From 047fcb403ee1a874a47b0cc53ea257fa6c20900e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bobban Rydh Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 22:05:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Harden the agents: keep the token off the command line, lock down their files Linux: the token went to curl as an argument, readable by any local user in the process list, and the reply was written to a fixed /tmp file that another user could replace with a symlink (the agent runs as root). The token now goes to curl on stdin, and the payload and reply live in a private mktemp directory that is removed afterwards. This also lifts the limit on a report's size that a command-line argument imposed. The systemd unit now runs with NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict, PrivateTmp and similar restrictions (it still sees every process, which is how it names the program behind a port). Windows: the SYSTEM task's folder was left to inherit ProgramData's permissions. It now gets explicit ones: SYSTEM and Administrators only. Installed agents keep their own copy of the script, so each server needs the install one-liner re-run to pick this up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 --- agent/linux/install.sh | 18 +++++++++++++++++ agent/linux/report-tasks.sh | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ agent/windows/install.ps1 | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/agent/linux/install.sh b/agent/linux/install.sh index a776960..04f12e3 100644 --- a/agent/linux/install.sh +++ b/agent/linux/install.sh @@ -88,6 +88,24 @@ Description=Report scheduled tasks to Homelab Manager Type=oneshot EnvironmentFile=$CONFIG_DIR/homelab-manager-agent.env ExecStart=$INSTALL_DIR/homelab-manager-agent.sh +# The agent only reads (crontabs, timers, /proc, listening sockets) and makes one HTTPS request, but it runs as root. These +# keep a bug in it, or in anything it parses, from being able to change the system. It still sees every process, which is +# how it names the program behind each listening port. Directives an older systemd doesn't know are ignored. +UMask=0077 +NoNewPrivileges=yes +PrivateTmp=yes +ProtectSystem=strict +ProtectHome=read-only +ProtectKernelTunables=yes +ProtectKernelModules=yes +ProtectKernelLogs=yes +ProtectControlGroups=yes +RestrictSUIDSGID=yes +RestrictRealtime=yes +RestrictNamespaces=yes +LockPersonality=yes +SystemCallArchitectures=native +RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_NETLINK EOF cat > "$SYSTEMD_DIR/homelab-manager-agent.timer" <>> post_report +# Sends $PAYLOAD to the server and prints the HTTP status code. +# +# Nothing sensitive goes on curl's command line: any user on this machine can read other processes' command lines, and the +# token would be there for the length of every report. So the token is handed to curl on its standard input, as a line of +# curl's own config format, and the payload and the server's reply go through files in a private directory (mktemp -d is +# readable by root only). A fixed name in /tmp is no good either — another user could plant a symlink there and have this +# script, running as root, overwrite whatever it points at. +curl_quote() { + local s=$1 + s=${s//\\/\\\\} + s=${s//\"/\\\"} + printf '%s' "$s" +} + +post_report() { + case "$API_TOKEN" in + *$'\n'*|*$'\r'*) echo "API_TOKEN must not contain a line break." >&2; return 1 ;; + esac + printf '%s' "$PAYLOAD" > "$HLM_TMPDIR/payload.json" + printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$(curl_quote "$API_TOKEN")" | curl -sS "${CURL_INSECURE_FLAG[@]}" -K - \ + -o "$HLM_TMPDIR/response.json" -w "%{http_code}" \ + -X POST "$API_URL/api/agent/report" \ + -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ + --data-binary @"$HLM_TMPDIR/payload.json" +} +# <<< post_report + +HLM_TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d) +trap 'rm -rf "$HLM_TMPDIR"' EXIT + +response=$(post_report) if [[ "$response" -lt 200 || "$response" -ge 300 ]]; then echo "Report failed with HTTP $response:" >&2 - cat /tmp/hlm-agent-response.json >&2 + cat "$HLM_TMPDIR/response.json" >&2 exit 1 fi diff --git a/agent/windows/install.ps1 b/agent/windows/install.ps1 index 84949cb..dac05d5 100644 --- a/agent/windows/install.ps1 +++ b/agent/windows/install.ps1 @@ -62,6 +62,16 @@ function Save-AgentConfig([string]$Path, [string]$ApiUrl, [string]$ApiToken, [bo [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Path, (ConvertTo-Json -InputObject $config), (New-Object System.Text.UTF8Encoding($false))) } +# The agent script runs as SYSTEM, so anyone who can change it can run code as SYSTEM. ProgramData's default lets any local user +# create files in a new subfolder, and a folder left to inherit that is only as safe as that default. So the folder is given +# explicit permissions: SYSTEM and Administrators, and nobody else - not even to read, since the agent doesn't need them to. +# $ExtraGrants (full icacls grants, e.g. "*S-1-5-21-...:(OI)(CI)(F)") exists only so a test that isn't elevated can keep access to its own folder. +function Protect-InstallDir([string]$Path, [string[]]$ExtraGrants = @()) { + $grants = @('*S-1-5-18:(OI)(CI)(F)', '*S-1-5-32-544:(OI)(CI)(F)') + $ExtraGrants + & icacls.exe $Path /inheritance:r /grant:r $grants | Out-Null + if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "Couldn't restrict permissions on $Path (icacls exit $LASTEXITCODE)." } +} + # The pieces of the scheduled task, built but not registered. function New-AgentTaskParts([string]$AgentScript, [int]$IntervalMinutes) { $argument = '-NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File "{0}"' -f $AgentScript @@ -97,6 +107,7 @@ function Install-Agent { Write-Output "Installing Homelab Manager agent from $apiUrl ..." New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $script:InstallDir | Out-Null + Protect-InstallDir $script:InstallDir $agentScript = Join-Path $script:InstallDir 'homelab-manager-agent.ps1' Save-Url "$apiUrl/agent/windows/report-tasks.ps1" $agentScript $insecure