Harden the login flow: new session at sign-in, signed ID tokens, same-origin requests, headers

From an audit of the Authentik login, run against a fake OIDC provider:

- Session fixation: the session id wasn't changed at sign-in, so one planted beforehand
  (from another page on the domain) became signed in as the victim. It is regenerated now.
- Requests from another origin: SameSite=Lax doesn't stop another app on the same parent
  domain, and a body-less POST (stop a guest, rotate a token) needs no preflight. Every
  POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE, and GET /auth/logout, is refused when Sec-Fetch-Site (or, for older
  browsers, Origin) says it came from elsewhere. The agent endpoint is exempt: it uses a token.
- ID token signature: openid-client checks a token's claims but, as OIDC allows for a token
  from the token endpoint, not its signature, so the login rested on HTTPS to Authentik
  alone. The signature is now verified against the provider's published keys (jose, now a
  declared dependency).
- SESSION_SECRET: production refuses to start without one (the fallback is in the source
  code) and warns when it is the .env.example placeholder or short.
- Response headers: frame-ancestors 'none', X-Frame-Options, nosniff, Referrer-Policy; the
  framework name is no longer sent.
- A failed sign-in shows a plain page and is audited (session / login_failed, with address
  and reason, no tokens); sign-in is limited to 20 attempts a minute per address so the
  audit log and session store can't be flooded.
- A failed OIDC discovery (provider down at the first sign-in) was remembered until restart;
  it is retried now.

Tests run the real app against the fake provider; switching each fix off in turn makes
the matching tests fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
bobbanandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-06 23:35:34 +02:00
1 parent 73b86d88de
commit 2dac273b1d
12 files changed
+681 -18

No files matched your search

+25
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,31 @@ export const env = {
},
};
/** What .env.example ships with. Anyone who read the repository knows it. */
export const SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER = "change-me-to-a-random-64-char-hex-string";
/**
* Whether the session secret is fit to run production with. Missing is fatal (the app would fall back to a value in its own
* source code); the placeholder from .env.example or something short is a warning, not a refusal, so an existing install
* that has been running with one isn't locked out by an upgrade.
*/
export function checkSessionSecret(value: string | undefined, nodeEnv: string): { fatal?: string; warning?: string } {
if (nodeEnv !== "production") return {};
if (!value) {
return {
fatal:
"SESSION_SECRET is not set. Sessions would be signed with a value that is public (it is in the source code). " +
"Set it to a long random string, e.g. node -e \"console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('hex'))\" " +
"(everyone is signed out when it changes).",
};
}
if (value === SESSION_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER) {
return { warning: "SESSION_SECRET is still the placeholder from .env.example, which is public. Replace it with a random value (everyone is signed out when it changes)." };
}
if (value.length < 32) return { warning: "SESSION_SECRET is shorter than 32 characters. Use a long random value." };
return {};
}
export function warnIfAuthNotConfigured() {
if (!env.authEnabled) {
console.warn(