Harden the login flow: new session at sign-in, signed ID tokens, same-origin requests, headers
From an audit of the Authentik login, run against a fake OIDC provider: - Session fixation: the session id wasn't changed at sign-in, so one planted beforehand (from another page on the domain) became signed in as the victim. It is regenerated now. - Requests from another origin: SameSite=Lax doesn't stop another app on the same parent domain, and a body-less POST (stop a guest, rotate a token) needs no preflight. Every POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE, and GET /auth/logout, is refused when Sec-Fetch-Site (or, for older browsers, Origin) says it came from elsewhere. The agent endpoint is exempt: it uses a token. - ID token signature: openid-client checks a token's claims but, as OIDC allows for a token from the token endpoint, not its signature, so the login rested on HTTPS to Authentik alone. The signature is now verified against the provider's published keys (jose, now a declared dependency). - SESSION_SECRET: production refuses to start without one (the fallback is in the source code) and warns when it is the .env.example placeholder or short. - Response headers: frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy; the framework name is no longer sent. - A failed sign-in shows a plain page and is audited (session / login_failed, with address and reason, no tokens); sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address so the audit log and session store can't be flooded. - A failed OIDC discovery (provider down at the first sign-in) was remembered until restart; it is retried now. Tests run the real app against the fake provider; switching each fix off in turn makes the matching tests fail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
73b86d88de
commit
2dac273b1d
12 files changed
+676
-13
No files matched your search
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ APP_BASE_URL=https://homelab.example.lan
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
# Random long string used to sign session cookies. Generate with:
|
# Random long string used to sign session cookies. Generate with:
|
||||||
# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))"
|
# node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))"
|
||||||
|
# Required in production: without it the app refuses to start (the alternative is a value that is
|
||||||
|
# in the source code). Changing it signs everyone out.
|
||||||
SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string
|
SESSION_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# 32-byte (64 hex char) key used to encrypt stored integration API tokens, and the
|
# 32-byte (64 hex char) key used to encrypt stored integration API tokens, and the
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -232,6 +232,18 @@ relatives), and connect to the address they checked rather than looking the name
|
|||||||
checks and scans; a WHOIS server must be public. IDs in a request (a device, a node, a DNS record) are checked against what a real ID
|
checks and scans; a WHOIS server must be public. IDs in a request (a device, a node, a DNS record) are checked against what a real ID
|
||||||
looks like before they go into a call to a connected system. `npm test --workspace server` covers all of this.
|
looks like before they go into a call to a connected system. `npm test --workspace server` covers all of this.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Signing in** — through Authentik (OpenID Connect) with PKCE and a random `state`. The ID token's signature is checked against Authentik's
|
||||||
|
published keys, not just its contents, so the login doesn't rest on the connection to Authentik alone. A new session id is issued at sign-in. A
|
||||||
|
request that changes something is refused when it comes from another origin: the session cookie is SameSite=Lax, which doesn't stop another app on
|
||||||
|
the same parent domain, so the server also checks where each such request came from. A failed sign-in shows a plain message and is written to the
|
||||||
|
audit log (as `session` / `login_failed`, with the address and a short reason), and sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address.
|
||||||
|
Every response carries `frame-ancestors 'none'`, `X-Frame-Options`, `nosniff` and a no-referrer-to-other-sites policy. In production the app
|
||||||
|
refuses to start without a `SESSION_SECRET`, and warns if it is still the placeholder from `.env.example`.
|
||||||
|
Things to know: the first account to sign in becomes admin, so sign in yourself first on a new install. A session lasts up to 7 days after last use,
|
||||||
|
and disabling someone in Authentik does not end it — delete them on the Users page (or revoke the session on the Sessions page) and it ends at once.
|
||||||
|
If Authentik uses a certificate from an internal CA, point Node at the CA with `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/path/to/ca.pem` rather than turning verification
|
||||||
|
off with `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
**Privacy** — a page every signed-in user can open that says what this
|
**Privacy** — a page every signed-in user can open that says what this
|
||||||
installation stores (accounts, sign-in sessions with their IP and browser, the audit
|
installation stores (accounts, sign-in sessions with their IP and browser, the audit
|
||||||
and diagnostic logs, server reports, the secrets tracker, credentials), where data
|
and diagnostic logs, server reports, the secrets tracker, credentials), where data
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Generated
+1
@@ -5002,6 +5002,7 @@
|
|||||||
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
|
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
|
||||||
"express": "^4.21.2",
|
"express": "^4.21.2",
|
||||||
"express-session": "^1.18.1",
|
"express-session": "^1.18.1",
|
||||||
|
"jose": "^6.2.12",
|
||||||
"mysql2": "^3.24.5",
|
"mysql2": "^3.24.5",
|
||||||
"node-schedule": "^2.1.1",
|
"node-schedule": "^2.1.1",
|
||||||
"nodemailer": "^6.9.14",
|
"nodemailer": "^6.9.14",
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
|
|||||||
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
|
"drizzle-orm": "^0.45.2",
|
||||||
"express": "^4.21.2",
|
"express": "^4.21.2",
|
||||||
"express-session": "^1.18.1",
|
"express-session": "^1.18.1",
|
||||||
|
"jose": "^6.2.12",
|
||||||
"mysql2": "^3.24.5",
|
"mysql2": "^3.24.5",
|
||||||
"node-schedule": "^2.1.1",
|
"node-schedule": "^2.1.1",
|
||||||
"nodemailer": "^6.9.14",
|
"nodemailer": "^6.9.14",
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
|||||||
|
import * as client from "openid-client";
|
||||||
|
import { createRemoteJWKSet, jwtVerify } from "jose";
|
||||||
|
import { env } from "../env.js";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const keySets = new WeakMap<client.Configuration, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Checks the ID token's signature against the keys the identity provider publishes.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* openid-client already checks the token's claims (issuer, audience, expiry, subject) but, as OpenID Connect allows for a token
|
||||||
|
* received straight from the token endpoint, not its signature: it takes the HTTPS connection to the provider as proof of where
|
||||||
|
* the token came from. That makes the whole login only as strong as that connection — if certificate checking toward the
|
||||||
|
* provider is ever switched off (the usual way to cope with an internal CA is NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0), anyone on the
|
||||||
|
* network path could hand the app a token naming any user, the admin included. Verifying the signature as well means a weakened
|
||||||
|
* connection no longer lets a forged login through.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Throws if the signature is wrong or the provider publishes no keys.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
export async function verifyIdTokenSignature(config: client.Configuration, idToken: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||||
|
const metadata = config.serverMetadata();
|
||||||
|
if (!metadata.jwks_uri) throw new Error("The identity provider publishes no signing keys (no jwks_uri).");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let keys = keySets.get(config);
|
||||||
|
if (!keys) {
|
||||||
|
// Fetched on demand and cached; an unknown key id (the provider rotated its key) triggers a re-fetch.
|
||||||
|
keys = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(metadata.jwks_uri));
|
||||||
|
keySets.set(config, keys);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
await jwtVerify(idToken, keys, {
|
||||||
|
issuer: metadata.issuer,
|
||||||
|
audience: env.authentik.clientId,
|
||||||
|
// The one algorithm openid-client itself accepts unless told otherwise, so this can't turn away a token the library would take.
|
||||||
|
algorithms: [config.clientMetadata().id_token_signed_response_alg ?? "RS256"],
|
||||||
|
clockTolerance: 60,
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ export function getOidcConfig(): Promise<client.Configuration> {
|
|||||||
env.authentik.clientId,
|
env.authentik.clientId,
|
||||||
env.authentik.clientSecret,
|
env.authentik.clientSecret,
|
||||||
);
|
);
|
||||||
|
// If the provider was unreachable this time, try again on the next sign-in — not never, until the app is restarted.
|
||||||
|
configPromise.catch(() => {
|
||||||
|
configPromise = null;
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
return configPromise;
|
return configPromise;
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
+69
-13
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||||||
import { Router } from "express";
|
import { Router, type Request, type Response } from "express";
|
||||||
import * as client from "openid-client";
|
import * as client from "openid-client";
|
||||||
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
|
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
|
||||||
import { getOidcConfig } from "./oidc.js";
|
import { getOidcConfig } from "./oidc.js";
|
||||||
@@ -7,12 +7,54 @@ import { env } from "../env.js";
|
|||||||
import { db } from "../db/client.js";
|
import { db } from "../db/client.js";
|
||||||
import { users } from "../db/schema.js";
|
import { users } from "../db/schema.js";
|
||||||
import { recordAudit } from "../services/audit.js";
|
import { recordAudit } from "../services/audit.js";
|
||||||
|
import { verifyIdTokenSignature } from "./idToken.js";
|
||||||
|
import { rateLimit } from "../utils/rateLimit.js";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
export const authRouter = Router();
|
export const authRouter = Router();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
authRouter.get("/login", async (req, res, next) => {
|
// Anyone can reach these two without an account. Each visit to /login starts a session and each failed callback is written to the
|
||||||
|
// audit log, so without a limit one script could fill the disk and the log.
|
||||||
|
const signInLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 60_000, max: 20, message: "Too many sign-in attempts. Wait a minute and try again." });
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const SIGN_IN_FAILED_PAGE = `<!doctype html>
|
||||||
|
<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"><title>Sign-in failed</title></head>
|
||||||
|
<body style="font-family: system-ui, sans-serif; max-width: 32rem; margin: 4rem auto; padding: 0 1rem; line-height: 1.5">
|
||||||
|
<h1>Sign-in failed</h1>
|
||||||
|
<p>Something went wrong while signing you in. <a href="/auth/login">Try again</a>.</p>
|
||||||
|
<p>If it keeps failing, ask an administrator to look at the audit log.</p>
|
||||||
|
</body></html>`;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* A sign-in that didn't work: the person gets a plain explanation (never the reason — that tells an attacker what to adjust),
|
||||||
|
* and the reason goes to the server log and, unless it's just a stale page, the audit log.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
async function failSignIn(req: Request, res: Response, reason: string, err?: unknown, options: { audit?: boolean } = {}) {
|
||||||
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : err === undefined ? undefined : String(err);
|
||||||
|
console.error(`[auth] sign-in failed (${reason})${message ? `: ${message}` : ""}`);
|
||||||
|
if (options.audit !== false) {
|
||||||
try {
|
try {
|
||||||
const config = await getOidcConfig();
|
await recordAudit({
|
||||||
|
category: "session",
|
||||||
|
action: "login_failed",
|
||||||
|
targetType: "auth",
|
||||||
|
detail: { reason, ...(message ? { error: message.slice(0, 200) } : {}), ip: req.ip },
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
} catch (auditErr) {
|
||||||
|
console.error("[auth] couldn't record the failed sign-in:", auditErr);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
delete req.session.pendingAuth; // a failed attempt's state and verifier can't be tried again
|
||||||
|
res.status(400).type("html").send(SIGN_IN_FAILED_PAGE);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
authRouter.get("/login", signInLimiter, async (req, res, next) => {
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
let config;
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
config = await getOidcConfig();
|
||||||
|
} catch (err) {
|
||||||
|
return await failSignIn(req, res, "provider_unreachable", err);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
const codeVerifier = client.randomPKCECodeVerifier();
|
const codeVerifier = client.randomPKCECodeVerifier();
|
||||||
const codeChallenge = await client.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(codeVerifier);
|
const codeChallenge = await client.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(codeVerifier);
|
||||||
const state = client.randomState();
|
const state = client.randomState();
|
||||||
@@ -37,24 +79,33 @@ authRouter.get("/login", async (req, res, next) => {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
authRouter.get("/callback", async (req, res, next) => {
|
authRouter.get("/callback", signInLimiter, async (req, res, next) => {
|
||||||
try {
|
try {
|
||||||
const pending = req.session.pendingAuth;
|
const pending = req.session.pendingAuth;
|
||||||
if (!pending) {
|
if (!pending) {
|
||||||
return res.status(400).send("Login session expired. Please try signing in again.");
|
// A page left open, or the callback address visited by hand: not worth an audit entry.
|
||||||
|
return await failSignIn(req, res, "no_pending_login", undefined, { audit: false });
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const config = await getOidcConfig();
|
let config;
|
||||||
|
let tokens;
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
config = await getOidcConfig();
|
||||||
const currentUrl = new URL(req.originalUrl, env.appBaseUrl);
|
const currentUrl = new URL(req.originalUrl, env.appBaseUrl);
|
||||||
|
tokens = await client.authorizationCodeGrant(config, currentUrl, {
|
||||||
const tokens = await client.authorizationCodeGrant(config, currentUrl, {
|
|
||||||
pkceCodeVerifier: pending.codeVerifier,
|
pkceCodeVerifier: pending.codeVerifier,
|
||||||
expectedState: pending.state,
|
expectedState: pending.state,
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
if (!tokens.id_token) throw new Error("The identity provider returned no ID token.");
|
||||||
|
// Not just the claims: the signature too, so the login doesn't rest on the connection to the provider alone.
|
||||||
|
await verifyIdTokenSignature(config, tokens.id_token);
|
||||||
|
} catch (err) {
|
||||||
|
return await failSignIn(req, res, "provider_rejected", err);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const claims = tokens.claims();
|
const claims = tokens.claims();
|
||||||
if (!claims?.sub) {
|
if (!claims?.sub) {
|
||||||
return res.status(400).send("Identity provider did not return a valid identity.");
|
return await failSignIn(req, res, "no_identity");
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
let email: string | undefined = typeof claims.email === "string" ? claims.email : undefined;
|
let email: string | undefined = typeof claims.email === "string" ? claims.email : undefined;
|
||||||
@@ -90,8 +141,7 @@ authRouter.get("/callback", async (req, res, next) => {
|
|||||||
detail: { name: user.name ?? user.email ?? user.oidcSub, ip: req.ip },
|
detail: { name: user.name ?? user.email ?? user.oidcSub, ip: req.ip },
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
delete req.session.pendingAuth;
|
const signedIn = {
|
||||||
req.session.user = {
|
|
||||||
sub: claims.sub,
|
sub: claims.sub,
|
||||||
email,
|
email,
|
||||||
name,
|
name,
|
||||||
@@ -99,10 +149,16 @@ authRouter.get("/callback", async (req, res, next) => {
|
|||||||
ip: req.ip,
|
ip: req.ip,
|
||||||
userAgent: req.headers["user-agent"],
|
userAgent: req.headers["user-agent"],
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
req.session.save((err) => {
|
// A new session id for the signed-in session. Reusing the one the browser arrived with would let anyone who had planted that
|
||||||
if (err) return next(err);
|
// id beforehand (from another page on the same domain, say) be signed in as whoever then completes the login.
|
||||||
|
req.session.regenerate((regenerateErr) => {
|
||||||
|
if (regenerateErr) return next(regenerateErr);
|
||||||
|
req.session.user = signedIn;
|
||||||
|
req.session.save((saveErr) => {
|
||||||
|
if (saveErr) return next(saveErr);
|
||||||
res.redirect("/");
|
res.redirect("/");
|
||||||
});
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
} catch (err) {
|
} catch (err) {
|
||||||
next(err);
|
next(err);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -19,6 +19,31 @@ export const env = {
|
|||||||
},
|
},
|
||||||
};
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/** What .env.example ships with. Anyone who read the repository knows it. */
|
||||||
|
export const SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER = "change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Whether the session secret is fit to run production with. Missing is fatal (the app would fall back to a value in its own
|
||||||
|
* source code); the placeholder from .env.example or something short is a warning, not a refusal, so an existing install
|
||||||
|
* that has been running with one isn't locked out by an upgrade.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
export function checkSessionSecret(value: string | undefined, nodeEnv: string): { fatal?: string; warning?: string } {
|
||||||
|
if (nodeEnv !== "production") return {};
|
||||||
|
if (!value) {
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
fatal:
|
||||||
|
"SESSION_SECRET is not set. Sessions would be signed with a value that is public (it is in the source code). " +
|
||||||
|
"Set it to a long random string, e.g. node -e \"console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))\" " +
|
||||||
|
"(everyone is signed out when it changes).",
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (value === SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER) {
|
||||||
|
return { warning: "SESSION_SECRET is still the placeholder from .env.example, which is public. Replace it with a random value (everyone is signed out when it changes)." };
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (value.length < 32) return { warning: "SESSION_SECRET is shorter than 32 characters. Use a long random value." };
|
||||||
|
return {};
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
export function warnIfAuthNotConfigured() {
|
export function warnIfAuthNotConfigured() {
|
||||||
if (!env.authEnabled) {
|
if (!env.authEnabled) {
|
||||||
console.warn(
|
console.warn(
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|||||||
|
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* A small fixed-window limiter, per client address. It exists for the sign-in endpoints, which anyone can reach without an
|
||||||
|
* account: each visit to /auth/login starts a session, and each failed callback is written to the audit log, so without a
|
||||||
|
* limit one script could fill the disk and the log. Kept in memory — a restart clears it, which is fine for this.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
export function rateLimit(options: { windowMs: number; max: number; message: string }) {
|
||||||
|
const windows = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
|
||||||
|
const now = Date.now();
|
||||||
|
const key = req.ip ?? "unknown";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (windows.size > 10_000) {
|
||||||
|
for (const [k, w] of windows) if (w.resetAt <= now) windows.delete(k);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let entry = windows.get(key);
|
||||||
|
if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= now) {
|
||||||
|
entry = { count: 0, resetAt: now + options.windowMs };
|
||||||
|
windows.set(key, entry);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
entry.count++;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if (entry.count > options.max) {
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("Retry-After", String(Math.ceil((entry.resetAt - now) / 1000)));
|
||||||
|
return res.status(429).type("text/plain").send(options.message);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
next();
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
|||||||
|
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
|
||||||
|
import { env } from "../env.js";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Refuses a request that changes something when it was made by a page on another origin.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* The session cookie is SameSite=Lax, which stops *other sites* from sending it. It does not stop another app on the same
|
||||||
|
* parent domain (dockge.home.lan against hm.home.lan is "same site"), and a POST with no body — stop a guest, restart a
|
||||||
|
* container, rotate a token — needs no preflight and does exactly what it says. So the server asks the browser where the request
|
||||||
|
* came from.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Modern browsers say so in Sec-Fetch-Site, and a page can't change it. For anything older, a browser always sends Origin
|
||||||
|
* with a cross-origin POST, so a request whose Origin isn't this app is refused. A request with neither header isn't from a
|
||||||
|
* browser (curl, a script) and has no ambient cookie to abuse, so it passes.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Covered: every POST, PUT, PATCH and DELETE, and GET /auth/logout (signing someone out from another page is a
|
||||||
|
* nuisance, and it also ends their Authentik session). Not covered: the OIDC callback, which is a GET that
|
||||||
|
* legitimately arrives from the identity provider, and the agent endpoint, which uses a token and is mounted ahead of this.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
export function sameOriginGuard(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
|
||||||
|
const changesSomething = !["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"].includes(req.method) || (req.method === "GET" && req.path === "/auth/logout");
|
||||||
|
if (!changesSomething) return next();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const site = req.get("sec-fetch-site");
|
||||||
|
if (site !== undefined) {
|
||||||
|
if (site === "same-origin" || site === "none") return next();
|
||||||
|
return refuse(res);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const origin = req.get("origin");
|
||||||
|
if (origin === undefined) return next();
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
const host = new URL(origin).host;
|
||||||
|
const own = [req.get("host"), req.get("x-forwarded-host"), new URL(env.appBaseUrl).host];
|
||||||
|
if (own.includes(host)) return next();
|
||||||
|
} catch {
|
||||||
|
// an Origin that isn't a URL ("null", from a sandboxed frame) is not ours either
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return refuse(res);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function refuse(res: Response) {
|
||||||
|
return res.status(403).json({ error: "cross_origin_request", message: "This request came from a different origin than the app, so it was refused." });
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|||||||
|
import type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from "express";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Headers every response carries. Deliberately small: a full Content-Security-Policy would have to be tuned to the UI's own
|
||||||
|
* styles and scripts, and a wrong one breaks the app.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* - frame-ancestors 'none' / X-Frame-Options: nobody can put this app in a frame on another site and have someone click
|
||||||
|
* through it (the old header is for browsers that don't read the CSP one).
|
||||||
|
* - nosniff: a response is never reinterpreted as a different kind of file.
|
||||||
|
* - Referrer-Policy: the address of a page here isn't sent along when someone follows a link to another site — admin links
|
||||||
|
* and integration pages are exactly such links.
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* No Strict-Transport-Security: whether the app is only ever reached over HTTPS is for the reverse proxy in front of it to say.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
export function securityHeaders(_req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'");
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin");
|
||||||
|
next();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
|
|||||||
|
/**
|
||||||
|
* Regression tests for the login flow, run against a fake OpenID Connect provider (a small HTTPS server that signs real tokens —
|
||||||
|
* and, when asked, broken ones) and the real application from createApp().
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* - the ID token's signature is checked, not just its claims
|
||||||
|
* - a new session id is issued at sign-in (no session fixation)
|
||||||
|
* - a request that changes something, made from another origin, is refused
|
||||||
|
* - a failed sign-in gets a plain explanation and an audit entry, and sign-in is rate-limited
|
||||||
|
* - every response carries the anti-framing headers
|
||||||
|
* - the session secret is checked at startup
|
||||||
|
*
|
||||||
|
* Needs `openssl` (for the fake provider's throwaway certificate); skipped without it.
|
||||||
|
* Run with: npm test --workspace server
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
import { test, describe, before, after } from "node:test";
|
||||||
|
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||||
|
import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
|
||||||
|
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
||||||
|
import { join } from "node:path";
|
||||||
|
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
|
||||||
|
import https from "node:https";
|
||||||
|
import http from "node:http";
|
||||||
|
import crypto from "node:crypto";
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const haveOpenssl = spawnSync("openssl", ["version"]).status === 0;
|
||||||
|
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "hm-login-test-"));
|
||||||
|
process.env.DATABASE_PATH = join(dir, "test.sqlite");
|
||||||
|
process.env.SESSION_DIR = join(dir, "sessions");
|
||||||
|
process.env.CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "ab".repeat(32);
|
||||||
|
process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"; // the fake provider's certificate is self-signed and thrown away
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const CLIENT_ID = "hm-client";
|
||||||
|
const CLIENT_SECRET = "client-secret";
|
||||||
|
let issuerBase = "";
|
||||||
|
let failDiscovery = true; // the very first sign-in must find the provider down, to prove that isn't remembered forever
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ─── the fake provider ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type Provider = { server: https.Server; close: () => void };
|
||||||
|
let provider: Provider | null = null;
|
||||||
|
const codes = new Map<string, { scenario: string; challenge: string; sub: string }>();
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async function startProvider(): Promise<Provider> {
|
||||||
|
const jose = await import("jose");
|
||||||
|
const cert = spawnSync("openssl", ["req", "-x509", "-newkey", "rsa:2048", "-nodes", "-keyout", join(dir, "k.pem"), "-out", join(dir, "c.pem"), "-days", "1", "-subj", "//CN=localhost"], {
|
||||||
|
encoding: "utf8",
|
||||||
|
env: { ...process.env, MSYS_NO_PATHCONV: "1" },
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
if (cert.status !== 0) throw new Error(`openssl failed: ${cert.stderr}`);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const good = await jose.generateKeyPair("RS256");
|
||||||
|
const other = await jose.generateKeyPair("RS256");
|
||||||
|
const jwk = { ...(await jose.exportJWK(good.publicKey)), kid: "k1", alg: "RS256", use: "sig" };
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async function idToken(scenario: string, sub: string) {
|
||||||
|
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
|
||||||
|
const claims = { iss: issuerBase, aud: CLIENT_ID, exp: now + 600 };
|
||||||
|
let key = good.privateKey;
|
||||||
|
if (scenario === "badsig") key = other.privateKey;
|
||||||
|
if (scenario === "wrongiss") claims.iss = "https://evil.example/";
|
||||||
|
if (scenario === "wrongaud") claims.aud = "someone-elses-client";
|
||||||
|
if (scenario === "expired") claims.exp = now - 3600;
|
||||||
|
if (scenario === "none") {
|
||||||
|
// an unsigned token, the classic forgery
|
||||||
|
const b64 = (o: object) => Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(o)).toString("base64url");
|
||||||
|
return `${b64({ alg: "none", typ: "JWT" })}.${b64({ ...claims, sub, iat: now - 10 })}.`;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (scenario === "hs256") {
|
||||||
|
// signed with the client secret instead of the provider's key — not what the provider does, and not what the app expects
|
||||||
|
return new jose.SignJWT({}).setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" }).setIssuer(claims.iss).setAudience(claims.aud).setSubject(sub).setIssuedAt(now - 10).setExpirationTime(claims.exp).sign(new TextEncoder().encode(CLIENT_SECRET));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
let jwt = new jose.SignJWT({ email: `${sub}@example.test`, name: sub }).setProtectedHeader({ alg: "RS256", kid: "k1" }).setIssuer(claims.iss).setAudience(claims.aud).setIssuedAt(now - 10).setExpirationTime(claims.exp);
|
||||||
|
if (scenario !== "nosub") jwt = jwt.setSubject(sub);
|
||||||
|
return jwt.sign(key);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const server = https.createServer({ key: readFileSync(join(dir, "k.pem")), cert: readFileSync(join(dir, "c.pem")) }, async (req, res) => {
|
||||||
|
const url = new URL(req.url!, issuerBase);
|
||||||
|
const json = (o: unknown) => {
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("content-type", "application/json");
|
||||||
|
res.end(JSON.stringify(o));
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/.well-known/openid-configuration")) {
|
||||||
|
if (failDiscovery) {
|
||||||
|
res.statusCode = 503;
|
||||||
|
return res.end("down");
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
return json({
|
||||||
|
issuer: issuerBase, authorization_endpoint: issuerBase + "authorize", token_endpoint: issuerBase + "token", jwks_uri: issuerBase + "jwks",
|
||||||
|
userinfo_endpoint: issuerBase + "userinfo", end_session_endpoint: issuerBase + "end-session",
|
||||||
|
response_types_supported: ["code"], subject_types_supported: ["public"], id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"],
|
||||||
|
code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"], token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"],
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/jwks")) return json({ keys: [jwk] });
|
||||||
|
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/authorize")) {
|
||||||
|
const [scenario, sub] = (url.searchParams.get("login_hint") ?? "good|nobody").split("|");
|
||||||
|
const code = `${scenario}.${crypto.randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}`;
|
||||||
|
codes.set(code, { scenario, challenge: url.searchParams.get("code_challenge")!, sub });
|
||||||
|
const back = new URL(url.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")!);
|
||||||
|
back.searchParams.set("code", code);
|
||||||
|
back.searchParams.set("state", url.searchParams.get("state")!);
|
||||||
|
back.searchParams.set("iss", issuerBase);
|
||||||
|
res.statusCode = 302;
|
||||||
|
res.setHeader("location", back.href);
|
||||||
|
return res.end();
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/token") && req.method === "POST") {
|
||||||
|
let body = "";
|
||||||
|
for await (const c of req) body += c;
|
||||||
|
const form = new URLSearchParams(body);
|
||||||
|
const entry = codes.get(form.get("code") ?? "");
|
||||||
|
if (!entry) {
|
||||||
|
res.statusCode = 400;
|
||||||
|
return json({ error: "invalid_grant" });
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (crypto.createHash("sha256").update(form.get("code_verifier") ?? "").digest("base64url") !== entry.challenge) {
|
||||||
|
res.statusCode = 400;
|
||||||
|
return json({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "PKCE verification failed" });
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
codes.delete(form.get("code")!);
|
||||||
|
return json({ token_type: "Bearer", access_token: "at-" + entry.sub, expires_in: 300, id_token: await idToken(entry.scenario, entry.sub) });
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (url.pathname.endsWith("/userinfo")) {
|
||||||
|
const sub = (req.headers.authorization ?? "").replace(/^Bearer at-/, "");
|
||||||
|
return json({ sub, email: "from-userinfo@example.test", name: "From Userinfo" });
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
res.statusCode = 404;
|
||||||
|
res.end("nope");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
await new Promise<void>((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
|
||||||
|
issuerBase = `https://127.0.0.1:${(server.address() as { port: number }).port}/application/o/hm/`;
|
||||||
|
return { server, close: () => server.close() };
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// The app reads its configuration when its modules are first loaded, so the provider has to be up — and its address known —
|
||||||
|
// before anything from ../src is imported.
|
||||||
|
if (haveOpenssl) {
|
||||||
|
provider = await startProvider();
|
||||||
|
Object.assign(process.env, {
|
||||||
|
AUTHENTIK_ISSUER_URL: issuerBase,
|
||||||
|
AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_ID: CLIENT_ID,
|
||||||
|
AUTHENTIK_CLIENT_SECRET: CLIENT_SECRET,
|
||||||
|
APP_BASE_URL: "http://app.test",
|
||||||
|
SESSION_SECRET: "test-session-secret-that-is-long-enough",
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
const { SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER, checkSessionSecret } = await import("../src/env.js");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ─── the app ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let app: http.Server;
|
||||||
|
let appPort = 0;
|
||||||
|
let db: typeof import("../src/db/client.js")["db"];
|
||||||
|
let tables: typeof import("../src/db/schema.js");
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
type Res = { status: number; headers: http.IncomingHttpHeaders; text: string };
|
||||||
|
let ipCounter = 0;
|
||||||
|
const freshIp = () => `10.1.${Math.floor(++ipCounter / 250)}.${ipCounter % 250}`;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
function call(method: string, path: string, opts: { cookie?: string; headers?: Record<string, string>; ip?: string } = {}): Promise<Res> {
|
||||||
|
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||||
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = { "x-forwarded-for": opts.ip ?? freshIp(), ...opts.headers };
|
||||||
|
if (opts.cookie) headers.cookie = opts.cookie;
|
||||||
|
const req = http.request({ host: "127.0.0.1", port: appPort, method, path, headers }, (res) => {
|
||||||
|
let text = "";
|
||||||
|
res.on("data", (c) => (text += c));
|
||||||
|
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, headers: res.headers, text }));
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
req.on("error", reject);
|
||||||
|
req.end();
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
const sidOf = (setCookie?: string[]) => setCookie?.find((c) => c.startsWith("connect.sid="))?.split(";")[0];
|
||||||
|
const hopToProvider = (u: string) =>
|
||||||
|
new Promise<Res>((resolve, reject) =>
|
||||||
|
https.get(u, { rejectUnauthorized: false }, (res) => {
|
||||||
|
let text = "";
|
||||||
|
res.on("data", (c) => (text += c));
|
||||||
|
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, headers: res.headers, text }));
|
||||||
|
}).on("error", reject),
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/** The browser's part of the sign-in, done by hand, as one client address. */
|
||||||
|
async function signIn(scenario: string, sub: string, opts: { cookie?: string; tamperState?: boolean; ip?: string } = {}) {
|
||||||
|
const ip = opts.ip ?? freshIp();
|
||||||
|
const start = await call("GET", "/auth/login", { cookie: opts.cookie, ip });
|
||||||
|
const cookie = sidOf(start.headers["set-cookie"]) ?? opts.cookie!;
|
||||||
|
const authUrl = new URL(start.headers.location!);
|
||||||
|
authUrl.searchParams.set("login_hint", `${scenario}|${sub}`);
|
||||||
|
const back = new URL((await hopToProvider(authUrl.href)).headers.location!);
|
||||||
|
if (opts.tamperState) back.searchParams.set("state", "not-the-state");
|
||||||
|
// The provider sends the browser back from another site, so the callback arrives marked cross-site — and must still work.
|
||||||
|
const callback = await call("GET", back.pathname + back.search, { cookie, ip, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } });
|
||||||
|
return { cookie, callback, newCookie: sidOf(callback.headers["set-cookie"]), authUrl, loginResponse: start };
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
const me = async (cookie: string) => (await call("GET", "/api/me", { cookie })).status;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
before(async () => {
|
||||||
|
if (!haveOpenssl) return;
|
||||||
|
const { runMigrations } = await import("../src/db/migrate.js");
|
||||||
|
({ db } = await import("../src/db/client.js"));
|
||||||
|
tables = await import("../src/db/schema.js");
|
||||||
|
const { createApp } = await import("../src/app.js");
|
||||||
|
await runMigrations();
|
||||||
|
app = createApp().listen(0);
|
||||||
|
appPort = (app.address() as { port: number }).port;
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
after(() => {
|
||||||
|
app?.close();
|
||||||
|
provider?.close();
|
||||||
|
try {
|
||||||
|
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||||
|
} catch {
|
||||||
|
// Windows keeps the SQLite file locked until the process exits.
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
const auditEntries = async (action: string) => (await db.select().from(tables.auditLog)).filter((e) => e.action === action);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// ─── tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
describe("sign-in", { skip: !haveOpenssl }, () => {
|
||||||
|
test("an unreachable provider is a plain message — and isn't remembered once it's back", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const down = await call("GET", "/auth/login");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(down.status, 400, down.text);
|
||||||
|
assert.match(down.text, /Sign-in failed/);
|
||||||
|
assert.doesNotMatch(down.text, /503|ECONN|discovery|127\.0\.0\.1/i, "the page must not say why");
|
||||||
|
failDiscovery = false;
|
||||||
|
const up = await call("GET", "/auth/login");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(up.status, 302, "the first failure was cached and the provider is never asked again");
|
||||||
|
const entries = await auditEntries("login_failed");
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(entries.some((e) => JSON.parse(e.detail!).reason === "provider_unreachable"));
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("the authorization request uses PKCE, a random state, and a cookie scripts can't read", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const r = await call("GET", "/auth/login");
|
||||||
|
const u = new URL(r.headers.location!);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(u.searchParams.get("code_challenge_method"), "S256");
|
||||||
|
assert.ok((u.searchParams.get("state") ?? "").length >= 32);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(u.searchParams.get("scope"), "openid email profile");
|
||||||
|
const cookie = (r.headers["set-cookie"] ?? []).join(";");
|
||||||
|
assert.match(cookie, /HttpOnly/);
|
||||||
|
assert.match(cookie, /SameSite=Lax/);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a good sign-in works: the first account is admin, the next is a viewer, and the name comes from userinfo", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const first = await signIn("good", "alice");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(first.callback.status, 302);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(first.callback.headers.location, "/");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(await me(first.newCookie!), 200);
|
||||||
|
const second = await signIn("good", "bob");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(await me(second.newCookie!), 200);
|
||||||
|
const roles = Object.fromEntries((await db.select().from(tables.users)).map((u) => [u.oidcSub, u.role]));
|
||||||
|
assert.deepEqual(roles, { alice: "admin", bob: "viewer" });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await db.select().from(tables.users))[0].name, "From Userinfo");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("tokens that must never be believed leave nobody signed in, and the person gets a plain page", async () => {
|
||||||
|
for (const scenario of ["badsig", "wrongiss", "wrongaud", "expired", "nosub", "none", "hs256"]) {
|
||||||
|
const r = await signIn(scenario, "mallory");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.callback.status, 400, `${scenario}: ${r.callback.text.slice(0, 100)}`);
|
||||||
|
assert.match(r.callback.text, /Sign-in failed/, scenario);
|
||||||
|
assert.doesNotMatch(r.callback.text, /JWT|signature|claim|openid|stack/i, `${scenario}: the page explains too much`);
|
||||||
|
assert.notEqual(await me(r.newCookie ?? r.cookie), 200, `${scenario}: signed in anyway`);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await db.select().from(tables.users)).some((u) => u.oidcSub === "mallory"), false, "an account was created for a forged identity");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a token signed with the wrong key is refused — which the OIDC library alone would not have done", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const r = await signIn("badsig", "mallory");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.callback.status, 400);
|
||||||
|
const entry = (await auditEntries("login_failed")).map((e) => JSON.parse(e.detail!)).find((d) => /signature/i.test(d.error ?? ""));
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(entry, "the audit entry should say the signature didn't verify");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a wrong state is refused", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const r = await signIn("good", "mallory", { tamperState: true });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.callback.status, 400);
|
||||||
|
assert.notEqual(await me(r.cookie), 200);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a failed sign-in is in the audit log, with where it came from and no secrets", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const before = (await auditEntries("login_failed")).length;
|
||||||
|
await signIn("wrongaud", "mallory", { ip: "203.0.113.7" });
|
||||||
|
const entries = await auditEntries("login_failed");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(entries.length, before + 1);
|
||||||
|
const latest = entries.at(-1)!;
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(latest.category, "session");
|
||||||
|
const detail = JSON.parse(latest.detail!);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(detail.ip, "203.0.113.7");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(detail.reason, "provider_rejected");
|
||||||
|
assert.doesNotMatch(latest.detail!, /eyJ|secret|code=/i, "a token or code ended up in the audit log");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a stale callback page is explained, but isn't written to the audit log", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const before = (await auditEntries("login_failed")).length;
|
||||||
|
const r = await call("GET", "/auth/callback?code=x&state=y");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.status, 400);
|
||||||
|
assert.match(r.text, /Sign-in failed/);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await auditEntries("login_failed")).length, before);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("the session id changes at sign-in, so a planted one is worthless", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const planted = sidOf((await call("GET", "/auth/login")).headers["set-cookie"])!;
|
||||||
|
const victim = await signIn("good", "victim", { cookie: planted });
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(victim.newCookie, "no new session cookie was issued at sign-in");
|
||||||
|
assert.notEqual(victim.newCookie, planted);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(await me(victim.newCookie!), 200);
|
||||||
|
assert.notEqual(await me(planted), 200, "the planted session id was signed in as the victim");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a callback can't be replayed", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const r = await signIn("good", "bob");
|
||||||
|
const again = await call("GET", r.callback.headers.location === "/" ? new URL(r.authUrl.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")!).pathname + "?code=x&state=y" : "/", { cookie: r.newCookie });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(again.status, 400);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("sign-in is rate limited per address, and one address doesn't affect another", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const noisy = "198.51.100.9";
|
||||||
|
const statuses: number[] = [];
|
||||||
|
for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) statuses.push((await call("GET", "/auth/login", { ip: noisy })).status);
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(statuses.includes(429), `no 429 in ${statuses.join(",")}`);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(statuses[0], 302);
|
||||||
|
const limited = await call("GET", "/auth/login", { ip: noisy });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(limited.status, 429);
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(Number(limited.headers["retry-after"]) > 0);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await call("GET", "/auth/login", { ip: "198.51.100.10" })).status, 302);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
describe("requests from another origin", { skip: !haveOpenssl }, () => {
|
||||||
|
let adminCookie = "";
|
||||||
|
let serverId = 0;
|
||||||
|
const rotate = (headers: Record<string, string>) => call("POST", `/api/servers/${serverId}/rotate-token`, { cookie: adminCookie, headers });
|
||||||
|
const tokenHash = async () => (await db.select().from(tables.servers))[0].apiTokenHash;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
before(async () => {
|
||||||
|
adminCookie = (await signIn("good", "alice")).newCookie!; // alice is the admin created above
|
||||||
|
const { generateApiToken } = await import("../src/services/tokens.js");
|
||||||
|
const { prefix, hash } = generateApiToken();
|
||||||
|
serverId = (await db.insert(tables.servers).values({ name: "victim-host", apiTokenHash: hash, apiTokenPrefix: prefix }).returning())[0].id;
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("a body-less POST from a sibling site is refused and does nothing", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const before = await tokenHash();
|
||||||
|
for (const site of ["same-site", "cross-site"]) {
|
||||||
|
const r = await rotate({ origin: "http://other-app.homelab.lan", "sec-fetch-site": site, "sec-fetch-mode": "no-cors" });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.status, 403, `${site}: ${r.text}`);
|
||||||
|
assert.match(r.text, /cross_origin_request/);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(await tokenHash(), before, "the token was rotated by a request from another origin");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("the app's own pages still work (same-origin, or typed into the address bar)", async () => {
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({ "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin", origin: "http://127.0.0.1:" + appPort })).status, 200);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({ "sec-fetch-site": "none" })).status, 200);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("without Sec-Fetch-Site the Origin decides; no Origin at all means a script, not a browser", async () => {
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "http://evil.example" })).status, 403);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "null" })).status, 403, "an opaque origin (a sandboxed frame) isn't this app");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "http://127.0.0.1:" + appPort })).status, 200, "the host the browser reached");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({ origin: "http://app.test" })).status, 200, "the configured APP_BASE_URL");
|
||||||
|
assert.equal((await rotate({})).status, 200, "curl, no browser headers");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("reading is never blocked", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const r = await call("GET", "/api/me", { cookie: adminCookie, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.status, 200);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("signing out from another page is refused, from the app itself it works", async () => {
|
||||||
|
const victim = (await signIn("good", "bob")).newCookie!;
|
||||||
|
const evil = await call("GET", "/auth/logout", { cookie: victim, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site", "sec-fetch-dest": "image" } });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(evil.status, 403);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(await me(victim), 200, "a cross-site request signed the user out");
|
||||||
|
const own = await call("GET", "/auth/logout", { cookie: victim, headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin" } });
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(own.status, 302);
|
||||||
|
assert.notEqual(await me(victim), 200);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
test("the agent endpoint, which uses a token and not a cookie, is not affected", async () => {
|
||||||
|
// Its own server and token: the rotate-token tests above change the shared one.
|
||||||
|
const { generateApiToken } = await import("../src/services/tokens.js");
|
||||||
|
const { token: agentToken, prefix, hash } = generateApiToken();
|
||||||
|
await db.insert(tables.servers).values({ name: "agent-host", apiTokenHash: hash, apiTokenPrefix: prefix });
|
||||||
|
const r = await new Promise<number>((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||||
|
const body = JSON.stringify({ hostname: "victim-host", tasks: [] });
|
||||||
|
const req = http.request(
|
||||||
|
{ host: "127.0.0.1", port: appPort, method: "POST", path: "/api/agent/report", headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${agentToken}`, "content-type": "application/json", "content-length": String(Buffer.byteLength(body)), "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" } },
|
||||||
|
(res) => {
|
||||||
|
res.resume();
|
||||||
|
res.on("end", () => resolve(res.statusCode ?? 0));
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
);
|
||||||
|
req.on("error", reject);
|
||||||
|
req.end(body);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r, 202);
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
describe("headers", { skip: !haveOpenssl }, () => {
|
||||||
|
test("every response says it can't be framed or sniffed, and doesn't name the framework", async () => {
|
||||||
|
for (const path of ["/health", "/api/me", "/auth/login", "/no-such-page"]) {
|
||||||
|
const r = await call("GET", path);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.headers["content-security-policy"], "frame-ancestors 'none'", path);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.headers["x-frame-options"], "DENY", path);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.headers["x-content-type-options"], "nosniff", path);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.headers["referrer-policy"], "same-origin", path);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(r.headers["x-powered-by"], undefined, path);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
describe("session secret", () => {
|
||||||
|
test("production refuses to run without one, and warns about a weak one", () => {
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret(undefined, "production").fatal);
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret("", "production").fatal);
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret(SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER, "production").warning);
|
||||||
|
assert.equal(checkSessionSecret(SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER, "production").fatal, undefined, "an existing install must not be locked out by an upgrade");
|
||||||
|
assert.ok(checkSessionSecret("short", "production").warning);
|
||||||
|
assert.deepEqual(checkSessionSecret("a".repeat(64), "production"), {});
|
||||||
|
assert.deepEqual(checkSessionSecret(undefined, "development"), {}, "development may use the built-in default");
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user