config = await getOidcConfig();
} catch (err) {
return await failSignIn(req, res, "provider_unreachable", err);
}
const codeVerifier = client.randomPKCECodeVerifier(); const codeVerifier = client.randomPKCECodeVerifier();
const codeChallenge = await client.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(codeVerifier); const codeChallenge = await client.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(codeVerifier);
const state = client.randomState(); const state = client.randomState();
@@ -37,24 +79,33 @@ authRouter.get("/login", async (req, res, next) => {
} }
}); });
authRouter.get("/callback", async (req, res, next) => { authRouter.get("/callback", signInLimiter, async (req, res, next) => {
try { try {
const pending = req.session.pendingAuth; const pending = req.session.pendingAuth;
if (!pending) { if (!pending) {
return res.status(400).send("Login session expired. Please try signing in again."); // A page left open, or the callback address visited by hand: not worth an audit entry.
return await failSignIn(req, res, "no_pending_login", undefined, { audit: false });
} }
const config = await getOidcConfig(); let config;
const currentUrl = new URL(req.originalUrl, env.appBaseUrl); let tokens;
try {
const tokens = await client.authorizationCodeGrant(config, currentUrl, { config = await getOidcConfig();
pkceCodeVerifier: pending.codeVerifier, const currentUrl = new URL(req.originalUrl, env.appBaseUrl);
expectedState: pending.state, tokens = await client.authorizationCodeGrant(config, currentUrl, {
}); pkceCodeVerifier: pending.codeVerifier,
expectedState: pending.state,
});
if (!tokens.id_token) throw new Error("The identity provider returned no ID token.");
// Not just the claims: the signature too, so the login doesn't rest on the connection to the provider alone.
await verifyIdTokenSignature(config, tokens.id_token);
} catch (err) {
return await failSignIn(req, res, "provider_rejected", err);
}
const claims = tokens.claims(); const claims = tokens.claims();
if (!claims?.sub) { if (!claims?.sub) {
return res.status(400).send("Identity provider did not return a valid identity."); return await failSignIn(req, res, "no_identity");
} }
let email: string | undefined = typeof claims.email === "string" ? claims.email : undefined; let email: string | undefined = typeof claims.email === "string" ? claims.email : undefined;
@@ -90,8 +141,7 @@ authRouter.get("/callback", async (req, res, next) => {
detail: { name: user.name ?? user.email ?? user.oidcSub, ip: req.ip }, detail: { name: user.name ?? user.email ?? user.oidcSub, ip: req.ip },
}); });
delete req.session.pendingAuth; const signedIn = {
req.session.user = {
sub: claims.sub, sub: claims.sub,
email, email,
name, name,
@@ -99,9 +149,15 @@ authRouter.get("/callback", async (req, res, next) => {
ip: req.ip, ip: req.ip,
userAgent: req.headers["user-agent"], userAgent: req.headers["user-agent"],
}; };
req.session.save((err) => { // A new session id for the signed-in session. Reusing the one the browser arrived with would let anyone who had planted that
if (err) return next(err); // id beforehand (from another page on the same domain, say) be signed in as whoever then completes the login.
res.redirect("/"); req.session.regenerate((regenerateErr) => {
if (regenerateErr) return next(regenerateErr);
req.session.user = signedIn;
req.session.save((saveErr) => {
if (saveErr) return next(saveErr);
res.redirect("/");
});
}); });
} catch (err) { } catch (err) {
next(err); next(err);
+25
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@@ -19,6 +19,31 @@ export const env = {
}, },
}; };
/** What .env.example ships with. Anyone who read the repository knows it. */
export const SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER = "change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string";
/**
* Whether the session secret is fit to run production with. Missing is fatal (the app would fall back to a value in its own
* source code); the placeholder from .env.example or something short is a warning, not a refusal, so an existing install
* that has been running with one isn't locked out by an upgrade.
*/
export function checkSessionSecret(value: string | undefined, nodeEnv: string): { fatal?: string; warning?: string } {
if (nodeEnv !== "production") return {};
if (!value) {
return {
fatal:
"SESSION_SECRET is not set. Sessions would be signed with a value that is public (it is in the source code). " +
"Set it to a long random string, e.g. node -e \"console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))\" " +
"(everyone is signed out when it changes).",
};
}
if (value === SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER) {
return { warning: "SESSION_SECRET is still the placeholder from .env.example, which is public. Replace it with a random value (everyone is signed out when it changes)." };
}
if (value.length < 32) return { warning: "SESSION_SECRET is shorter than 32 characters. Use a long random value." };
return {};
}
export function warnIfAuthNotConfigured() { export function warnIfAuthNotConfigured() {
if (!env.authEnabled) { if (!env.authEnabled) {
console.warn( console.warn(
+32
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
/**
* A small fixed-window limiter, per client address. It exists for the sign-in endpoints, which anyone can reach without an
* account: each visit to /auth/login starts a session, and each failed callback is written to the audit log, so without a
* limit one script could fill the disk and the log. Kept in memory — a restart clears it, which is fine for this.
*/
export function rateLimit(options: { windowMs: number; max: number; message: string }) {
const windows = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
const now = Date.now();
const key = req.ip ?? "unknown";
if (windows.size > 10_000) {
for (const [k, w] of windows) if (w.resetAt <= now) windows.delete(k);
}
let entry = windows.get(key);
if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= now) {
entry = { count: 0, resetAt: now + options.windowMs };
windows.set(key, entry);
}
entry.count++;
if (entry.count > options.max) {
res.setHeader("Retry-After", String(Math.ceil((entry.resetAt - now) / 1000)));
return res.status(429).type("text/plain").send(options.message);
}
next();
};
}
+44
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@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
import { env } from "../env.js";
/**
* Refuses a request that changes something when it was made by a page on another origin.
*
* The session cookie is SameSite=Lax, which stops *other sites* from sending it. It does not stop another app on the same
* parent domain (dockge.home.lan against hm.home.lan is "same site"), and a POST with no body — stop a guest, restart a
* container, rotate a token — needs no preflight and does exactly what it says. So the server asks the browser where the request
* came from.
*
* Modern browsers say so in Sec-Fetch-Site, and a page can't change it. For anything older, a browser always sends Origin
* with a cross-origin POST, so a request whose Origin isn't this app is refused. A request with neither header isn't from a
* browser (curl, a script) and has no ambient cookie to abuse, so it passes.
*
* Covered: every POST, PUT, PATCH and DELETE, and GET /auth/logout (signing someone out from another page is a
* nuisance, and it also ends their Authentik session). Not covered: the OIDC callback, which is a GET that
* legitimately arrives from the identity provider, and the agent endpoint, which uses a token and is mounted ahead of this.
*/
export function sameOriginGuard(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const changesSomething = !["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"].includes(req.method) || (req.method === "GET" && req.path === "/auth/logout");
if (!changesSomething) return next();
const site = req.get("sec-fetch-site");
if (site !== undefined) {
if (site === "same-origin" || site === "none") return next();
return refuse(res);
}
const origin = req.get("origin");
if (origin === undefined) return next();
try {
const host = new URL(origin).host;
const own = [req.get("host"), req.get("x-forwarded-host"), new URL(env.appBaseUrl).host];
if (own.includes(host)) return next();
} catch {
// an Origin that isn't a URL ("null", from a sandboxed frame) is not ours either
}
return refuse(res);
}
function refuse(res: Response) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: "cross_origin_request", message: "This request came from a different origin than the app, so it was refused." });
}
+21
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@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
/**
* Headers every response carries. Deliberately small: a full Content-Security-Policy would have to be tuned to the UI's own
* styles and scripts, and a wrong one breaks the app.
*
* - frame-ancestors 'none' / X-Frame-Options: nobody can put this app in a frame on another site and have someone click
* through it (the old header is for browsers that don't read the CSP one).
* - nosniff: a response is never reinterpreted as a different kind of file.
* - Referrer-Policy: the address of a page here isn't sent along when someone follows a link to another site — admin links
* and integration pages are exactly such links.
*
* No Strict-Transport-Security: whether the app is only ever reached over HTTPS is for the reverse proxy in front of it to say.
*/
export function securityHeaders(_req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'");
res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin");
next();
}
+428
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@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
/**
* Regression tests for the login flow, run against a fake OpenID Connect provider (a small HTTPS server that signs real tokens —
* and, when asked, broken ones) and the real application from createApp().
*
* - the ID token's signature is checked, not just its claims
* - a new session id is issued at sign-in (no session fixation)
* - a request that changes something, made from another origin, is refused
* - a failed sign-in gets a plain explanation and an audit entry, and sign-in is rate-limited
* - every response carries the anti-framing headers
* - the session secret is checked at startup
*
* Needs `openssl` (for the fake provider's throwaway certificate); skipped without it.
* Run with: npm test --workspace server
*/
import { test, describe, before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import https from "node:https";
import http from "node:http";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
const haveOpenssl = spawnSync("openssl", ["version"]).status === 0;
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hm-login-test-"));
process.env.DATABASE_PATH = join(dir, "test.sqlite");
process.env.SESSION_DIR = join(dir, "sessions");
process.env.CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "ab".repeat(32);
process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"; // the fake provider's certificate is self-signed and thrown away
const CLIENT_ID = "hm-client";
const CLIENT_SECRET = "client-secret";
let issuerBase = "";
let failDiscovery = true; // the very first sign-in must find the provider down, to prove that isn't remembered forever
// ─── the fake provider ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type Provider = { server: https.Server; close: () => void };
let provider: Provider | null = null;
const codes = new Map<string, { scenario: string; challenge: string; sub: string }>();
async function startProvider(): Promise<Provider> {
const jose = await import("jose");
const cert = spawnSync("openssl", ["req", "-x509", "-newkey", "rsa:2048", "-nodes", "-keyout", join(dir, "k.pem"), "-out", join(dir, "c.pem"), "-days", "1", "-subj", "//CN=localhost"], {
encoding: "utf8",
env: { ...process.env, MSYS_NO_PATHCONV: "1" },
});
if (cert.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl failed: ${cert.stderr}`);
const good = await jose.generateKeyPair("RS256");
const other = await jose.generateKeyPair("RS256");
const jwk = { ...(await jose.exportJWK(good.publicKey)), kid: "k1", alg: "RS256", use: "sig" };
async function idToken(scenario: string, sub: string) {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const claims = { iss: issuerBase, aud: CLIENT_ID, exp: now + 600 };
let key = good.privateKey;
if (scenario === "badsig") key = other.privateKey;
if (scenario === "wrongiss") claims.iss = "https://evil.example/";
if (scenario === "wrongaud") claims.aud = "someone-elses-client";
if (scenario === "expired") claims.exp = now - 3600;
if (scenario === "none") {
// an unsigned token, the classic forgery
const b64 = (o: object) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(o)).toString("base64url");
return `${b64({ alg: "none", typ: "JWT" })}.${b64({ ...claims, sub, iat: now - 10 })}.`;
}
if (scenario === "hs256") {
// signed with the client secret instead of the provider's key — not what the provider does, and not what the app expects
return new jose.SignJWT({}).setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" }).setIssuer(claims.iss).setAudience(claims.aud).setSubject(sub).setIssuedAt(now - 10).setExpirationTime(claims.exp).sign(new TextEncoder().encode(CLIENT_SECRET));
}
let jwt = new jose.SignJWT({ email: `${sub}@example.test`, name: sub }).setProtectedHeader({ alg: "RS256", kid: "k1" }).setIssuer(claims.iss).setAudience(claims.aud).setIssuedAt(now - 10).setExpirationTime(claims.exp);
if (scenario !== "nosub") jwt = jwt.setSubject(sub);
return jwt.sign(key);
}
const server = https.createServer({ key: readFileSync(join(dir, "k.pem")), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, "c.pem")) }, async (req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url!, issuerBase);
const json = (o: unknown) => {
res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
res.end(JSON.stringify(o));
};
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/.well-known/openid-configuration")) {
if (failDiscovery) {
res.statusCode = 503;
return res.end("down");
}
return json({
issuer: issuerBase, authorization_endpoint: issuerBase + "authorize", token_endpoint: issuerBase + "token", jwks_uri: issuerBase + "jwks",
userinfo_endpoint: issuerBase + "userinfo", end_session_endpoint: issuerBase + "end-session",
response_types_supported: ["code"], subject_types_supported: ["public"], id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"],
code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"], token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"],
});
}
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/jwks")) return json({ keys: [jwk] });
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/authorize")) {
const [scenario, sub] = (url.searchParams.get("login_hint") ?? "good|nobody").split("|");
const code = `${scenario}.${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}`;
codes.set(code, { scenario, challenge: url.searchParams.get("code_challenge")!, sub });
const back = new URL(url.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")!);
back.searchParams.set("code", code);
back.searchParams.set("state", url.searchParams.get("state")!);
back.searchParams.set("iss", issuerBase);
res.statusCode = 302;
res.setHeader("location", back.href);
return res.end();
}
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/token") && req.method === "POST") {
let body = "";
for await (const c of req) body += c;
const form = new URLSearchParams(body);
const entry = codes.get(form.get("code") ?? "");
if (!entry) {
res.statusCode = 400;
return json({ error: "invalid_grant" });
}
if (crypto.createHash("sha256").update(form.get("code_verifier") ?? "").digest("base64url") !== entry.challenge) {
res.statusCode = 400;
return json({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "PKCE verification failed" });
}
codes.delete(form.get("code")!);
return json({ token_type: "Bearer", access_token: "at-" + entry.sub, expires_in: 300, id_token: await idToken(entry.scenario, entry.sub) });
}
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/userinfo")) {
const sub = (req.headers.authorization ?? "").replace(/^Bearer at-/, "");
return json({ sub, email: "from-userinfo@example.test", name: "From Userinfo" });
}
res.statusCode = 404;
res.end("nope");
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
issuerBase = `https://127.0.0.1:${(server.address() as { port: number }).port}/application/o/hm/`;
return { server, close: () => server.close() };
}
// The app reads its configuration when its modules are first loaded, so the provider has to be up — and its address known —
// before anything from ../src is imported.
if (haveOpenssl) {
provider = await startProvider();
Object.assign(process.env, {
AUTHENTIK_ISSUER_URL: issuerBase,
AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_ID: CLIENT_ID,
AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_SECRET: CLIENT_SECRET,
APP_BASE_URL: "http://app.test",
SESSION_SECRET: "test-session-secret-that-is-long-enough",
});
}
const { SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER, checkSessionSecret } = await import("../src/env.js");
// ─── the app ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let app: http.Server;
let appPort = 0;
let db: typeof import("../src/db/client.js")["db"];
let tables: typeof import("../src/db/schema.js");
type Res = { status: number; headers: http.IncomingHttpHeaders; text: string };
let ipCounter = 0;
const freshIp = () => `10.1.${Math.floor(++ipCounter / 250)}.${ipCounter % 250}`;
function call(method: string, path: string, opts: { cookie?: string; headers?: Record<string, string>; ip?: string } = {}): Promise<Res> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const headers: Record<string, string> = { "x-forwarded-for": opts.ip ?? freshIp(), ...opts.headers };
if (opts.cookie) headers.cookie = opts.cookie;
const req = http.request({ host: "127.0.0.1", port: appPort, method, path, headers }, (res) => {
let text = "";
res.on("data", (c) => (text += c));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, headers: res.headers, text }));
});
req.on("error", reject);
req.end();
});
}
const sidOf = (setCookie?: string[]) => setCookie?.find((c) => c.startsWith("connect.sid="))?.split(";")[0];
const hopToProvider = (u: string) =>
new Promise<Res>((resolve, reject) =>
https.get(u, { rejectUnauthorized: false }, (res) => {
let text = "";
res.on("data", (c) => (text += c));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, headers: res.headers, text }));
}).on("error", reject),
);
/** The browser's part of the sign-in, done by hand, as one client address. */
async function signIn(scenario: string, sub: string, opts: { cookie?: string; tamperState?: boolean; ip?: string } = {}) {
const ip = opts.ip ?? freshIp();
const start = await call("GET", "/auth/login", { cookie: opts.cookie, ip });
const cookie = sidOf(start.headers["set-cookie"]) ?? opts.cookie!;
const authUrl = new URL(start.headers.location!);
authUrl.searchParams.set("login_hint", `${scenario}|${sub}`);
const back = new URL((await hopToProvider(authUrl.href)).headers.location!);
if (opts.tamperState) back.searchParams.set("state", "not-the-state");
// The provider sends the browser back from another site, so the callback arrives marked cross-site — and must still work.
const callback = await call("GET", back.pathname + back.search, { cookie, ip, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } });
return { cookie, callback, newCookie: sidOf(callback.headers["set-cookie"]), authUrl, loginResponse: start };
}
const me = async (cookie: string) => (await call("GET", "/api/me", { cookie })).status;
before(async () => {
if (!haveOpenssl) return;
const { runMigrations } = await import("../src/db/migrate.js");
({ db } = await import("../src/db/client.js"));
tables = await import("../src/db/schema.js");
const { createApp } = await import("../src/app.js");
await runMigrations();
app = createApp().listen(0);
appPort = (app.address() as { port: number }).port;
});
after(() => {
app?.close();
provider?.close();
try {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
// Windows keeps the SQLite file locked until the process exits.
}
});
const auditEntries = async (action: string) => (await db.select().from(tables.auditLog)).filter((e) => e.action === action);
// ─── tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("sign-in", { skip: !haveOpenssl }, () => {
test("an unreachable provider is a plain message — and isn't remembered once it's back", async () => {
const down = await call("GET", "/auth/login");
assert.equal(down.status, 400, down.text);
assert.match(down.text, /Sign-in failed/);
assert.doesNotMatch(down.text, /503|ECONN|discovery|127\.0\.0\.1/i, "the page must not say why");
failDiscovery = false;
const up = await call("GET", "/auth/login");
assert.equal(up.status, 302, "the first failure was cached and the provider is never asked again");
const entries = await auditEntries("login_failed");
assert.ok(entries.some((e) => JSON.parse(e.detail!).reason === "provider_unreachable"));
});
test("the authorization request uses PKCE, a random state, and a cookie scripts can't read", async () => {
const r = await call("GET", "/auth/login");
const u = new URL(r.headers.location!);
assert.equal(u.searchParams.get("code_challenge_method"), "S256");
assert.ok((u.searchParams.get("state") ?? "").length >= 32);
assert.equal(u.searchParams.get("scope"), "openid email profile");
const cookie = (r.headers["set-cookie"] ?? []).join(";");
assert.match(cookie, /HttpOnly/);
assert.match(cookie, /SameSite=Lax/);
});
test("a good sign-in works: the first account is admin, the next is a viewer, and the name comes from userinfo", async () => {
const first = await signIn("good", "alice");
assert.equal(first.callback.status, 302);
assert.equal(first.callback.headers.location, "/");
assert.equal(await me(first.newCookie!), 200);
const second = await signIn("good", "bob");
assert.equal(await me(second.newCookie!), 200);
const roles = Object.fromEntries((await db.select().from(tables.users)).map((u) => [u.oidcSub, u.role]));
assert.deepEqual(roles, { alice: "admin", bob: "viewer" });
assert.equal((await db.select().from(tables.users))[0].name, "From Userinfo");
});
test("tokens that must never be believed leave nobody signed in, and the person gets a plain page", async () => {
for (const scenario of ["badsig", "wrongiss", "wrongaud", "expired", "nosub", "none", "hs256"]) {
const r = await signIn(scenario, "mallory");
assert.equal(r.callback.status, 400, `${scenario}: ${r.callback.text.slice(0, 100)}`);
assert.match(r.callback.text, /Sign-in failed/, scenario);
assert.doesNotMatch(r.callback.text, /JWT|signature|claim|openid|stack/i, `${scenario}: the page explains too much`);
assert.notEqual(await me(r.newCookie ?? r.cookie), 200, `${scenario}: signed in anyway`);
}
assert.equal((await db.select().from(tables.users)).some((u) => u.oidcSub === "mallory"), false, "an account was created for a forged identity");
});
test("a token signed with the wrong key is refused — which the OIDC library alone would not have done", async () => {
const r = await signIn("badsig", "mallory");
assert.equal(r.callback.status, 400);
const entry = (await auditEntries("login_failed")).map((e) => JSON.parse(e.detail!)).find((d) => /signature/i.test(d.error ?? ""));
assert.ok(entry, "the audit entry should say the signature didn't verify");
});
test("a wrong state is refused", async () => {
const r = await signIn("good", "mallory", { tamperState: true });
assert.equal(r.callback.status, 400);
assert.notEqual(await me(r.cookie), 200);
});
test("a failed sign-in is in the audit log, with where it came from and no secrets", async () => {
const before = (await auditEntries("login_failed")).length;
await signIn("wrongaud", "mallory", { ip: "203.0.113.7" });
const entries = await auditEntries("login_failed");
assert.equal(entries.length, before + 1);
const latest = entries.at(-1)!;
assert.equal(latest.category, "session");
const detail = JSON.parse(latest.detail!);
assert.equal(detail.ip, "203.0.113.7");
assert.equal(detail.reason, "provider_rejected");
assert.doesNotMatch(latest.detail!, /eyJ|secret|code=/i, "a token or code ended up in the audit log");
});
test("a stale callback page is explained, but isn't written to the audit log", async () => {
const before = (await auditEntries("login_failed")).length;
const r = await call("GET", "/auth/callback?code=x&state=y");
assert.equal(r.status, 400);
assert.match(r.text, /Sign-in failed/);
assert.equal((await auditEntries("login_failed")).length, before);
});
test("the session id changes at sign-in, so a planted one is worthless", async () => {
const planted = sidOf((await call("GET", "/auth/login")).headers["set-cookie"])!;
const victim = await signIn("good", "victim", { cookie: planted });
assert.ok(victim.newCookie, "no new session cookie was issued at sign-in");
assert.notEqual(victim.newCookie, planted);
assert.equal(await me(victim.newCookie!), 200);
assert.notEqual(await me(planted), 200, "the planted session id was signed in as the victim");
});
test("a callback can't be replayed", async () => {
const r = await signIn("good", "bob");
const again = await call("GET", r.callback.headers.location === "/" ? new URL(r.authUrl.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")!).pathname + "?code=x&state=y" : "/", { cookie: r.newCookie });
assert.equal(again.status, 400);
});
test("sign-in is rate limited per address, and one address doesn't affect another", async () => {
const noisy = "198.51.100.9";
const statuses: number[] = [];
for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) statuses.push((await call("GET", "/auth/login", { ip: noisy })).status);
assert.ok(statuses.includes(429), `no 429 in ${statuses.join(",")}`);
assert.equal(statuses[0], 302);
const limited = await call("GET", "/auth/login", { ip: noisy });
assert.equal(limited.status, 429);
assert.ok(Number(limited.headers["retry-after"]) > 0);
assert.equal((await call("GET", "/auth/login", { ip: "198.51.100.10" })).status, 302);
});
});
describe("requests from another origin", { skip: !haveOpenssl }, () => {
let adminCookie = "";
let serverId = 0;
const rotate = (headers: Record<string, string>) => call("POST", `/api/servers/${serverId}/rotate-token`, { cookie: adminCookie, headers });
const tokenHash = async () => (await db.select().from(tables.servers))[0].apiTokenHash;
before(async () => {
adminCookie = (await signIn("good", "alice")).newCookie!; // alice is the admin created above
const { generateApiToken } = await import("../src/services/tokens.js");
const { prefix, hash } = generateApiToken();
serverId = (await db.insert(tables.servers).values({ name: "victim-host", apiTokenHash: hash, apiTokenPrefix: prefix }).returning())[0].id;
});
test("a body-less POST from a sibling site is refused and does nothing", async () => {
const before = await tokenHash();
for (const site of ["same-site", "cross-site"]) {
const r = await rotate({ origin: "http://other-app.homelab.lan", "sec-fetch-site": site, "sec-fetch-mode": "no-cors" });
assert.equal(r.status, 403, `${site}: ${r.text}`);
assert.match(r.text, /cross_origin_request/);
}
assert.equal(await tokenHash(), before, "the token was rotated by a request from another origin");
});
test("the app's own pages still work (same-origin, or typed into the address bar)", async () => {
assert.equal((await rotate({ "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin", origin: "http://127.0.0.1:" + appPort })).status, 200);
assert.equal((await rotate({ "sec-fetch-site": "none" })).status, 200);
});
test("without Sec-Fetch-Site the Origin decides; no Origin at all means a script, not a browser", async () => {
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "http://evil.example" })).status, 403);
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "null" })).status, 403, "an opaque origin (a sandboxed frame) isn't this app");
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "http://127.0.0.1:" + appPort })).status, 200, "the host the browser reached");
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "http://app.test" })).status, 200, "the configured APP_BASE_URL");
assert.equal((await rotate({})).status, 200, "curl, no browser headers");
});
test("reading is never blocked", async () => {
const r = await call("GET", "/api/me", { cookie: adminCookie, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } });
assert.equal(r.status, 200);
});
test("signing out from another page is refused, from the app itself it works", async () => {
const victim = (await signIn("good", "bob")).newCookie!;
const evil = await call("GET", "/auth/logout", { cookie: victim, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site", "sec-fetch-dest": "image" } });
assert.equal(evil.status, 403);
assert.equal(await me(victim), 200, "a cross-site request signed the user out");
const own = await call("GET", "/auth/logout", { cookie: victim, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin" } });
assert.equal(own.status, 302);
assert.notEqual(await me(victim), 200);
});
test("the agent endpoint, which uses a token and not a cookie, is not affected", async () => {
// Its own server and token: the rotate-token tests above change the shared one.
const { generateApiToken } = await import("../src/services/tokens.js");
const { token: agentToken, prefix, hash } = generateApiToken();
await db.insert(tables.servers).values({ name: "agent-host", apiTokenHash: hash, apiTokenPrefix: prefix });
const r = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {
const body = JSON.stringify({ hostname: "victim-host", tasks: [] });
const req = http.request(
{ host: "127.0.0.1", port: appPort, method: "POST", path: "/api/agent/report", headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${agentToken}`, "content-type": "application/json", "content-length": String(Buffer.byteLength(body)), "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } },
(res) => {
res.resume();
res.on("end", () => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
},
);
req.on("error", reject);
req.end(body);
});
assert.equal(r, 202);
});
});
describe("headers", { skip: !haveOpenssl }, () => {
test("every response says it can't be framed or sniffed, and doesn't name the framework", async () => {
for (const path of ["/health", "/api/me", "/auth/login", "/no-such-page"]) {
const r = await call("GET", path);
assert.equal(r.headers["content-security-policy"], "frame-ancestors 'none'", path);
assert.equal(r.headers["x-frame-options"], "DENY", path);
assert.equal(r.headers["x-content-type-options"], "nosniff", path);
assert.equal(r.headers["referrer-policy"], "same-origin", path);
assert.equal(r.headers["x-powered-by"], undefined, path);
}
});
});
describe("session secret", () => {
test("production refuses to run without one, and warns about a weak one", () => {
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret(undefined, "production").fatal);
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret("", "production").fatal);
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret(SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER, "production").warning);
assert.equal(checkSessionSecret(SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER, "production").fatal, undefined, "an existing install must not be locked out by an upgrade");
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret("short", "production").warning);
assert.deepEqual(checkSessionSecret("a".repeat(64), "production"), {});
assert.deepEqual(checkSessionSecret(undefined, "development"), {}, "development may use the built-in default");
});
});